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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: 
A CASE STUDY OF THE GREAT NORTH FOREST 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis reveals a number of difficulties for accountability in 
the partnership approach adopted in the implementation of sustainable 
development in the UK, and argues that these have serious implications 
for the success of such programmes. 
Environmental policy has grown in importance in recent decades and 
this has led to the emergence of the sustainable development concept 
which attempts to encourage economic growth along a less environmentally 
damaging path. There is, however, no consensus about how sustainable 
development can be achieved and views vary from the use of market forces 
to reliance on participation by communities. Therefore, understanding how 
sustainable development can be realised is best approached through 
examination of practical implementation. For this, the Great North Forest 
Project, one of twelve Community Forests currently being established 
around England, has been chosen as a suitable case study. 
At the Project's core is a formal organisation which merges into 
a more diffuse, wider network encompassing the many partners with an 
interest in the Project. The public sector has a major role in the 
Project but the resulting partnership arrangement is complex and 
confusing. Moreover, public sector accountability becomes more critical 
yet is diminished by the close working relationship between public, 
private and voluntary sectors. 
Managerial accountability is emphasised in the Project but close 
scrutiny reveals that its application is troublesome because of the 
multiple objectives and numerous participants. Information quality and 
information flow are poor, with the consequence that apparent success 
tends to be overblown, public cost underestimated, and value for money 
not properly attended to. Furthermore, the suitability of the 
organisation may not be adequaeely considered because accountability 
arrangements tend to concentrate attention on objectives. This thesis 
suggests that this may have serious implications for the successful 
achievement of sustainable development elsewhere; it also stimulates 
doubts about the implementation of other programmes involving complex 
partnership arrangements. 
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PREFACE 
Much of the research for this thesis was undertaken between the 
Summer of 1994 and Spring 1996. However, serious illness then made 
continuation impossible and work was suspended for two years to be 
finally completed a year later in Summer 1999. Considerable effort has 
been made to ensure that this inconvenient intermission has not adversely 
effected the final thesis, but if any discontinuity is apparent to the 
reader, this preface ensures that the reason may be understood. 
The research is based upon documents published by a wide range of 
bodies participating in the Great North Forest Project and publicly 
available. However, access was given to a number of internal documents 
which, for one reason or another, could only be inspected on request. 
Substantial use was also made of interviews with members of the Great 
North Forest 1 s Members Steering Group and Chief Officer Groups, conducted 
in 1995 and 1996. These interviews were open ended and, to encourage 
interviewees to be as frank as possible, it was agreed that their 
comments would be 'off the record'. Consequently, views expressed in the 
text have been attributed to individuals in a general way to avoid 
placing them in an awkward or embarrassing position. Where necessary, 
correspondence with members and officers of relevant public bodies and 
other organisations helped to clarify matters and to elicit information 
not available in documentary form. 
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CHAPTER l 
THIE ENVIRONMENT 
. ' 
SU~STAI!NABLE DEVE,LOPM!ENT 
AND 
THE ·GREAT NORTH FOREST 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing tendency for the administration of public policy 
in the United Kingdom and elsewhere to be undertaken less by clearly 
defined and hierarchical organisations and more by, what are best 
described as, complex organisations. These organisations are flexible, 
decentralised, have multiple aims and include many groups contributing 
to decision making and participating in implementation. 1 Arguably, they 
are ideally suited to expansive areas of policy like the environment and, 
specifically, the vital matter of implementing sustainable development. 
It is unfortunate, then, that the more complex organisations become, the 
more difficult it is to identify and enforce responsibility; yet the more 
important it is to do so. 
This thesis reflects upon the affinity between the implementation 
of sustainable development and the nature of complex organisations. Some 
important features of complex organisations are then examined through a 
study of a specific sustainable development initiative, the Great North 
Forest (GNF) Project which is currently underway in the north-east of 
England. The crucial role of the public sector in implementing 
sustainable development is central to the study. However, the public 
sector bodies involved in this Project are many and frequently distant 
from central and local government. They also work in partnership with 
numerous participating private and voluntary sector bodies and the 
complexity of this arrangement has serious implications for 
accountability. The study raises questions about contemporary views of 
accountability and the difficulties presented by complex organisations, 
which are of fundamental importance to the success of sustainable 
development. The implementation of public policies for the environment 
has attracted little academic attention; it is therefore hoped that the 
findings of this study may advance the understanding of this significant 
and growing area in public administration. 
1 . 2. THE ENVIRONMENT 
The term 'environment' has become something of a commonplace in the 
1 This term has most recently been used by Mark Bovens to describe a wide variety of public and private 
organisations that have e1erged over recent years. The organisations described here are bot a part of 
the larger group of complex organisations described by Bovens. The Ouest for Responsibility: 
Accountability and Citizenship in Co1plex Organisations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
pp.10-11. 
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last quarter of the 20th Century, leading to a neglect in attention to 
its meaning. At its simplest, the environment refers to the objects or 
region surrounding something, coming, as it does, from the Old French 
'environner', meaning 'to surround'. In the context used here, it could 
be taken to refer to man's natural surroundings. Arguably however, 'there 
is no such thing as "nature" unmeditated by human beings, and therefore 
no great difference between the urban environment and the environment 
created by farmed land or deforestation': all environments are the result 
of the economic and social relations that underlie them. 2 So the term 
environment can refer to man's natural surroundings, if any such thing 
still exists; but may include the built environment, that is the 
buildings and other edifices that man has constructed; and the cultural 
environment, the less obvious of man's constructs like social, economic 
and political systems, even religion. 3 The environment, in conclusion, 
is an ill defined term: it is simply 'where we all live', but clearly it 
'does not exist as a sphere separate from human actions, ambitions, and 
needs'. 4 
Concern about environmental degradation is not new. It is claimed, 
for example, that Britain had the earliest piece of environmental 
regulation in the form of a decree, issued by Edward I in 1273, 
prohibiting the burning of sea coal. By the 17th Century, such was the 
air pollution of the City of London that the diarist John Evelyn was 
moved to write: 
... her inhabitants breathe nothing but an impure and [thick] Mist, accompanied with a 
fuliginous and filthy vapour, which renders the.11 obnoxious to a thousand inconveniences, 
corrupting the Lungs and discarding the entire habit of their Bodies; so that Catarrs, 
Phthisicks, Coughs and consutptions rage more in this one City, than in the whole Earth 
2 This, as Andrew Dobson points out, is predominantly a socialist argument which sees social relations 
and the capitalist tode of production as responsible for any particular envirouent, although the 
argument applies more generally. See Green Political Thought, 2nd Edition, (London: Routledge, 1995), 
p.175. 
3 David Pearce, Anil Markandya & Edward B.Barbier, for e1a1ple, include natural, built and cultural 
environtents under the ulbrella ter1 'envirouent'. See their Blueprint for a Green Econoty, (London: 
Earthscan, 1989), p.2. 
4 The World Commission on Envirouent and Development (WCED), Our Couon Future, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), Foreword by Gro Harle• Brundtland, p.xi. 
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besides. 5 
However, it was the Industrial Revolution, 'by far the most important 
movement in social history since the Saxon conquest', as G.M.Trevelyan 
put it earlier this century, 6 which did so much to increase the degree 
of environmental degradation, particularly pollution, and ushered in the 
modern practice of legislating against the worst excesses of human 
activity. 7 Broadly speaking, what has developed over the last century 
and a half is a complex regulatory system which can roughly be divided 
into two groups. First, the regulation of emissions into the environment 
(the air, land, seas and rivers), which are dealt with through the 
pollution control system. Secondly, the conflicts arising from the 
competing demands of development and conservation, resolved through the 
land use planning system. 8 
In recent years, however, the environment has taken on a new 
importance. The focus of environmental concern now centres around the 
fear of a rise in global temperatures caused primarily by the emission 
of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels since the beginning 
of the Industrial Revolution. 'A few years ago', began a 1990 report by 
the Institute of Terrestrial Ecology, 'the notion that man could warm the 
earth by producing greenhouse gases was treated with some 
scepticism ... Today, almost everybody is familiar with the notion, and 
most scientists accept that some warming will occur'. 9 The fear of 
global warming has served to stimulate new thinking about the 
environment. It is now appreciated that knowledge of the environment is 
best acquired 'not by the isolated examination of the parts of the system 
5 John Evelyn quoted in Derek Wall, Green History, (London: Routledge, 1994), p.45. 
6 G.M.Trevelyan, English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries, Chaucer to Queen Victoria, [1941], 
(London: Penguin, 1986), p.386. 
7 The main measures introduced since 1853 are given in Robert Garner, Environmental Politics, (Heme! 
He1pstead: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1996), pp.88-89. 
8 Garner suggests this approach as a means of understanding the regulatory system. Ibid., p.89. 
9 Institute of Terrestrial Ecology, The Greenhouse Effect and Terrestrial Ecosystems of the UK, (London: 
HMSO, 1990), Preface by M.G.R.Cannell & M.D.Cooper (Eds), p.S. 
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but by examining the way in which these parts interact', or 
holistically. 10 This view has also influenced thinking about how the 
environment can be protected and preserved in the face of man's desire 
for continued economic growth, resulting in the idea of sustainable 
development. 
1.3. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
The term sustainable development originated in the report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) entitled 'Our 
Common Future', published in 1987, and now generally referred to as the 
Brundtland Report, after the Norwegian Chairwoman Gro Harlem Brundtland. 
In what has become a classic statement, the Report defines sustainable 
development as 'development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs'. 11 However, despite the apparent simplicity of this statement, 
sustainable development, as Sir Crispin Tickell recently observed, 'has 
been variously understood and interpreted. It is not so much an idea as 
a convoy of ideas, and all single definitions have proved defective in 
one way or another'. 12 
Ideas like sustainable development undoubtedly arise from a belief 
that mankind is demanding too much of his environment: the finite 
resources of Earth cannot be equated with the infinite demands of man. 
This is not a novel concern and, in the mid-19th Century, John Stuart 
Mill expressed similar fears. He hoped for a 'stationary state' in man's 
affairs, saying: 
If the earth must lose that great portion of its pleasantness which it owes to things that the 
unli1ited increase of wealth and population would extirpate from it, for the mere purpose of 
enabling it to support a larger, but not a better or happier population, I sincerely hope, for 
the sake of posterity, that they will be content to be stationary, long before necessity 
10 Dobson, for example, says that 'This act of synthesis, and the language of linkage and reciprocity 
in which it is expressed, is often handily collected in the term 'holis1''. Green Political Thought, 
(1995), p.39. 
11 WCED, Our Comton Future, (1987), p.43. 
12 British Govern1ent Panel on Sustainable Development, First Report, (London: DoE, January 1995), p.3. 
Pearce, Markandya & Barbier also 1ake the point, quoting a 'Gallery of Definitions' of sustainable 
development in Blueprint for a Green Economy, (1989), pp.173-185. 
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coapels thea to it. 13 
However, far from being stationary, the core of sustainable development 
lies in an attempt to compromise the demands of economic development and 
growth with protection of the environment. As Frances Cairncross, has 
pointed out: 'Its virtue is that it allows people to think of 
compromises: of ways to temper growth, without sacrificing it 
entirely'. 14 Therefore, in sustainable development is an acceptance that 
growth will continue, but a simultaneous belief that its effect on the 
environment can be minimised if the right path of development is chosen: 
'technology and social organisation can be both managed and improved to 
make way for a new era of economic growth', says the Brundtland Report, 
for example. 15 
Since 1987, sustainable development has risen in popularity and 
gathered widespread support. This is attested to by the support given to 
Agenda 21, one of the main products of the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development, held in Rio de Janerio in 1992. Agenda 21, it is said, 
'forms the general guiding document for pursuing sustainable development 
and initiates significant institutional change'. 16 The Agenda 21 
document is lengthy, running to some 40 chapters, but its main 
recommendation was for 'participatory and community-based approaches' for 
achieving sustainable development combined with an acceptance of 'market 
principles'. 17 The, so-called, Earth Summit was held some time after the 
establishment of the UK's Community Forest policy; however, Agenda 21 is 
an important document for understanding the thinking behind current 
approaches to sustainable development. 
1.4. REALISING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
No single defining principle exists for the realisation of 
13 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy with some applications to Social Philosophy, 
(1848], New Itpression Edited with an introduction by Sir W.J.Ashley, (London: Longaans, 1920), pp.750-
751. 
14 Frances Cairncross, Costing the Earth, (London: The Econoaist, 1991), p.15. 
15 WCED, Our Common Future, (1987), p.8. 
16 Michael Grubb, Mat hi as Koch, Abby Monson, Francis Sullivan & Koy Thollson, The Earth Summit 
Agreeaents: A Guide and Assesstent, (London: Earthscan, 1993), p.xiii. 
17 Ibid., p.xv. 
15 
sustainable development, but that there are economic, political and 
social, and institutional dimensions is generally acknowledged. 
ECONOMIC MEASURES 
Environmental issues, like those of pollution or conflicts between 
growth and conservation, are often explained in economic terms. The 
environment is made up of what economists would call public goods 18 (the 
air, seas, a peaceful place, a beautiful vista, for example) and 
therefore no market exists for their exchange. Consequently, the full 
social costs of consuming environmental goods are not always taken into 
account, and they are prone to overuse. For example, a company may 
discharge polluting effluent from a production process into the air or 
sea at little or no cost to the company, but at considerable cost to the 
local community who breathe the foul air or fish the polluted sea. 19 
Sustainable development can also be viewed in economic terms and, 
arguably, its realisation would follow from correcting the market 
failures associated with consumption of environmental goods. In the above 
example, the material used in the production process could be taxed to 
encourage the company to move to cleaner production processes. 
Alternatively, the company might be required to purchase pollution 
permits to allow the production process to be continued but at increased 
cost. Either way, the private costs of the process are brought closer to 
the social costs. The use of these economic instruments is the focus of 
the, so-called, Pearce Report prepared for the Department of the 
Environment (DoE) in 198920 , and this is echoed in the UK Government's 
White Paper on the environment published in 1990. 21 
18 Briefly, public goods have three defining characteristics: first, they yield 'non-rivalrous' 
consumption, that is, no person can be deprived of their use by consu1ption by another person. Secondly, 
they are 'non-excludable' so that no person can be excluded from using them, and, finally, they are 
frequently 'non-rejectable', that is, individuals cannot abstain from using thel. 
19 A fuller discussion of the econo1ic approach to environmental problems is given in the articles 
entitled 'Pollution', by R.Levacic, and 'Conservation', by R.Shone, in Peter Johnson & Barry Tho1as 
(Kds), Economic Perspectives on Key Issues, (Oxford: Phillip Allen, 1985), pp.56-89. 
20 Pearce, Markandya, & Barbier, Blueprint for a Green Kcono1y, (1989), Note 1, p.171. 
21 
'In the Government's view, market mechanisms offer a more efficient and flexible response to 
environmental issues, both old and new'. DoE, This Com~on Inheritance: Britain's Environmental Strategy, 
[C1.12001, (London: H!!SO, 1990), para.1.28, p.l4. 
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POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PlEASURES 
In contrast to the Pearce Report, the slightly earlier Brundtland 
Report tended to place more emphasis on the political and social aspects 
of implementing sustainable development. Admittedly the World Commission 
ensured that its terms of reference were broadly drawn and the role of 
institutions in the process was discussed at length. However, the Report 
does make great play of the need for 'equitable opportunities for all', 
'education', and 'greater public participation' in the decision making 
process. 22 Moreover, the Commission considered participation from a wide 
range of groups in society - public bodies, private organisations, 
voluntary groups (or non-governmental bodies) and the community at large 
to be necessary for achieving sustainable development. 23 This 
sentiment is echoed in the UK Government's environmental White Paper24 
where it is combined with market methods. 
The extension of thinking about sustainable development beyond the 
economic should be no surprise. The environment, as a public good, is, 
after all, also common property. Moreover, the nature of such 'common' 
goods intuitively suggests that their maintenance is a concern for the 
community as a whole. Perhaps fortuitously, the rise of sustainable 
development has coincided with a resurgence of interest in the idea of 
'community' more generally, vague though that term may be. 25 Community 
has particular resonance in the environmental movement since it has been 
a traditional response to environmental threats, as Jonathon Porritt and 
David Winner point out: 
Time after time, local groups have emerged to fight local campaigns to stop a section of urban 
1otorway, to save a few acres of woodland or to stop an industrial plant threatening their 
22 WCED, Our Common Future, (1987), pp.44,46 & 63. 
23 Ibid., p.326. 
24 
'The responsibility for our environment is shared. It is not the duty for Government alone. It is 
an obligation on us all. lie set out. •• how everyone can bel p and what everyone can do - business, 
government (central and local), schools, voluntary bodies and individuals'. DoE, This Common 
Inheritance, ( 1990), para.1.38, p.16. 
25 There are real probleas in defining a com1unity as Nelson li.Polsby pointed out in 'The Study of 
Coamonity Power' in David L.Stills (Ed), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (London: 
MaCJillan & Free Press, 1968), p.157. More recently, Hugh Butcher has said that co11unity 'is one of 
those •hoorah• words that see•s to encourage war• and positive feelings at the expense of precise and 
meaningful analysis'. See Hugh Botcher, A.Glen, P.Henderson & J.Stith (Eds), Couonity and Public 
Policy, (London: Pluto Press, 1993), p.3. 
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couunity. 26 
Moreover, comparison has recently been made between the restoration of 
civic virtues and protection of the environment in the way that they both 
concern 'duties that lay moral claims on us from which we derive no 
immediate benefit or even long-term payoff'. 27 Community has also become 
a concept popular in the UK as a means of implementing a wide range of 
policies. The most notable of these is perhaps Community Care, but the 
prefix 'community' is now quite common throughout the public policy 
spectrum. 28 However, community is an echo of past ideas about how 
society should be formulated which stretches back to Aristotle and the 
ancient Greeks. Earlier this Century Mary Parker Follett based her New 
State upon community, saying: 
Our vital relation to the Infinite consists of our capacity ... to bring forth a group idea, to 
create a couoo I if e. But we have at present no machinery for a coostructi ve I ife. The 
organisation of neighbourhood groups will give us this machinery. 29 
Community is also seen as something of an antidote to the narrow market 
orientated individualism of the neo-liberal state, 30 and, perhaps 
because of the decline of many social structures from church to corner 
shop, there has been renewed interest in the idea of 'communitarianism' 
in recent years. 31 
26 Jonathon Porritt & David Winner, The Coming of the Greens, (London: Fontana, 1988), p.17. 
27 Amitai Htzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda, 
(London: Harper Collins, 1993), p.44. 
28 For example, five such public policy illustrations are given in Butcher, Glen, Henderson & Smith 
(Eds) Community and Public Policy, (1993), pp.S-11. 
29 Mary Parker Follett, The New State: Group Organisation, the solution of Popular Government, [1918], 
(Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1965), p.4. 
30 Raymond Plant comments, for example, that 'Hegel, T.H.Green, Bosanquet, Tawney, Raymond Williams and 
Robert Paul Wolf have all in different ways invoked the ideal of community as a way of trying to 
comhat ... [the] baneful features of liberal society, so modern communitariao thought is not really new'. 
Modern Political Thought, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p.325. 
31 According to Simon Caney, communitarianism can be characterised as follows: 'First, communitarians 
make descriptive clai1s about the nature and essence of persons, arguing that individuals are social 
creatures whose identity is shaped by their community ... Secondly, communitarians make normative claims 
and defend the value of community, public participation and civic virtoe ... Thirdly, communitarians make 
a meta-ethical claim about the status of political principles .•. argoing that correct values for a given 
community are those that accord with the shared values of that community'. See 'Liberalism and 
Communitarianism: a Misconceived Debate', Political Studies, Vol.XL, (1992), pp.273-274. 
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THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
The final point to make about the realisation of sustainable 
development concerns the role of institutions in the process. The most 
important institutions are those of government; as Cairncross points out, 
'environmental policy is inevitably interventionist. Without government 
intervention, the environment cannot be fully protected'. 32 Moreover, 
the role of national governments in sustainable development is 
comprehensive because no other institution or body has the authority to 
regulate or administer economic incentives in the way that governments 
can. Furthermore, if social and political factors are considered, then 
governments must also be involved in improving education, widening 
democracy and encouraging community action in the pursuit of sustainable 
development. Governments are, therefore, crucial to the realisation of 
sustainable development and their role is nothing if not complex, due to 
the wide range of functions that they need to perform. 
The complexity of the government's role is augmented by the 
expansive nature of the environment itself. It is curious in its breadth, 
and environmental policy overlaps every other policy area, making it 
difficult to compartmentalize. 33 In the UK until recently, a department 
existed expressly for the protection of the environment, that was the 
DoE. 34 However, 'environmental issues cut across the established 
structures of Whitehall' 35 , making the DoE a particularly good example 
of the practical difficulties of allocating functions to government 
departments. 36 Environmental policy and particularly sustainable 
development are therefore frequently administered by many departments of 
government and other public bodies, all contributing in their own 
particular way to the whole. 
32 Cairncross, Costing the Earth, (1991), p.16. 
33 John McCormick, British Politics and the Environment, (London: Earthscan, 1991), p.14. 
34 In 1997 the DoE was brought together with the Departllent of Transport and Regional Gover01ent Offices 
to for the Depart•ent of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR). 
35 John Bradbeer, 'Environmental Policy: Past and Future Agendas', in Stephen P.Savage, Rob Atkinson 
& Lynton Robbins (Eds), Public Policy in Britain, (London: Macmillan, 1994), p.ll6. 
36 The practical difficulties of allocating functions to departments were fa1ously noted by Charles 
H.Wilson in his lecture delivered at the 24th Haldane Memorial Lecture in 1956, entitled 'Haldane and 
the Machinery of Govern•ent'. See p.17 in particular. 
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In addition to this lateral complexity, environmental policy is 
complicated in two other respects. First, the idea of sustainable 
development has a social dimension associated with community and, as with 
the environment, has geographical connotations of localness. Moreover, 
in administrative terms in the UK, it has been observed that the 
'responsibility for meaningful action to protect and improve the 
environment seems to have been devolved to a large extent to local 
councils and communi ties'. 37 Thus a vertical dimension of complexity 
also exists because responsibilities for the environment, and therefore 
sustainable development, reside at the level of both central and local 
government. 
Secondly, it must be recognised that in the British system of 
government, there exists a wide range of administrative bodies which 
cannot be neatly categorised as departments of state or as local 
government. These are 'government-created and semi-private organisations 
which are both distinct from, but usually relate to, either central 
government departments or local authorities' and are generally referred 
to as 'quasi-government'. 38 The most obvious amongst these bodies are 
quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (QUANGOs) or, more 
correctly, non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs), and these will be 
discussed more fully later. 39 However, since the launch of the Next 
Steps initiative in 1988, the administrative map has been complicated 
still further by the separation of administrative functions of many 
departments from the policy centre to produce a new group of 
organisations known as Agencies. As will become apparent during the 
course of this thesis, the responsibility for implementing sustainable 
development policies like the GNF, frequently lies with the wide range 
of quasi-governmental organisations which operate at arm's length from 
37 Ken Peattie & Gareth Hall, 'The Greening of Local Government: A Survey', Local Govern•ent Studies, 
(1994), Vol.20, No.3, p.482. 
38 John Greenwood & David Wilson, Public Administration in Britain Today, 2nd Edition, (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989), p.209. 
39 The terminology to describe these bodies is signally complex and unsatisfactory. This has been noted 
on nUJerous occasions and many efforts have been Jade to clear the matter up. However, as Grant Jordan 
points out: 'There is no simple (or reliable) guide. The problem is not only nomenclature, however, but 
deliliting these categories- howsoever they are labelled'. See his The British Administrative System: 
Principles Versus Practice, (London: Routledge, 1994), p.33. See also Anthony Barker (Hd), Quangos in 
Britain: Government and the Networks of Policy-Making, (London: Macmillan, 1982). 
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the democratically accountable bodies of central or local government. 
In conclusion, the role of government institutions in pursuing 
sustainable development is both substantial and complex. They carry the 
responsibility for selecting, establishing, enforcing and administering 
a wide range of regulatory and economic instruments in the environmental 
field. Moreover, such is the complex nature of environmental policy that 
considerable coordination between departments of state, local 
authorities, agencies and quasi-autonomous bodies - is required for the 
successful implementation of sustainable development policy. The study 
of the organisations responsible for the coordination of these many and 
varied bodies is crucial. However, it is the difficulties of 
accountability in such a complex arrangement that are of most interest 
since accountability is dispersed among many public sector bodies often 
operating at a distance from central and local government. Moreover, 
accountability becomes more important and complicated because the public 
sector is increasingly operating in close partnership with private and 
voluntary sector groups which have their own interests to pursue. 
1. 5. THE COMMUNITY FOREST POLICY AND THE GREAT NORTH FOREST 
The UK's forest and woodland cover stands at around 10%, low by 
European standards, but a considerable improvement on the mere 5% that 
existed at the turn of the century. This dramatic increase in tree cover 
is mainly the result of large scale afforestation undertaken for 
strategic reasons after World Wars I and II by the Forestry Commission 
(FC). In 1990, 43% of the forest area of the UK remained in public hands 
with the remainder being privately owned. At 28%, a high proportion is 
composed of broadleaf stands with a rotation age of around 120 years; the 
remainder being more rapidly maturing conifers. Total domestic production 
meets only about 15% of total domestic consumption. 40 
MULTIPURPOSE FORESTRY 
The strategic imperative for expanding forestry in the UK has 
declined in importance in the last fifty years. Forestry is now seen in 
a broader context; as multipurpose, with a wide range of objectives and 
4
° Figures from Kullervo Knusela, European Forest Institute Research Report 1: Forest Resources in 
Europe 1950-1990, (Catbridge: Ca1bridge University Press, 1994), p.57. 
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not dissimilar to the medieval view.~~ That national forestry policy 
should be based on multiple objectives was a recommendation made by the 
Countryside Commission (CC) in a major statement on the future of 
forestry in the UK published in 1987. In the CC's view, the objectives 
of forestry should be to produce a national supply of timber as a raw 
material and as a source of energy; offer an alternative to agricultural 
use of land; contribute to rural employment either in timber industries 
or through associated recreation developments; create attractive sites 
for public enjoyment; enhance the natural beauty of the countryside; and 
create wildlife habitats. 'In future', said the statement, 'all forestry 
proposals should aim to fulfil in different measures all of these 
objectives'. 42 
In addition to the purposes noted above, forestry is also seen to 
have specific environmental benefits, as noted in the 1990 White Paper 
on the environment: 
Forests, woodlands and trees ... provide one of the most effective ways by which carbon dioxide 
can be absorbed from the atmosphere and stored for long periods of time. They also provide 
timber which, if converted into durable products, can further prolong the storage process. 43 
Moreover, as the British Government Panel on Sustainable Development 
commented: 'More clearly than in many other sectors of the economy, 
forestry can demonstrate what is meant by sustainable development', ~ 4 
and, importantly, forestry represents a notable tool for controlling 
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels which contribute to global warming 
(although the role that a country like the UK can play is, admittedly, 
small). 
THE COPDmNITY FOREST POLICY 
The creation of urban fringe or Community Forests (CFs) was one of 
the multi-purpose forestry initiatives proposed by the CC in 1987 (the 
41 John Blunden ~Nigel Curry point out the ease with which we forget the diversity of benefits derived 
from 1edieval woodlands: 'The coppice stand system of aanagement', they say, 'yielded everything from 
walking sticks to house tiabers, provided shelter for man and beast, fodder for domestic and game 
animals, sporting opportunities, doainant landscape features and a rich variety of habits for flora and 
fauna'. A Future for Our Countryside, (01ford: Blackwell & The CC, 1988), pp.92. 
42 CC, Forestry in the Countryside, [CCP 245], (Cheltenham: CC, 1987), paras.13-14, p.7. 
43 DoE, This Common Inheritance, (1990), para.7,25, p.100. 
44 British Government Panel on Sustainable Development, Second Report, January 1996, para.35, p.16. 
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other being the creation of the National Forest in the Midlands): 
We believe that a nuaber of ..• forests adjacent to big cities would create a pleasant 
environment for the public to enjoy, and in doing so would be a means of restoring so1e 
derelict land and 1anagiog other land of lilited agricultural value. The forests would provide 
e1ploytent opportunities in associated recreational develop•ents. They would, by enhancing the 
enviro01ent, Jake those areas better places in which people live and work. In the course of 
tile they would produce ti1ber with a co11ercial value. 45 
A feasibility study was undertaken in 1988 which satisfied the CC and FC 
of the suitability of the CF initiative46 and, in 1989, a programme of 
twelve CFs was launched jointly by the CC and FC. 
The sites for the three 'lead projects' were Thames Chase, east of 
London; The Forest of Mercia in south Staffordshire; and the Great North 
Forest (GNF) in south Tyne and Wear and north-east Durham. The remaining 
nine, in Cleveland, south Yorkshire, Merseyside, west Manchester, north 
Nottingham, Bedford, south Hertfordshire, Swindon, and Bristol, were 
announced in 1991 (see Appendix 1). 47 The CFs vary in size from around 
9,000 to 92,000 hectares, an area totalling more than 450,000 hectares 
or 'approximately 3.6% of all land in England, [and] equivalent to about 
half the combined size of all the National Parks'. 48 The CF programme 
is now firmly established as part of the sustainable development 
programme being pursued by the UK Government. 
THE GREAT NORTH FOREST 
The northern region of England has particular environmental 
problems due to the large areas of derelict land which have been left 
following the dramatic decline of heavy industry over the past few 
decades. 49 It also has a very low proportion of land under forest or 
45 CC, Forestry in the Countryside, (1987), para. 77, p.23. 
46 GNF, 'Members Steering Group Report', Annex 1, 'Memorandum of Agreement for the Great North Forest 
1993-96', (Chester-le-Street: Great North Forest, 21/10/92), para.2.6, p.2. 
47 GNF, Forest Plan, (Chester-le-Street: GNF, 1994), para.1.7, p.4. 
48 CC, The Couuoity Forest Unit, Community Forests - qrowi oq fro11 Vision to Reality, [ CCP 412], 
(London: CC, 1995), para.l.15, p.4. 
49 The Northern Region Councils Association com~~ented in 1989 that: 'Since 1970, more than 200,000 jobs 
have been lost in the shipbuilding, heavy engineering, and coal industries in the Region. Such e1teosive 
industrial restructuring has seen large plants and tracts of land fall into disuse, often with 
additional probleas of cheaical contamination or instability', Northern Region of England: Report 1989, 
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woodland - a mere 4% compared to 7% in the rest of England - because of 
the industrial use of timber in the mining industry. 50 Both of these 
problems are being tackled through afforestation schemes in the region 
and the GNF will contribute towards this by increasing woodland cover 
from 4% to around 30%51 over an area of approximately 175 square 
kilometres (67.5 square miles) 52 , as shown in Appendix 2. It is the 
smallest Community Forest after Thames Chase and will take a period of 
thirty to forty years to establish; however, the entire CF initiative is 
expected to 'contribute significantly' towards increasing forest cover 
to 15% in England by the year 2050. 53 
The GNF was formally established in February 1990 as a partnership 
between the CC, the FC, and five local authorities - Gateshead and South 
Tynes ide Metropolitan Borough Councils, City of Sunderland Council, 
Chester-le-Street District Council and Durham County Council. These seven 
bodies form the core of the organisation which has been established to 
develop and implement the initiative, but the partnership has been 
extended to include numerous other public, private and voluntary bodies. 
1.6. OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
In this chapter the concept of sustainable development and the 
approaches towards its achievement have been introduced. Sustainable 
development is a complex and relatively new area of environmental policy 
which is being approached through community organisations but with due 
regard to the market. The public sector has a critical role to play in 
this process but is intended to work in partnership with the private and 
voluntary sectors. However, the institutional arrangements are 
complicated and this raises serious questions about accountability and 
responsibility. The GNF, with its origins in the multipurpose forestry 
strategy will serve as a case study for the implementation of sustainable 
(Newcastle upon Tyne: Northern Region Councils Association, 1989), para.9.1, p.9. 
50 See Northern Region Councils Association, Northern Region of England: Profile 1992, (Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Northern Region Co~ncils Association, 1992), para,2.3, p.3. 
51 GNF, Forest Advisory Forum Report, (Chester-le-Street: GNF, 26/7/94), para.4. 
52 GNF, 'Memoranda• of Agreeaent 1993-96', (21/10/92), para.3.2, p.3. 
53 CC, Position State1ent: Sustainability & the Countryside, [CCP 432], (Cheltenha•: CC, 1993), p.6. 
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development, providing an opportunity to explore the difficulties that 
exist for its successful achievement. 
Chapter Two examines the policy process which led to the emergence 
of the Community Forest initiative in 1987. It considers the aims and 
objectives of the programme, the participants, the instruments chosen for 
its implementation and the organisational arrangements through which it 
is being administered. Special consideration is given to the role of the 
public sector in the initiative and attention is drawn to the particular 
difficulties associated with responsibility and accountability. 
In Chapter Three, the organisation established to implement the GNF 
Project is explored in detail. Here the formal organisation- the Project 
Team, and advisory and steering groups - is considered, together with the 
wider organisation - businesses, voluntary and community groups, and 
supporting public sector organisations. Attention is focused on 
hierarchical control and the organisational lines of responsibility that 
exist, to assess their value in ensuring the accountability of the 
participating public bodies. 
Chapter four examines the management of the GNF Project and the 
progress made in its establishment since inception in 1990. The 
achievements and difficulties identified in interview by those involved 
in the Project are considered, and the success of the Project is 
estimated from published data. The chapter focuses upon the managerial 
methods of accountability which have replaced and supplemented more 
tradi tiona! hierarchical systems. The difficulties of applying managerial 
accountability in complex organisations like those found in the case 
study are discussed and its value in ensuring public sector 
accountability are assessed. 
Finally, Chapter Five provides a summary of the important features 
of this research. The combination of market methods with the community 
in the partnership approach developed for the implementation of 
sustainable development produces a complex pattern of organisation. These 
organisations offer a higher degree of flexibility and responsiveness, 
and they tend to rely less on hierarchy for control and more on 
managerial methods. However, it is argued that managerial accountability 
does not function well in such complicated arrangements. Success may be 
overrated and cost underestimated as participating public bodies struggle 
to meet the many objectives laid down for them. This raises particular 
25 
concerns about the value for money obtainedi through the partnership 
(lpproach to the imp!lementatlon of sustainable d£we1opment. and may have 
wider impHcations for the Stjcc:ess of thfs important new. area of public 
policy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE 
COMMUNITY FOR·EST 
PROGRAMME 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
According to David B. Truman: 'Predictions concerning the 
consequences of given political activities are based upon conceptions of 
the governmental process'. 54 After examining the role of interest groups 
in the formal institutions of government, Truman saw the process of 
government in much the same way as Arthur F.Bentley had earlier this 
century. Bentley observed that: 'All phenomena of government are 
phenomena of groups pressing one another, forming one another, and 
pushing out new groups and group representatives ... to mediate the 
adjustments'. 55 The political process could, therefore, be attributed 
to the constant interplay of group pressures with each group basing its 
demands on a rational assessment of its own interests. The 'raw 
materials' of any study of government, said Bentley, lie in the 
activities of the concerned groups and the relationships which exist 
between them: 'there are no political phenomena except group 
phenomena'. 56 The group approach is particularly relevant to the study 
of the multipurpose forestry policy, because it evolved from the 
interactions of many groups with disparate interests. Arguably, the 
policy is a convenient solution to a set of difficulties rather than the 
imposition of an ideological imperative, and the CF programme is simply 
part of that broader policy. 
The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the unusual 
complexity of the CF programme. First, the process of group interaction 
which led to the programme is examined through discussion of the relevant 
debates about agriculture, forestry, planning and the environment. 
Secondly, implementation is considered; the participating groups and 
bodies are identified together with the aims and objectives of the 
programme, and the instruments chosen to encourage participation. Special 
attention is given to the many public sector organisations involved and 
the vital role they have in promoting and steering the programme through 
a mixture of economic instruments, advice, agreements and planning. 
54 David B.Trn1an, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, (New York: Alfred 
A.Knopf, 1953), p.503. 
55 Arthur F.Bentley, The Process of Govern1ent: A Study of Social Pressures, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1908), p.269. 
56 Ibid., p.222. 
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Concluding the chapter, the unusual way in which the participating groups 
are brought together to develop each Forest is explained. The arrangement 
centres around a formal organisation which is distant from both central 
and local government, and involves the public sector working in close 
partnership with private and voluntary groups. This presents particular 
difficulties for public sector accountability and responsibility and 
these are briefly reviewed. 
2.2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY 
The origins of the CF programme lie in a need to diversify rural 
land use which emerged in the early 1980s. It is claimed that four 
factors 'influenced the development of the CF concept and will affect its 
evolution in future years'. These are agricultural change, forestry 
policy, urban pressure and environmental 57 awareness, and it is 
convenient to use these four factors as a framework to discuss the 
development of policy. 
AGRICULTURAL CHANGE 
The dominant force in shaping agriculture in Europe over the last 
40 years has been the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Established in 
the shadow of World War Two as a means of uniting those nations committed 
to a common market in Europe, its objectives, defined by the Treaty of 
Rome, were 'to increase agricultural productivity ... ; thus to ensure a 
fair standard of living for the agricultural community ... ; to stabilise 
markets ... ; to ensure the availability of supplies [and] to ensure that 
supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices'. 58 These objectives have 
largely been attained: the European Union now enjoys self-sufficiency in 
agriculture; incomes in the industry are higher than may have otherwise 
been the case; technological changes have been introduced, significantly 
increasing productivity; and a single and unified market in European 
agriculture has resulted. 59 However, despite its apparent success, the 
57 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.2.1, p.5. 
58 Article 39 of the Treaty of Rose, reprinted in K.R.Simmonds, European Treaties, (London: Sweet & 
Hanel!, 1980). 
59 Valerio Lintner & Sonia Mazey, The European Collllunity: Economic and Political Aspects, (London: 
McGraw-Bill, 1991), pp.97-99. 
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CAP has been criticised on a number of counts. First, it has led to over 
production of some foodstuffs increasing the cost of price support, 
storage and disposal of some goods which are often sold at a loss. 
Secondly, the insecticides, herbicides and pesticides used in intensive 
agricultural practices are claimed to be environmentally damaging, 
raising concerns about the safety of foods produced in this way and the 
impact on the land on which they are grown. Finally, the high level of 
financial assistance given to the farming industry, through the price 
support system and grants, runs counter to the principles of free trade 
which are internationally supported through the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and similar agreements. As a consequence of 
these criticisms a programme of reform of the CAP has been undertaken in 
Europe in recent years. 
According to the Commission of the European Communities, the first 
modest action to curb agricultural overproduction occurred in 1979. Since 
then, a variety of initiatives have been introduced to reduce production 
and, since 1988, to contain the growth in European Union (EU) spending 
on agriculture. 60 The removal of land from agricultural production is 
the main tool of CAP reform and there are two ways this is being 
attempted in the UK. The first is the 'set-aside' policy introduced in 
1988, which compensates farmers for land left fallow. This scheme has 
been criticised, however, because it is seen as the virtual abandonment 
of large parcels of land, and because publicly funding farmers to do 
nothing is considered worse than paying them to overproduce. The scheme 
is also prone to failure because it encourages farmers to 'set-aside' 
poorer land and use compensation payments to finance increased 
intensification of their remaining land, in order to maintain income. 61 
An alternative to set-aside is the conversion of agricultural land 
to forestry. This was seen as a solution to the problem of overproduction 
as early as 1980 when the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communi ties suggested that surplus land should be turned over to 
6
° Commission of the European Communities, Our Farming Future, (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Coamunity, 1993), p.l7. 
61 This problem, called 'slippage', has been well documented in the USA and Germany according to Friends 
of the Earth (FoB). Special Briefing, Set-Aside: Money for Nothing, (London: FoB, 1992), pp.2-3. 
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forestry. 62 The role of forestry in the process of agricultural reform 
grew in popularity and in 1986, for example, the Nature Conservancy 
Council (NCC) noted that: 'There seems much merit ... in the afforestation 
of some lowland agricultural land, as an alternative to excess food 
production'. 63 By 1987 the House of Commons Agriculture Committee was 
giving the idea serious consideration and reported in 1990 that: 'We 
concentrated our investigations on forestry as this had been identified 
as the main alternative use for surplus agricultural land'. 64 
Clearly, conversion of agricultural land to forestry offers a 
practical response to many of the criticisms of the CAP. Forestry would 
remove land from agricultural production, reducing output and the need 
for high levels of financial support currently provided to the sector 
through the CAP. In doing so, it is also hoped that many of the tensions 
arising from the needs of farmers and the demands for conservation can 
be ameliorated. The new CFs are part of this forestry programme although 
they will not be large areas of continuous woodland, rather a mixed 
landscape more akin to the medieval idea of forest. 65 The object of the 
initiative with regard to farmers is to integrate woodland with 
agriculture 'in a manner that encourages farmers and landowners to manage 
their land for conservation, to meet the demand for increased recreation, 
and to provide managed access to public open space' . 66 
FORESTRY POLICY 
Both the state and private forestry sectors in the UK underwent 
considerable change during the 1980s and early 1990s. First, the state 
sector was rationalised by the Conservative Government, beginning in 1981 
with a programme of disposal of surplus FC land, intended to raise £84m 
62 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, 24th Report, EEC Forestry Policy, 
[HL259), (London: HMSO, 4/11/80). 
63 NCC, Nature conservation and afforestation in Britain, (Peterborough: NCC, 1986), p. 77. 
64 House of Commons Agriculture Committee, Second Report, Land Use and Forestry, Vol.1, (London: HMSO, 
10/1/90), paras.1-2, p.xi. 
65 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), p.3. 
66 cc, Community Forest Unit, Farming in Community Forests: The opportunities and the benefits, [CCP 
416), (London: CC, 1993), p.2. 
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for the Treasury. 67 However, forestry remained in difficulty and, in 
1984, the Director General of the FC reported that the timber industry 
was facing the worst trade recession since the 1930s, leaving the FC 
unable to meet its 3% target rate of return, despite continued sales of 
land. 68 Such a return was substantially lower than the 5% expected from 
other public sector investments, moreover, it was estimated that the FC 
was still costing £50 million a year in 1987. 69 
Although much criticism was aimed at the costs involved in 
maintaining a publicly funded forestry body, the FC was also condemned 
for its poor environmental record. In an attempt to provide a strategic 
reserve of softwood, it was claimed that large areas of countryside had 
been despoiled by blanket afforestation which was not only harsh on the 
eye but also inhospitable to wildlife and caused acidification of land 
and water courses. 70 It was argued that this costly and environmentally 
damaging outcome was partly the result of the conflict between the FC's 
dual roles as manager of the state's forests and as regulator for the 
industry. 71 Separating these roles was recommended by the House of 
Commons Agriculture Committee in 1990, 72 and, in 1991 Robin Cutler, the 
FC's Director General, announced that a new structure would be 
established. The FC would be separated into 'the Forestry Authority, the 
regulatory body that examines planting applications, and the Forestry 
Enterprise, the nationalised industry which owns more than two million 
acres of woodland all over the country and is responsible for promoting 
planting in the private sector'. 73 
Nevertheless, the question of privatising the FC remained and the 
67 
'Forestry Commission for sale', The Economist, 15/2/85. 
68 Mr.Bolmes, Director General of the FC. 18th Report from the Comaittee of Public Accounts, Session 
1983-84, Quinquennial revaluation of assets and review of performance, Forestry Commission: The Forestry 
Enterprise, [DC 265), (London: BKSO, 16/4/84), Para.1892 of minutes. 
69 
'Co1ing up green', The Economist, 12/12/87. 
70 This is explained in some detail in the NCC's, Nature conservation and afforestation in Britain, 
( 1986). 
71 Marion Shoard, 'Forests: profit with pleasure', The Tilles, 17/6/89. 
72 Charles Clover, 'Forestry split will 'balance rival needs'', The Daily Telegraph, 2/2/90. 
73 Charles Clover, 'Forestry chief to split powers of Commission', The Daily Telegraph, 4/4/91. 
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Government set up the forestry review group in March 1993, in part to 
look into the 'options for the ownership and management of Forestry 
Commission woodlands'. 74 Concluding in 1994, it announced that the 
Forestry Commission should remain in the public sector. However, the 
Secretary of State did announce the replacement of the Forest Enterprise 
arm of the FC with 'a new trading body, established as a next steps 
agency' which would still be part of the Forestry Commission, but would 
'deal at arm's length with other parts of the commission'. 75 
The second major change in forestry concerned economic incentives, 
and the system of grants and taxation which encouraged the private sector 
to undertake large scale conifer planting in environmentally sensitive 
highland areas. The tax and grant system which existed to encourage the 
planting of new forests by the private sector is a complex one. However, 
in simple terms it allowed investors, particularly those paying the top 
rate of tax, to purchase hill country through forestry companies. This 
land was then cleared for planting, raising its value by 70-100%; planted 
with conifers, attracting generous grants from the FC; and the expense 
of this work off-set against tax. The woodland would then be sold after 
about ten years with capital gains tax paid on the land but not on the 
trees. Not only did this allow taxable income to be converted into 
untaxed capital, but tax concessions weakened the ability of the FC to 
control where trees were planted because owners often chose to forgo 
grants to escape the need for the FC's permission to plant. 76 
The sale of FC land in the early 1980s found favour with some 
conservationists for the increased supply of woodland that it provided 
to the private sector, and the consequent reduction in the need for large 
scale conifer planting elsewhere. However, this was undermined by the tax 
and grant system which, by 1986, was under criticism by the NCC for the 
automatic granting of tax relief for all planting, whether or not it had 
74 DoE, FC, MAFF, The Government's Response to the First Report from the House of Commons Select 
Co11ittee on the Environment, Forestry and the Environment, [C1.2259), (London: HMSO, June 1993), p.14, 
Annex. Reply by Mr.Lang. 
75 The 'Forestry Review' announced by Ian Lang, The Secretary of State for Scotland, to the Coamons. 
Weekly Hansard (Collons), Ho.1663, (London: HMSO, 19/7/94), Col.177. 
76 
'Money that grows on trees', The Econo1ist, 10/5/86, p.25. This article provides an explanation of 
how the tax and grant syste1 works and how it leads to poor planting decisions. 
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been approved by the FC for grant-aid. 77 There was also increasing 
anxiety about the relationship between nature conservation and 
afforestation, and the NCC Chairman wrote that 'we continue to be very 
concerned ... we believe that ... new policies are required which reconcile 
the economic and social objectives with those of nature conservation and 
amenity as harmoniously as possible'. 78 In addition to the conservation 
and environmental consequences of the government's tax policy on private 
forestry, there remained the question of its cost. This was not thought 
to be high, but figures of £10 to £15 million a year for tax relief and 
£7 million a year for grants were suggested, although these amounts did 
not include losses in capital gains tax. 79 The result was the abolition 
of tax relief on forestry in the 1988 Budget with the removal of the 
planting and management of commercial woodlands from the income tax 
system. 80 
Large scale conifer planting was found to be environmentally 
damaging and contrary to the demands for conservation, and the production 
of softwoods from conifers was uneconomic, providing a low return on 
investment unless artificially supported. The environmental and economic 
problems of large scale conifer forests, relevant to both the private and 
state sectors, led to a belief that timber may not be the only objective 
of forestry. It was recognised that financial returns could also come 
from the use of forests for recreation and leisure pursuits - shooting 
being perhaps the most obvious example. However, closely packed conifer 
plantations in remote areas were not entirely appropriate to this use and 
what was really needed was broadleaf woodlands closer to urban areas 
where people could use them. Forestry policy, therefore, began to be 
directed towards restoring existing woodland and encouraging planting Qf 
new broadleaf woodlands with a multipurpose aim. In 1993 the shift in the 
Government's forestry policy was clear and the FC claimed that: 'Forestry 
is now entering a new phase in which increasing emphasis is placed on 
social and environmental, as well as economic, benefits'. The CF 
77 NCC, Nature conservation and afforestation, (1986), p.82. 
78 William Wilkinson, NCC Chairman, Ibid., pp.4-5. 
79 
'Money that grows on trees', The Economist, 10/4/86, p.25. 
8
° Carol Ferguson & Andrew Morgan, 'Tree-planting investment tax loophole is abolished', The Tiles, 
16/3/88. 
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programme, said the FC, is one of the vehicles for encouraging new 
woodlands close to areas of population. 81 
URBAN PRESSURE 
The rural band surrounding towns and cities is an arena in which 
several significant interest groups confront each other. These are land 
investors, farmers, speculative housebuilders and conservationists, and 
historically, according to Peter Ambrose, the often contradictory demands 
of these four groups have been managed through planners. 82 It is the 
planning system involving this group and through which the expansion of 
towns and cities is controlled, that is the focus of attention here. 
Controlling the spread of towns and cities has long been a problem 
for countries with a high urban population like England. The best known 
solution is the Green Belt policy first enacted for London in the 1938 
London County Council Green Belt Act, and extended to other local 
planning authorities in the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act. 83 
According to Nan Fairbrother, 'London's Green Belt was the prototype with 
three stated purposes - to enclose the main built-up mass of London and 
prevent further spread; to keep ~ountry towns beyond the Green Belt as 
distinct and separate entities; [and] to preserve the fine countryside 
of the Home Counties'. 84 
The importance of the Green Belt cannot be overstated; however, it 
is only one aspect of the planning system. Planning is primarily the 
responsibility of local authorities whose 'Structure plans', 'Local 
plans' and, in Metropolitan and London boroughs, 'unitary development 
plans', identify areas for development and conservation, enabling the 
process of development in any given area to be controlled. 85 There have 
been critics of the planning system and housebuilders in particular have 
argued that the rate of release of land for housing has been slow, 
raising the price of land for house building and forcing house prices to 
81 FC, Forestry Policy for Great Britain, (Edinburgh: FC, 1993), pp.9 & 13. 
82 Peter Ambrose, Whatever Happened to Planning?, (London: Methuen, 1986), p.186. 
83 Ibid., p.200. 
84 Nan Fairbrother, New Lives, New Landscapes, (Har•ondsvorth: Penguin, 1972), p.182. 
85 Tony Byrne, Local Govern1ent in Britain, 4th Edition, (Har1ondsvorth: Penguin, 1986), p.65. 
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arbitrarily high levels. However, since 1979 there has been a distinctive 
move towards free market principles and a weakening of the planning 
system. 86 
Other social and economic changes have also affected the approach 
to development in the urban fringe. A shift in attitudes and lifestyles, 
together with technological improvements, has led to the redistribution 
of employment and economic activity towards smaller towns and rural 
areas. 87 High technology industries like computing and information 
technology are often built in more pleasant and cheaper greenfield areas. 
The same is true for out-of-town superstores, and the offer of greenfield 
sites is a major attraction for inward investors like foreign car 
manufacturers. It is also true that the massive increase in car ownership 
over recent years has made these new patterns of living more viable. 
Arguably, however, there remains a disturbed landscape of industry 
and urban-marginal farming around built-up areas 'like the pale fringe 
round an ink spot on blotting paper'. 88 The unbalanced development 
pattern of the last two hundred years has meant that the 'pale fringe' 
is at its most conspicuous around the industrial towns and cities, mainly 
in the north of England, which grew up around the coal, steel and allied 
heavy industries like shipbuilding. 89 However, significant changes in 
the structure of industry in the UK in recent decades has led to a 
decline in manufacturing in these localities and the appearance of large 
areas of derelict land on the margins of many towns and cities. In the 
early 1970s, for example, as much as a quarter of all land was derelict 
in some parts of the North, the North Midlands, and South Wales. 90 The 
picture was little changed a decade later when the North of England 
86 John Bradbeer, for example, suggests that 'land use planning ... beca•e an early target for the 
government's zeal for deregulation and reliance on market forces'. 'Environ11ental Policy: Past and 
Future Agendas', in Savage, Atkinson & Robbins (Eds), Public Policy in Britain, (1994), p.l22. 
87 John Blunden & Nigel Curry (Eds), The Changing Countryside, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p.97. Also 
David Keeble, 'Small firm creation, innovation and growth and the urban-rural shift', James Curran & 
David Storey (Eds), Small Firms in Urban and Rural Locations, (London: Routledge, 1993), p.54-59. 
88 This observation, made by Fairbrother, continues to be relevant, New Lives, (1972), p.190. 
89 Ambrose, for example, says that urban/industrial growth resulted in 'the crowding of 30 to 40 % of 
the population of Britain on the coalfield regions, which are something like 10% of the area'. Whatever 
Happened to Planning?, (1986), p.l79. 
9
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County Councils Association noted that there was as much derelict land 
in the Region as there was in 1974. 91 
Establishing woodland on the boundaries between town and country 
to control urban expansion was suggested in the 1970s as a practical 
application of the Green Belt policy. Nan Fairbrother, for example, made 
the important point that 'trees commit the land to nothing: they save it 
from casual development without sterilizing it for further use'. 92 The 
aims of multipurpose forestry and the CF initiative are perhaps a 
reflection of this view, although in somewhat extended form. They offer 
a variety of new opportunities to farmers, forestry interests and 
conservationists, and will contribute to the restoration of derelict land 
and increase tree cover. 93 In doing so, it is hoped that the new Forests 
will 'improve an area's economic prospects by "greening" its image, help 
to attract new investment and provide an attractive setting for a 
thriving local economy' . 94 
Despite the attempt to satisfy the many interests operating in the 
urban fringe exhibited by multipurpose forestry policy and the CF 
programme, some conflict, nevertheless, remains. One of the major uses 
of the Forests is likely to be recreation and leisure pursuits, 
particularly for the income that it can produce. 95 People in urban areas 
commonly make use of the rural fringe for recreation and leisure, whether 
it be formal activities like sports and other organised pursuits or 
informal ones like picknicking and walking. 96 Formal recreational use 
of CF areas has raised concerns about a potential relaxation of planning 
controls and increased development. The Avon Wildlife Trust, for example, 
is concerned about breaches of planning regulations through the 
manipulation of recreation and leisure proposals 'endorsing development 
91 North of England County Councils Association, The State of the Region Report 1982, para.4.28, p.22. 
92 Fairbrother, New Lives, (1972}, p.318. 
93 Tree cover is often low in areas previously dominated by heavy industry because of the use of timber 
for smelting, pit-props and so on. 
94 CC, Forests for the Community, [CCP 340], (London: CC, 1991). 
95 Blunden & Curry note that the most common after-use for derelict land is for leisure. The Changing 
Countryside, (1985), p.lll. 
96 A.S.Mather, Land Use, (Harlow: Longman, 1986}, p.143. 
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in areas that otherwise would not have any chance of success'. 97 Noting 
the wide variety of sporting facilities envisaged for Forest areas - dry 
ski slopes, sports stadia, ice rinks, and the like - the Campaign for the 
Protection of Rural England (CPRE) has also expressed concern that CFs 
'may become a vehicle for pushing aside existing planning policies' . 98 
Conversely, informal recreational activities require a high degree 
of public access to the land. However, access beyond that which already 
exists in the form of Public Rights of Way, is specifically excluded by 
the 'Statement of Understanding' drawn up by the CC and FC for farmers 
and landowners. 99 Moreover, some potential uses of land in Forest areas 
are inimical to public access. For example, coppicing and the growing of 
Christmas trees allow no more access than a field of cabbages, and there 
are practical difficulties associated with public access to areas 
reserved for game shooting. 100 
Concerns have also been expressed that planning regulations in the 
CFs may be relaxed allowing farmers to regenerate old farm buildings, and 
make way for other developments. 101 Worries about planning deals have 
led the CPRE to suggest that 'landowners and local authorities will 
conclude planning gain "deals", planting trees only where planning 
permission for otherwise unacceptable development is also granted' . 102 
Moreover, the FoE claim that land speculation may pose a problem because 
urban fringe landowners might prefer to wait for the Forests to be 
established before taking advantage of potentially more profitable 
building development. 103 
97 Avon Wildlife Trust, quoted in Peter Bri1acombe, 'They have branches everywhere', The Daily 
Telegraph, 23/2/91. 
98 Martin Elson, 'CoiDiunity Forest Charter', ECOS, (1991), Vol.12, No.4, p.64. 
99 A copy of the 'Farmers, Landowners and Coamunity Forests: State1ent of Understanding' appears in the 
CC's Farming in Co11unity Forests, (1993), pp.3-4. 
100 
'Money in the trees', The Economist, 28/9/85. 
101 The FoE suggest that this 1ay siaply be a way of releasing agricultural land for other foras of 
developaent. Set-Aside - Money for Nothing, (1993), p.4. 
102 Elson, 'Community Forest Charter', ECOS, (1991), p.64. 
103 The FoE suggest that there aay be 'a hidden agenda to release agricultural land for other forms of 
developtent', Set-Aside - Money for Nothing, (1993), p.4. 
38 
ENVIRONJimNTAL AWARENESS 
Environmental concern underlies the debates about agricultural 
change, forestry policy and urban pressure which have been examined so 
far, and it is worth briefly reviewing those concerns together with the 
wider role that the environment plays in the CF programme in global, 
national and local terms. 
Forestry is part of a broader undertaking towards sustainable 
development adopted by governments worldwide, and illustrated by the 
agreements made at the UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) at Rio de Janerio in 1992. 104 Any increase in tree cover 
contributes directly towards the UNCED Agreement on Forest Principles, 
and it also contributes towards the Convention on Biological Diversity 
by strengthening and improving ecosystems, thereby protecting 
species. 105 Most importantly, forestry contributes to the Convention on 
Climate Change and, on this point, it can act in two ways. First, 
increasing carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is considered to be one of 
the chief causes of the apparent rise in global temperatures and trees 
can act as a sink, consuming carbon dioxide through aspiration and 
storing it in their cellulose structure. Secondly, trees, particularly 
broadleaved trees, are a source of useful timber and raising domestic 
production of hardwoods could reduce the demand for imported timber from 
such environmentally fragile, yet highly exploited areas like the Amazon 
Basin and Indonesia. 
At the national level there has been a significant increase in 
environmental awareness amongst the public. This is shown by the growth 
in membership of environmental organisations in recent decades and by 
opinion polls which suggest that many people now consider themselves 
environmentally aware. 106 Accordingly, there has been a great deal of 
public concern about the consequences for the environment of the 
intensive agricultural practices promoted by the CAP. Public disquiet 
also preceded changes to the forestry practices which encouraged 
104 Details of the agree1ents made at the UNCRD Conference are given in Grubb, Koch, Monson, Sullivan 
& Tho1son, The Earth Sum~it Agreements, (1993), p.xv. 
105 The Forestry Collission have initiated a project of work towards improving biodiversity in managed 
forests, for exatple. FC, Forestry Review: Highlights fro• the Forestry Co11ission Annual Report 1992-
1993, (London: HMSO, February 1994), p.6. 
106 Garner, RnviroDJental Politics, (1996), p.64. 
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environmentally damaging large scale conifer planting. Moreover, it is 
clear that a better understanding of the environment has contributed to 
'a far greater recognition of the interdependence of environmental 
problems' amongst the public and environmental groups. 107 
Arguably, there has always been interest in and concern about the 
environment at the local level. Environmental degradation is obvious to 
those who live alongside it and the environment and conservation are 
important factors in local planning and central to the Green Belt policy. 
Restoration of derelict land, the aftermath of industrial decline, is 
perhaps the best example of how the CF initiative could help in improving 
a community's immediate environment. According to the CC, the CFs will 
provide a 'better place to live and work'; act 'as a giant air 
conditioning system, soaking up pollution and releasing oxygen back into 
the atmosphere' ; they wi 11 be havens for wildlife and offer 'new 
environments for leisure'. 108 In addition, there is a local dimension 
to the CF initiative which, because of its community nature, attempts to 
encourage people in Forest areas to participate in a development from 
which they will ultimately benefit. 
2. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMUNITY FOREST PROGRAMME 
Examination of the process which led to the CF programme shows it 
to be the result of the interaction of a large number of groups with 
widely differing interests. However, the focus of this thesis is the 
organisation of those groups to bring the CFs into existence. For this, 
the participants, the aims and objectives of the initiative and the 
incentives required to move it forward must be identified. Moreover, the 
arrangement of these features - how they are combined to form a cohesive 
whole must be considered, and of specific interest are the 
participating public sector bodies which have primary responsibility for 
guiding the initiative to a successful conclusion. 
THE PARTICIPANTS 
There are many partners to the CF initiative and although they will 
vary slightly with each Forest project (the participating local councils 
107 Ibid., p.66. 
108 CC, Forests for the Community, ( 1991). 
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will differ, for example), broadly speaking they will be as follows: 
the national partners - the CC and FC; 
central governaent - the DoE (now the Departlent for the Environaent, Transport and the 
Regions, DE'l'R) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF); 
national agencies - English Nature, Sports Council and English Heritage; 
local governaent - local authorities and parish councils; 
far11ers and landowners - Country Landowners Association (CLA), the National Fauers Union 
(NFU), and individual farmers and owners; 
the business col!unity - forestry and timber companies, and local businesses; 
tbe voluntary sector - environaental groups, interest groups, schools and educational 
institutions, coamonity groups and local people. 109 
This extensive, though not exhaustive, list includes a large proportion 
of public sector bodies but however separate and autonomous they appear, 
listing them in this way disguises the variations in their character and 
the complex web of relationships and responsibilities that exists between 
them. It is, therefore, worth considering each of them in more detail. 
The first three groups of participants listed are government 
departments and their agencies and are • the main instruments for 
implementing government policy when Parliament has passed the necessary 
legislation • . 110 Whilst this may be true, it is important to deal with 
departments and agencies separately since they clearly have different 
structures of accountability. The DETR is the government department with 
responsibility for the environment and for local government. 111 The 
MAFF is the department responsible for policies of agriculture, 
horticulture and fisheries; food safety and quality; some negotiations 
with the EU on Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies; and some rural 
matters, like the enhancement of the countryside. 112 Both departments 
are headed by Cabinet Ministers who, by convention are responsible for 
the actions of those departments of state and accountable to Parliament 
for them. 
The FC is the government department responsible for forestry 
109 GNF, Forest Plan: Executive Sumaary, (Chester-le-Street: GNF, 1994), p.13. 
11
° Central Office of Information (COl), The British Syste1 of Governtent, 3rd Edition, (London: The 
Stationery Office, 1996), p.49-50. 
111 Cabinet Office, The Civil Service Year Book 1996, (London: HMSO, 1995), col.220. 
112 Ibid., col.37. 
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throughout Great Britain. However, the FC differs from most departments 
because it 'has a Chairman and Board of Commissioners with statutorily 
prescribed duties and powers'. 113 The Commissioners report directly to 
Forestry Ministers, namely the Secretary of State for Scotland, the 
Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food and the Secretary of State for 
Wales. Moreover, the FC was restructured in 1991, separating its roles 
and responsibilities. The Forest Authority now provides advice and sets 
standards for the industry, administers grant aid schemes for private 
woodlands, and so on. The Forest Enterprise is responsible for managing 
the Commission's forestry estate and, since 1994 has operated as an 
Executive Agency. 
Executive Agencies arose from the Next Steps programme launched in 
1988. 114 The programme was an attempt to improve efficiency and 
management in government by 'hiving-off' some executive functions of 
government to agencies operating at arms-length from government 
departments and headed by a Chief Executive. Ministers remain responsible 
for policy, but it is the Chief Executive who is personally responsible 
for the day-to-day operations of the agency. 115 Regarding the Forest 
Enterprise arm of the FC, the Chief Executive is 'responsible for day-to-
day management of the Forest Estate ... within a framework of policy 
objectives and resources set out in a framework document'. 116 
The CC, as the other national partner to the CF initiative, is the 
government body responsible for conserving and enhancing the beauty of 
the English countryside, and helping people to enjoy it. 117 It is a 
non-departmental public body (NDPB), that is 'a body which has a role in 
the process of national government, but is not a government department 
or part of one, and accordingly operates to a greater or lesser extent 
113 Ibid., col.316. 
114 Efficiency Unit, Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps, The Ibbs Report, (London: HMSO, 
1988). 
115 This is the position according to the Government's CO!, The British System of Government, (1996), 
p.62. However, it most be reteabered that this, apparently simple, line of accountability remains 
unclear. For example, the Ibbs Report clearly states that: 'For agencies which are government 
departaents or parts of departments ultimate accountability for operations 11ost also rest with 
Ministers'. Improving Management in Government, (1988), Annex A, p.17. 
116 Cabinet Office, The Civil Service Year Book 1996, (1995), col.318. 
117 Cabinet Office, The Civil Service Year Book 1994, (London: HMSO, 1994), col.743. 
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at arms length from Ministers'. 118 The CC is a NDPB of the executive 
type whose sponsoring department is the DoE (now the DETR). 119 English 
Nature is also an executive type NDPB sponsored by the DoE (now the 
DETR), 120 and advises government on nature conservation in England. 121 
The Sports Council 'is responsible for developing sports and physical 
recreation' 122 and English Heritage is 'devoted to the conservation and 
preservation of England's inheritance of ancient monuments and historic 
buildings'. 123 Both are executive type NDPBs sponsored by the 
Department of National Heritage (DNH). 124 The DNH is, therefore, a 
further government department linked to the CF initiative through the 
Sports Council and English Heritage. It has responsibility for a range 
of cultural policies including the arts, sport, the National Lottery, 
museums and galleries, libraries, architectural and archaeological 
heritage and tourism. 125 
Each CF requires the cooperation of the local councils in the 
relevant areas. Local government can be defined as 'self-government 
involving the administration of public affairs in each locality by a body 
of representatives of the local community' . 126 These bodies are 
multipurpose and have a wide range of duties in local affairs, possessing 
considerable responsibility and discretionary power, they are ultimately 
responsible to the DETR and subordinate to Parliament. For historical 
reasons there is no uniform pattern of local government structure in 
England. Generally, two principal tiers exist, an upper tier of county 
118 Cabinet Office, Office of Public Service and Science (OPSS), Public Bodies 1994, (London: HMSO, 
1995), para.5, p.v. 
119 Rrecutive bodies 'normally employ staff and have their own budget, but in a few cases bodies are 
included which erercise administrative or regulatory functions in their own name but are supported by 
staff supplied by the sponsoring department'. Ibid., pp.v & 14. 
12
° Cabinet Office, Office of Public Service (OPS), Public Bodies 1995, (London: HKSO, 1995), p.12. 
121 Cabinet Office, The Civil Service Year Book 1996, (1995), col.756. 
122 Ibid., cols.794-5. 
123 Ibid., col.756. 
124 Cabinet Office, OPS, Public Bodies 1995, (1995), p.30. 
125 Cabinet Office, The Civil Service Year Book 1996, (1995), col.496. 
126 Byrne, Local Government, (1986), pp.1-2. 
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councils and a lower tier district councils (often called city or borough 
councils). In non-metropolitan areas parish councils make up a third 
tier, however, in general in metropolitan areas only one tier 
exists. 127 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Identifying and defining goals and objectives in the public sector 
is manifestly difficult because of the absence of the profit motive. The 
aims of public bodies are frequently more numerous and diverse than the 
aims of private companies and this is also true of the CF programme. The 
initiative is part of the multipurpose forestry policy and aims to alter 
the pattern of afforestation in England. In general an increase in 
lowland broadleaf woodland is sought, with the emphasis on obtaining 
multiple benefits from forestry rather than viewing it simply as a means 
of producing timber. This will contribute towards the Government's policy 
of expanding woodland in the lowlands by increasing the level of tree 
cover in the Forest areas from 6. 9% to about 30% over 30 years or 
so. 1 ~ 8 In turn the CFs will build upon the Government's broader 
commitment to sustainable development. 
To properly understand the CF programme it is important to consider 
the more specific goals and objectives that have been established for it. 
The 'single aim' is 'to develop multipurpose forests which will create 
better environments for people to use, cherish and enjoy'. 129 A more 
comprehensive version reads: 
The ail of the national prograue of Couuni ty Forests is to achieve 1ajor environ•ental 
i1prove1ents around towns and cities, creating beautiful areas rich in wildlife, with 
associated provision for access, leisure and education; thereby making them more attractive 
places in which to live, do business and enjoy leisure time. 130 
This might be referred to as the goal of the programme, that is, 'the 
higher level of activity which may be general in nature and the 
127 David Wilson & Chris Gale, with Steve Leach & Gerry Stoker, Local Govern1ent in the United Kingdom, 
(London: l!ac•illan, 1994), pp.61-62. 
128 CC, Couunity Forests: Briefing Doc~aent, (Cheltenham: CC, 1995), para.1.15, p.5. 
129 Ibid., para.l.8, p.3. 
130 Ibid., para.IO, p.13. 
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responsibility of the highest levels of management'. 131 Objectives are 
more specific and measurable activities which are the responsibility of 
lower levels in the management hierarchy. 132 A number of general 
objectives have been identified for each individual CF to adopt and are: 
i. To regenerate the environment of the Green Belt and equivalent areas, where it is public 
policy to keep it open, and help ensure that it is permanently green and open; 
ii. To improve the landscape of the area, including reclamation of derelict land, to create a 
visually exciting and functionally diverse environment; 
iii. To increase opportunities for sport and recreation, including artistic and cultural 
events, and access; 
iv. To protect areas of high quality landscape or historical or archaeological interest; 
v. To protect sites of nature conservation value and create new opportunities for nature 
conservation; 
vi. To provide new opportunities for educational use of the area, and ensure the mosaic of 
habitats in the forest can be used for the full range of enviroDJental education needs of the 
surrounding schools. Also to ensure that urban schools are not disadvantaged in meeting the 
needs of the National Curriculum; 
vii. To protect the best agricultural land and increase opportunities for farm diversification 
elsewhere in accordance with Governaent agricultural and local planning policies; 
viii. To establish a supply of local timber and other woodland products; 
ix. To achieve a high level of community cotmitment to the concept and involvement in its 
implementation; 
x. To give private and public sector confidence in the long-term prospects of the area and to 
provide a proper base for investment. To improve the environment near housing and local 
industry and to increase the value of properties and businesses; 
xi. To seek private sector support to implement the forest and to invest in leisure and other 
relevant service sectors; 
xii. To create jobs in the new woodland industries, both management of woodland and use of the 
raw materials. To create jobs in the leisure industry developed in and around the Community 
Forest. To sustain other local jobs by providing an outstanding environment as a comparative 
economic advantage over cotpetitor areas; 
xiii. To complement the Government's priorities for inner cities, by providing for associated 
leisure and open space needs at the physically closest locations; and 
131 Richard A. Chapman, 'Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Civil Service', Evidence taken before the 
Expenditure Committee (General Sub-Committee), Vol.3, Appendix 25, (London: HMSO, 1977), p.957. 
132 Ibid., p. 957. 
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xiv. To remain flexible in the light of changes, such as in the leisure market. 133 
It should, however, be noted that the objectives vary in number, wording 
and emphasis according to the document consulted. For example, The 1994 
Forest Plan for the GNF gives eleven objectives; a CC Briefing Document, 
published in 1995, gives twelve objectives and fourteen 'corporate' 
objectives; and the CC's 1998 Monitoring Report gives thirteen. 134 
INSTRUMENTS FOR CHANGE 
It is argued that the UK Government's approach towards 
environmental policy is tolerant and unassertive. 135 Realisation of 
sustainable development, relies on providing the appropriate and 
necessary environmental information for the public to base their decision 
on, combined with market mechanisms to encourage behavioural changes in 
favour of the environment. 136 The CF initiative is broadly in line with 
this approach and the Statement of Understanding, drawn up to clarify the 
position of farmers and landowners, highlights the voluntary nature of 
the initiative. Moreover, compulsory purchase of land is ruled out, the 
agreement of landlords and tenants must be obtained before planting is 
carried out, and there is no change in the legal position regarding 
public access to land. 137 The 'main approach', therefore, 'will be to 
encourage farmers, landowners and businesses to consider the 
opportunities which the community forests might represent'. 138 
The GNF literature defines three 'mechanisms' - persuasion, 
purchase and planning - through which the establishment of the Forest 
133 CC, Community Forests: Briefing Document, (1995), para.10, pp.14-15. 
134 See GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.3.9, p.12; CC, Community Forests: Briefing Document, (1995), 
para.1.9, pp.3-4 & Section 10, pp.13-14; and Report prepared by ENTEC for CC & FC, Community Forest 
Programme: Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (Cheltenham: CC, 1998), Appendix C, pp.1-2. 
135 Neil Carter & Phillip Lowe, for example, claim that environmental control in Britain is 'pervaded 
by administrative rather that judicial procedures; is informal, accommodative and technocratic'. In 
dealing with private concerns, they say, the approach is 'voluntarist', 'seeks to foster cooperation' 
and leans heavily on 'negotiation and persuasion' to achieve objectives. Implementation is preferably 
through 'consent', self-regulation' and informal agreement'. 'Environmental Politics and Administrative 
Reform', Political Quarterly, (1994), Vol.65, pp.265-266. 
136 DoE, This Common Inheritance, (1990). 
137 CC, Farming in the Community Forests, (1993), pp.2-3. 
138 CC, Community Forests: Briefing Document, (1995), para.l.lO, p.4. 
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will be pursued. Advice, grants and agreements will be used to persuade 
farmers, landowners and others to convert their land to forestry. Some 
land will be purchased 'to secure direct control through ownership', and 
then turned over to forestry; and planning agreements and conditions will 
ensure that forestry becomes one of the considerations for new 
developments. 139 Clearly all these mechanisms will play a role in the 
Forest's development, but perhaps the most important mechanism for 
persuading people in the Forest areas to establish woodland and develop 
their land in concert with the aims of multipurpose forestry is the use 
of economic instruments. 
Although this is a community policy, market mechanisms will also 
be applied to the improvement of the environment. These are economic 
instruments and mainly consist of the range of grants that are available 
from various government bodies to support groups that contribute towards 
the objectives laid down for the CFs. The most important grants are those 
which encourage the planting of woodland and include the Woodland Grant 
Scheme (WGS) administered through the FC' s Forestry Authority, and 
available to farmers and landowners to support the establishment, 
regeneration and management of woodlands over 0. 25 hectares; and the Farm 
Woodland Scheme (FWS), administered by the MAFF and aimed at supporting 
the establishment of woodlands over 0.5 hectares. 
Numerous other grants are available to support different aspects 
of the Forest development. In addition to the FWS, for example, MAFF is 
responsible for administering the Farm and Conservation Scheme to help 
farmers with the capital costs of maintaining efficient farming systems, 
pollution control and countryside conservation. The DETR, through the CC, 
is responsible for the Countryside Stewardship Scheme, available for 
conservation and enhancement of wildlife habitats, landscape and 
archaeological features; the Landscape Conservation Scheme and Recreation 
Grants. As the sponsoring department for English Nature, the DETR is also 
responsible for awarding Project Grants. The DNH, through English 
Heritage, is responsible for Historic Building Grants, Ancient Monument 
Grants, and, through the Sports Council, administers various grants for 
the provision of sports facilities. The Rural Development Commission 
(ROC), the 'Government agency tasked with promoting the well being of 
139 GNF, Executive Souary, (1994), p.13. 
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communi ties in the rural areas of England', 140 administers the 
Redundant Building Grant. Also worth noting are Training and New 
Enterprise Grants for business training. 141 These are administered by 
Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), set up in 1988 and under the 
general supervision of the DfEE with members drawn from local 
authorities, private companies, unions and voluntary bodies. 142 It must 
be remembered that this is not an exhaustive list of grants and others 
offered by Government include those which are obtained through bids made 
to the Lottery and Millennium Commissions. 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The complex pattern of organisation developed for implementing the 
CFs is a consequence of the multipurpose nature of the programme, its 
scale and inclusiveness. First, the initiative cuts across the 
responsibilities of several government departments and agencies which 
provide grants, advice and other services. Responsibility for 
administration of the initiative cannot, therefore, easily be assigned 
to any single government body. Secondly, the administrators of the CFs 
must be responsive to their community and elicit support from that 
community. Yet, by spanning local government boundaries, individual CFs 
are geographically too large for any single local authority to 
administer. 143 Finally, although the public sector has a major part to 
play in the CF initiative, it is a partnership which also incorporates 
organisations from the private and voluntary sectors. Administration of 
the programme is, therefore, not a simple matter because there are many 
participants and contributors, and no existing central or local 
government body in England which could legitimately and satisfactorily 
undertake this duty. 
The solution is that twelve 'ad hoc' or, single purpose, 
14
° Cabinet Office, The Civil Service Year Book 1997, (London: The Stationery Office, 1997), col.813. 
141 CC, ColDIDunity Forests: Briefing Docu.ment, (1995), paras.l.ll-1.12, p.4; & CC, Farming in the 
ColDllnnity Forests, (1993), pp.10-11. 
142 Michael Dynes & David Walker, The Tises Guide to the New British State: The Governaent Machine in 
the 1990s, (London: Times Books, 1995), p.195. 
143 There are possible exceptions to this, but in most cases it holds true. See CC, Community Forests: 
Briefing Document, (1995), pp.l0-13. 
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organisations have been established, each with the single aim of 
developing their own CF. These organisations are unusual and can be 
described as quasi-governmental bodies, representing a functional 
decentralisation, or hiving off of services and functions, both from 
central and local government. 144 They also combine some of the features 
of joint arrangements which exist either for the coordination of services 
spanning more than one local authority (joint boards); or for 
implementing projects that involve participants from a number of public 
and private sector bodies (mixed joint committees). 145 
Each CF is administered by a formal organisation146 centred 
around a Project Team appointed by the Forestry and Countryside 
Commissions in partnership with the relevant local authorities. 
Supporting groups, or committees, served by local councillors, council 
officers and representatives from the CC, FC and other participating 
bodies, have also been formally established to advise and steer the 
Project Teams. The formal organisation is internally complex with staff 
or membership made up of appointees representing participating public, 
private and voluntary bodies. Moreover the limits of the formal 
organisation are not easy to define because there are a wide range of 
bodies that are not properly members, yet have a role in each Project. 
For example, the DNH has indirect responsibility through the Sports 
Council and English Heritage; and the ROC and TECs provide grants for the 
programme but are not represented in the formal organisation. Therefore, 
the formal organisation tends to blend into a wider and more diffuse 
organisation and, in this sense, it is more of a network of 
interconnected and interrelated organisations centred around the formal 
organisation. This extended organisational structure is akin to what Tom 
144 Byrne uses functional decentralisation to describe decentralisation fro• central government, Local 
Government in Britain, (1986), p.1. Whereas Christopher Stevens uses the term to describe the way that 
local authority functions have been 1oved closer to the public 'ostensibly on a territorial basis, but 
in reality by splitting different functions •.. and delegating them to the private sector, ad hoc boards, 
the voluntary sector, quasi-deaocratic units and quangos'. 'The Politics of Decentralisation', Teaching 
Public Ad1inistration, (1994), Vol.15, No.2, p.2. 
145 Gerry Stoker gives the examples of Police services which are coordinated through joint boards, and 
the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal project adainistered by a mixed joint co11ittee. The Politics of Local 
GoverDJent, 2nd Edition, (London: Mac1illan, 1988), pp.75-78. 
146 Peter M.Blau ' Richard Scott have defined formal organisations as those organisation 'formally 
established for the explicit purpose of achieving certain goals'. Foraal Organisations: A Cotparative 
Approach, (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1964), p.5. 
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Burns and G.M.Stalker described as an organic system, rather than a 
mechanistic system based on traditional bureaucratic principles derived 
from Max Weber's ideal-type. 147 Although Burns' and Stalker's research 
concerned the internal workings of a single organisation, the term could 
equally apply to the way the many participating organisations interact 
with one another in the administration of the CFs. 
There are limits to the amount of decentralisation and flexibility 
possible in the public sector organisations. The 'fundamental dilemma' 
of decentralisation, according to Elcock, 'is between allowing local 
discretion and thus giving scope for service providers to be more 
accessible, responsive and creative, and maintaining sufficient central 
control to ensure efficiency and protect equity'. 148 Regarding 
flexibility, Stewart Ranson and John Stewart point out that the 'public 
organization cannot be wholly organic because it has to act as a vehicle 
for imposing collective will' . 149 Moreover, public orgarlt.sations are 
constrained by the law and can only do what they have been specifically 
given the powers to do. Despite these natural limits, the implementation 
of the CFs must be as decentralised and flexible as possible to satisfy 
community expectations, yet the greater this is achieved, the more 
difficult coordination and control of the project is and the less clear 
accountability becomes. 
2. 4. ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE COMMUNITY FOREST PROGRAMME 
In this chapter the process which led to the CF programme and the 
way in which the many groups are brought together to implement the 
initiative have been considered. Clearly the multipurpose forestry policy 
and CF programme are pluralist150 and, although there is a significant 
147 To• Burns & G.M.Stalker, The Management of Innovation, (London: Tavistock, 1961). 
148 Howard Elcock, Change and Decay? Public Adlinistration in the 1990s, (Harlow: Longman, 1991), p.59. 
149 Stewart Ranson & John Stewart, 'Citizenship and Govern1ent: The Challenge for Manage.~~ent in the 
Public Domain', Political Studies, (1989), Vol.37, pp.21-22. 
150 Nelson Polsby defines pluralisl as having one or 1ore of the following characteristics: 'dispersion 
of power a•ong •any rather than few participants in decision-laking; competition or conflict a.ong 
political leaders; specialisation of leaders to relatively restricted sets of issue areas; bargaining 
rather than hierarchical decision-making; election in which suffrage is relatively widespread as a 1ajor 
determinant of participation in key decisions; bases of influence over decisions relatively dispersed 
rather that closely held; and so on'. Community Power and Political Theory, [1963), 2nd Edition, (Yale 
University Press, 1980), p.154. 
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role for the public sector, many private and voluntary groups are also 
involved. The programme attempts to compromise the varying and often 
contradictory interests by providing multiple aims and involving the 
participating groups in decision making and implementation. Each CF is 
separately developed by a formal organisation centred around a Project 
Team supported by advisory and steering groups or committees. These ad 
hoc or single purpose bodies have similarities with joint boards and 
mixed joint committees, and enable the coordinating of projects which 
span several local authority areas and involve many participants. Not all 
participants or contributors have a role in the formal organisation but 
they may all be considered as part of the wider network. 
Although some land will be bought for Forest use, the initiative 
is designed to proceed through voluntary and consensual means, involving 
the community but with reference to the market. This is administrativelr 
complex with a wide range of grants and other economic incentives 
dispensed by a number of government departments, agencies and other 
public bodies. In addition these public sector organisations provide 
advice and may arrange agreements with participating groups. Local 
authorities will also act as advisors and broker agreements, although 
their main role is perhaps in the field of planning. 
This largely organic administrative structure appears to be 
particularly apt for the implementation of sustainable development 
because of its flexibility and the opportunity it provides to co-opt many 
different groups and interests. Coordination of such a varied and 
unwieldy organisation (the formal and wider organisation) may present 
difficulties for the Project Teams. However, it is control, specifically 
the formal control of administrative responsibility in the complex 
organisation, that presents most difficulty. The most obvious concern is 
who prevails in administrative decisions where the many participating 
groups compete to satisfy their own interests which may conflict with the 
goal or objectives of the initiative, or simply be imprudent. This raises 
important questions about accountability and responsibility in the 
organisation, and particularly amongst the public sector participants. 
Responsibility is generally taken to mean the compass of authority 
to make decisions and act, and accountability the requirement to justify 
actions: accountability is, then, the enforcement of responsibility. The 
notions of accountability and responsibility have a special place in the 
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process of government in the UK because of the absence of a written 
constitution. The system relies on the conventions that Ministers are 
both 'collectively responsible to Parliament for the general conduct of 
the affairs of the country', and 'individually responsible to Parliament 
for the conduct of their departments'. 151 However, in the case of the 
CF programme Ministers are distant from the formal organisation and it 
may not be practical for them to be responsible for day-to-day operation. 
Neither is the formal organisation part of elected local government and 
there are many other participating public sector bodies, none of which 
have overall responsibility. Moreover, since the formal organisation is 
composed of representatives from several government and private and 
voluntary bodies, its status is far from clear. A key question for this 
study is how administrative responsibility is built in to the 
organisational and management structure, and how this fits into the 
democratic system of the UK. 
Concern about political responsibility in Britain is a 20th Century 
phenomenon, according to A.H.Birch. Only after reform of the 
represent aU ve systems of government had been achieved in the 19th 
Century, was attention turned to 'the significance of the conventions of 
ministerial responsibility and the reality of Parliamentary control of 
the executive', he says. 152 However, the structural and management 
changes of the last few decades have done much to change the political 
landscape and heighten the debate. Responsibility and accountability were 
clearly defined in tradi tiona! bureaucracies where, at its most rational, 
staff would 'only observe the impersonal duties of their offices', there 
would be 'a clear hierarchy of offices', and the 'functions of the 
offices [would be] clearly specified'. 153 
The structure of the public sector has been significantly altered 
by the 'hiving off' of specific government activities which can be traced 
back to recommendations made in the Report of the Fulton Committee on the 
151 Here responsible 'does not mean morally responsible or culpable, bot accountable or answerable'. 
O.Hood Phillips & Paul Jackson, O.Hood Phillips' Constitutional and Administrative Law, 7th Edition, 
(London: Sweet & Ma1well, 1987), pp.125, 126 & 309. 
152 A.B. Bi reb, Representative and Responsible Government: An Essay on the British Consti totion, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1964), p.237. 
153 Ma1 Weber, Wirtschaft ond Gesel1scbaft [1946], quoted in Martin Albrow, Bureaucracy, (London: 
Macmillan, 1970), p.44. 
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Civil Service published in 1968. 154 Concerns have consistently been 
voiced since about the number of QUANGOs and the amount of administration 
undertaken by them. 155 However, the hiving off process was formalised 
and extended by the Next Steps initiative in 1988 and has been 
progressively implemented since. 
In addition, the style of management in the Civil Service has 
altered with the introduction of business methods and the emphasis on 
accountability for performance. 156 The most significant statement about 
the application of performance measurement at all levels of government 
appeared in the White Paper which launched the Financial Management 
Initiative (FMI) in 1982. This aimed: 
to proaote in each department an organization and system in which managers at all levels have: 
a. a clear view of their objectives and means to assess and, wherever possible, measure outputs 
or perforaances in relation to those objectives; 
b. well-defined responsibility for making the best use of their resources including a critical 
scrutiny of output and value for money; and 
c. the information (particularly about costs), the training and the access to expert advice 
they need to exercise their responsibilities effectively. 157 
Hiving off government activities to unelected quasi-governmental 
bodies which operate at arms length from ministers and elected local 
government, and the emphasis on accountability for performance are, 
arguably, the result of government becoming too complex for 
responsibility for the work of a department to lie entirely with 
accountable Ministers alone. However. the rise of what Christopher Hood 
has called New Public Management (NPM), combined with the trend towards 
154 The Report recommended the establishment of accountable units within government departments 'where 
output can be measured against costs or other criteria, and where individuals can be held personally 
responsible for their performance'. Report of the Committee on the Civil Service, The Civil Service, 
The Fulton Report, [Cmnd.3638], Vol.l, (London: HMSO, 1968), para.150. 
155 For example, Barker (Ed), Ouanqos in Britain, (1982), and F.F.Ridley & David Wilson, (Eds), The 
Ouango Debate, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
156 Christopher Hood, for example, suggests that one of the doctrines of new public management is 
explicit standards and measures of perfor1ance justified on the grounds that accountability requires 
a clear statement of goals and that efficiency requires attention to objectives. 'A Public Management 
for all Seasons?', Public Adlinistration, (1991), Vol.69, No.1, p.4. 
157 Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Civil Service, Government Observations on the Third Report from 
the Treasury and Civil Service Select Com~ittee, [HC.236, Cmnd.8616], (London: HMSO, 1982), para.13. 
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implementing public policy through partnership arrangements with the 
private and voluntary sectors as community policy, does little to reduce 
the complexity of the public sector. 
Several difficulties with the administration of the CF programme 
can be suggested. First, functional decentralisation means that many of 
the public bodies are distant from central and local government, making 
lines of responsibility unclear. Secondly, there are numerous public 
bodies involved, all with designated responsibilities but none with 
overall responsibility. Thirdly, the partnership arrangement between 
public, private and voluntary organisations, blurs the public sector 
boundary. Clear and intelligible organisation is a fundamental 
requirement in public service and important questions must be raised 
about democratic accountability in these complex arrangements. 
Furthermore, the prospects for success of the CF programme, the 
achievement of its aims and objectives, must be in question when there 
is no one in overall control. This has wider implications for the 
implementation of sustainable development in other contexts. Accordingly, 
the next two chapters examine how accountability is built into the 
structure and management of one of the CF projects, the GNF, and 
considers its operation and questions its efficacy in such complex 
arrangements. 
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CHAPTER 3 
~HE 
GREAT NQRkH FOREST.: 
ORGANISATI~ON-AL STRUCTURE 
AN1D TRAJIJITIONAL 
METHODS OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
- _, ~ 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine in detail the form and 
structure of the organisation which has developed to implement the GNF. 
First, it will consider the formal organisation established explicitly 
for the purpose of achieving that goal. Secondly, the wider organisation, 
which is inextricably linked to the Project and which will play a 
significant part in achieving its goal, is explored. The roles and 
responsibilities of the many actors and the relationships between them 
are discussed. However, it is the accountability arrangements between the 
participating public bodies that are the main focus of attention, and the 
Chapter concludes by considering the role of hierarchical accountability, 
and its limitations in the Project. The discussion draws particular 
attention to the difficulties of identifying who is accountable and to 
whom they are accountable in this complex arrangement. This is of 
significant concern for a project which benefits from substantial 
financial support from the public sector, and especially so where the 
public, private and voluntary sectors work in close partnership. 
3.2. THE FORMAL ORGANISATION 
Participation in the development of the GNF is planned to be wide 
and diverse. The Forest Plan, for example, states that: 
Its realisation will detand the co11itted support of key national and local bodies, together 
with all sections of the local coamunity. Each has a role to play in forging and sustaining the 
working partnerships needed to carry the initiative to fruition over its long tiaescale. 158 
However, the Forest is principally a partnership between the CC, the FC 
and the five local authorities which operate in the area, and these are 
considered first. 
THE PRINCIPAL PARTNERS 
There are five local authorities participating in the GNF Project 
(see Appendix 3). 159 Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council (MBC), 
South Tyneside MBC and the City of Sunderland Council are unitary or 
single-tier authorities. The remaining two are part of the two-tier local 
158 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.l6.23, p.93. 
159 It should be noted that the Forest e1tends into the local authority areas of Derwentside, Durham 
City and Easington although they are not represented in the for1al organisation. 
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government system and geographically overlap, so the Chester-le-Street 
District Council (DC) area of responsibility is contained within that of 
the Durham County Council area. As noted in Chapter 2, the CC is a NDPB 
responsible to the DETR and the FC is a government department. 
The general organisational arrangement for the administration of 
the GNF was decided by the CC and FC when the initiative was launched in 
1989. 160 However, the detailed structure of the Project Team and the 
relationships between the principal partners were formalised in a three 
year joint 'Memorandum of Understanding' on the establishment of the GNF 
in February 1990, and covering the provisional planning stage of the 
Project. This was followed in April 1993 by a joint 'Memorandum of 
Agreement', to cover a further three years during which time the final 
Forest Plan was published and implementation began. The main purpose of 
the Memorandum of Agreement was to 
set out the detailed arrangeaents and agreements between the seven partner organisations for 
developing ways in which they will work individually and together to support the creation of 
the GNF. 161 
The memorandum has since been reviewed; however, the purpose and 
arrangements remain essentially unchanged as the longer-term process of 
implementation proceeds. 
THE PROJECT TEAPJ 
The focal point for the seven principal partners in the GNF 
initiative is a 'freestanding' Project Team162 which forms the core of 
the formal organisation. The staff are appointed from a number of 
participating bodies, mainly the principal partners, and paid by these 
bodies. 163 It is a coordinating body and its major role is 'to promote 
and support effective partnerships between the many agencies and 
organisations which will play a part in the complex jigsaw of 
16
° Comment made by the GNF Project Director, John Vaughan, during interview in July 1995. 
161 GNF, Members Steering Group Report of 21/10/92, p.1 and Annez 1, 'MesorandUJ of Agreement 1993-96', 
para 1.2, p.l. 
162 GNF, 'MeJorandum of Agree1ent 1993-96', para.5.1, p.5. 
163 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), paras.3.5-3.6, p.12. 
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implementing the Great North Forest'. 164 The specific objectives of the 
Project Team are to:-
1 prepare and i1ple1ent a Forest Plan; 
1 pro1ote the Co11unity Forest concept; 
I seek the cooperation, involve1ent and partnership of private owners, landowning and tenant 
farmers; 
# provide advice, e1pertise and access to grant aid; 
I secure adequate resources for the Great North Forest, including private sector funding and 
targeted grant aid; 
# involve and work with schools, local co11unities, voluntary groups and individuals; [and) 
I investigate planting techniques and costs to ensure effective establishment and 
1anage1ent. 165 
The Forest Plan 
Of particular importance is the preparation of the Forest Plan, 'a 
non-statutory document setting out the agreed view and approach of the 
major partners to the future management of the countryside within ... [the 
Forest] area'. 166 This document, published in January 1994 after a four 
month consultation period, represents the first step towards putting the 
Project into practice, providing details of anticipated developments 
which can be then incorporated into the structural and local plans 
prepared by the participating local authorities. The aims and objectives 
of the CF programme, identified in Chapter 2, are reaffirmed, but, 
importantly, the Forest Plan provides details of the many groups expected 
to be involved in the Project, and the roles and responsibilities that 
they will have in the complex process of developing the Forest. 
The Team ftembers 
As of 1994, the Project Team comprised the following members 
appointed by the partner local authorities: A Project Director, John 
Vaughan, employed by Gateshead MBC, whose role is to liaise with key 
agencies to encourage support, especially from business sources, and to 
deal with sponsorship. The Project Director is responsible to the Members 
164 GNF, Forest Advisory Forum Report, (26/7/94), para.10. 
165 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.3.4, pp.ll-12. 
166 Ibid., para.5.1, p.17. 
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Steering Group (see below) which directs the Project, and through the CC 
and FC to ministers in the DETR and MAFF who monitor the progress of the 
Project. 167 A Project Development Manager, Jon Clark, employed by 
Durham County Council, whose role is to coordinate the Project with 
farmers and landowners, conservation and recreation bodies, and to liaise 
with local authorities. A Community Liaison Officer, Chris Growcott, 
employed by South Tyneside MBC; an Office Manager, Christine Heppe!, 
employed by City of Sunderland Council; and a Community Forester, Fraser 
Scott, dedicated and employed by the FC. 168 In addition, a number of 
other organisations have appointed staff to the Project Team. These 
include a Community Woodland Officer from the Woodland Trust; a Project 
Officer from the Tidy Britain Group; 169 a Business Liaison Officer on 
temporary secondment from the Department of Employment (since 1997, the 
Department for Education and Employment, DfEE); and a Sport and 
Recreation Development Officer is funded by the Sports Council. 170 
Finance 
The Project Team is not primarily a spending body. Its main 
function is to coordinate the many participating groups, providing advice 
and information to interested parties and bringing them together with the 
appropriate grant awarding bodies. The Project Team's budget is small and 
is used to support the organisation itself; however, some limited 
spending on other activities is permitted. In 1993-94, for example, the 
Project Director could spend up to £500 without endorsement from the 
Project partners on providing of information, supporting events, 
publicity, and conservation and recreation activities. 171 
The members of the Project Team are employed on a full-time basis 
167 Monitoring Reports are prepared annually for the FC & CC and presented to ministers. They provide 
details of the year's achievements against seven indicators identified by the DHfR and MAFF, along with 
other relevant information. See, for example, HNTHC for CC & FC Community Forest Programme: Monitoring 
Report 1997/1998, (1998) p.2. 
168 GNF, 'Memorandum of Agreement 1993-96', para.5.2, p.5, & GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.3.5, p.l2. 
169 The Tidy Britain Group is an independent charity funded by the DHTR and the private sector which 
campaigns to improve the cleanliness and amenity value of public places in Britain. 
170 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.3.6, p.12 & Appendix F, p.ll2. 
171 GNF, 'Memorandum of Agreement 1993-96', para.9.15, p.14. 
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by their appointing organisations, and the five participating local 
authorities and the CC contribute to the cost of running the Project 
Team's offices. 172 This totalled £65,000 in the financial year 1993-4, 
with the local authorities contributing £32,500 in total (£6,500 each) 
and an equal amount of £32,500 from the CC. These amounts are adjusted 
each year to keep pace with inflation. The financial administrator is 
Gateshead MBC and spending in 1993-4 broke down as follows: office 
accommodation, and running costs (£35,000); publicity, information, 
training and minor research (£20,000); and assistance to local community 
groups, voluntary bodies and schools (£10,000). 173 
The Future of the Project Team 
The Project Team owes its existence to the Memorandum of Agreement 
and its continuation and the structure which it takes is dependent on the 
partners to that agreement and future agreements. The partners are not 
tied to the organisation and can terminate the contract with the Project 
at any time, giving 6 months notice. 174 The existing structure is 
intended to continue, although the organisation could become an 
independent charitable trust or a private company, or it could be 
replaced by a much more informal arrangement with the partners simply 
working to the Forest Plan. Future arrangements, it was said, would be 
the prerogative of the principal partners who 'need to agree which 
arrangement is most appropriate to the achievement of the Forest's 
objectives'. 175 
STEERING AND ADVISORY BODIES 
The Project Team is not an autonomous body and is directed and 
advised by a number of formal groups, or committees. These are important 
in their own right but are worth considering here for the insight they 
provide into the network of relationships which tie the Project together. 
172 Although the Memorandum of Agreement 1993-96 states that the CC will grant aid of 50% of the agreed 
cost of e1ploying each member of the Project reaa, excluding the Co11unity Forester who is sponsored 
by the FC. para.9.1, p.11. 
173 GNF, 'Me~orandUJ of Agreement 1993-96', paras.9.3-9.6, p.11. 
174 Ibid., para.l2, p.16. 
175 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.17.11, p.101. 
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The Members Steering Group 
The Members Steering Group (MSG} provides the main decision-making 
forum for the GNF and its role is to direct the Project. 176 The Group 
is comprised of two councillors from each of the five local authorities, 
and one representative from each of the FC, the CC, the CLA and the NFU. 
The Group meets on a quarterly basis to review the progress of the 
initiative and agree annual reports and business plans prepared by the 
Project Director. 177 Voting rights were restricted to local authority 
members who elected a chairman and vice-chairman from amongst their 
number on a rotational basis. Since 1996, this has been extended to all 
MSG members and the CC, the FC, the CLA and NFU are no longer limited to 
observer status. Regarding decision making in the Group, Vaughan 
commented that 'while they have a "show of hands" to agree 
recommendations on which they have been asked to make a decision, they 
have never yet needed to take a formal vote to resolve anything - it is 
generally a matter of consensus politics' . 178 This was confirmed by 
comments made by MSG members during interviews. 
Each body has its own method of selecting elected councillors to 
sit on the MSG. With respect to local authorities, Vaughan said that 
'some nominate individuals and others specify that it should be the Chair 
or Vice-chair of an appropriate committee'. 179 This was confirmed from 
interviews with local authority officers who claimed that councillors are 
normally chosen by the controlling group of the council (normally the 
Labour Party in these areas}, except in the case of South Tyneside MBC 
where the Tyneside Development Department make the selection. The 
procedure is therefore one of appointment rather than election, based on 
the criteria that the chosen councillor should have an interest in 
environmental issues (they are often members of the relevant Environment 
Committee}; that they are politically experienced; and that they have a 
degree of status in their local authority (they are often the Chair or 
Vice-chair of the Environment committee). 
176 Ibid. I para. 3. 7 I p.l2. 
177 GNF1 'Memorandum of Agreement 1993-96' I Section 81 pp.9-10. 
178 Letter from John Vaughan dated 19/5/95. 
179 Ibid. 
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The important thing about the MSG is that it provides a democratic 
element to the Project in two ways. First, it is the body on which 
locally elected councillors sit, thereby, it may be said, providing a 
democratic link with local people. However, as one Councillor pointed 
out, the MSG is not a local authority sub-committee and not fully 
controlled by them. Moreover, the Group is 'cosmetic' rather than 
democratic, he added, and the lack of control has presented some 
difficulties for local authorities. Secondly, the MSG provides for a 
democratic decision-making process via a voting system. Thus the Group 
has internal and external democratic features, although even when voting 
rights were restricted to elected councillors democratic accountability 
was weak and tenuous. Nevertheless, because of the, albeit limited, 
democratic accountability of the MSG, it is identified as the body 
accountable for the actions the Project Team. 180 
The Officer Technical Group 
The Officer Technical Group was established under the Memorandum 
of Understanding, 'to bring together technical officers from the project 
partners and officers from a number of agencies not represented on the 
Members Steering Group'. 181 The role of the Officer Technical Group was 
to 'prepare plans, coordinate action amongst the principal partners and 
provide technical advice to the Project Team'. 182 Membership consisted 
of nine local authority officers drawn from planning or environment 
departments (two officers from each participating local authority, except 
for Chester-le-Street DC which provided one); two representatives from 
the CC (a regional officer and a senior countryside officer who chaired 
the group); a FC representative (a regional technical adviser); an 
Agricultural Development and Advisory Service (ADAS) representative from 
the MAFF; a regional adviser from the NFU; the Regional Secretary from 
the CLA; and representatives from each of the Northern Development 
Company, The Wearside 
180 Interview with Vaughan, July 1995. 
181 Letter fro• Vaughan, 19/5/95. 
Opportunity 
182 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.3.8, p.12. 
(both business development 
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initiatives), English Nature and the Sports Council. 183 The Officer 
Technical Group was short lived; according to Vaughan: 'It served as a 
useful discussion forum during the preparation of the Forest Plan ... [but 
it] eventually became apparent that many of its functions were more 
appropriately served by a developing Chief Officer Group ... which was 
eventually formalised in the second Memorandum'. 184 
The Chief Officer Group 
The Chief Officer Group partly replaced the Officer Technical Group 
after the first three year provisional planning stage, as noted above, 
and was formalised in the Memorandum of Agreement 1993-96. 185 The role 
of this new group is to advise and direct the Project Director186 , 
particularly on the planning and environmental functions of the 
project. 187 The Chief Officer Group consists of one council officer 
from each of the participating local authorities, along with 
representatives from the FC and the CC. Meetings are held quarterly and 
are chaired by the CC representative. 188 
The Forest Advisory Forum 
The Forest Advisory Forum also evolved from the Officer Technical 
Group but has a wider membership. This includes English Nature and the 
Sports Council which were formerly represented on the Officer Technical 
Group, key voluntary sector organisations like the British Trust for 
Conservation Volunteers (BTCV) and the Woodland Trust, and key community 
organisations like the CPRE and the Ramblers Association. 189 Its role 
is to 'bring together a wide range of public, private and voluntary 
bodies to review the work of the project and discuss key areas for future 
183 There are some discrepancies in the membership details of this group and this list is a compilation 
of information given in Vaughan's letter of 19/5/95, and GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), Appendix F, p.112. 
184 Letter from Vaughan, 19/5/95. 
185 Ibid. 
186 GNF, 'MemorandDII of Agreement 1993-96', para.8.2, p.10. 
187 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.3.8, p.12. 
188 GNF, 'Memorandum of Agreement 1993-96', para.8.2, p.10. 
189 Ibid., para.8.3, p.10. 
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consideration'. 190 The work of the Forest Advisory Forum is aimed at 
specific aspects of implementation for which they advise relevant members 
of the Project Team. Meetings are held at least annually and are chaired 
by the CC and FC representatives in rotation. 191 
Working Groups and Bilateral Meetings 
A number of working groups have been established to discuss 
specific aspects of the Project and to encourage broader involvement from 
those organisations not represented on the Chief Officer Group. For 
example, the Farm/Forestry Working Group deals specifically with the 
concerns of farmers and landowners; and the Conservation Working Group, 
restructured into the Countryside Working Group in 1995, brings together 
agencies responsible for implementing work related to countryside and 
conservation initiatives. The role of the Working Groups is to advise 
relevant members of the Project Team on particular aspects of 
implementation and membership varies accordingly. Bilateral meetings 
serve a similar purpose and, for example, are held with English Nature 
to acquire and exchange specific advice, in this instance, on nature 
conservation research. 192 
The Project Directors Forum 
The CF initiative is a national programme and is closely linked to 
the National Forest, currently being developed over some 194 square miles 
of countryside in the Midlands. It also has relevance for other national 
programmes, particularly those concerned with forestry, and countryside 
conservation and enhancement. A Project Directors Forum has been 
established to provide links between individual CFs, the National Forest 
and other national programmes. It meets quarterly and is attended by the 
Project Directors of the twelve CFs and the National Forest, senior 
representatives from the CC and FC, members of the CC's Community Forest 
Unit, the MAFF's national officer responsible for CFs, amongst others. 
According to John Vaughan: 
The Forum combines a business meeting, covering matters of direct relevance to the national 
190 GNF, Forest Advisory Forum Report, (26/7/94), para.l2. 
191 See GNF, 'Memorandum of Agreement 1993-96', para.8.3, p.10, and Vaughan's letter of 19/5/95. 
192 Letter from Vaughan, 19/5/95. 
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partnership (grants, national policy, research, training, PR [Public Relations], and marketing 
etc.) with seminars, briefings and training sessions on key issues (EC funding, Countryside 
Stewardship, lonitoring and evaluation, the National Lottery etc.) over two days. 193 
The Project Directors Forum plays a role in the national policy-
making process. For example, it made representations to the 'forestry 
review group', set up by the Secretary of State for Scotland in 1993 to 
consider the effectiveness of incentives for forestry, ownership and 
management of FC woodland and the delivery of the Government's forestry 
policy. 194 
3.4. THE WIDER ORGANISATION 
As Peter Blau and Richard Scott observed in 1963: 'Formal 
organisations are associated with diverse publics' which span 'the larger 
society in its capacity as a pool of potential members ... other 
organisations with whom the organisation competes, cooperates, or enters 
into various exchange relationships ... the public-in-contact, with whom 
or on whom the organisation's members work, and the public served'. 195 
Consideration of these diverse publics is particularly important where 
sustainable development policies are concerned and participation is 
actively sought. Moreover, the diverse publics represent the 'community' 
in the Community Forest programme, a prefix which symbolises both the 
type of good provided (primarily a public good of benefit to the 
community as a whole196 ) and the agency chosen for its achievement (the 
wider community as integral to the development and implementation 
process). In this sense, the CFs are unusual in that the diverse publics, 
or community, are both beneficiary and an integral part of the process 
of development. 
It is for this reason that consideration of the formal organisation 
associated with the GNF alone would provide only a partial picture of the 
Project's implementation. Importantly, there are many groups and 
193 Ibid. 
194 GNF, Forest Advisory Forum Report, (26/7/94), para.18. 
195 Blau & Scott, Formal Organisations, (1964). p.59. 
196 Blau & Scott describe organisations providing these goods as co.lllDonweal organisations, whose 
'distinctive characteristic ... is that the public-at-large is their priae beneficiary'. Ibid., p. 74. 
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organisations which lie outside the formal organisation but which are, 
nonetheless, significant because of the role that they play, or will 
play, in the administrative process. This can be called the wider 
organisation and constitutes 'the working partnerships needed to carry 
the initiative to fruition over its long timescale'. 197 Some of these 
partnerships were briefly discussed both in the previous chapter and 
above, with reference to the formal organisation. However, because of the 
importance of these groups and organisations it is worth providing a 
fuller catalogue of them and their anticipated roles. 
THE PARTNERSHIP IN OVERVIEW 
The National Partners 
The national partners to the GNF are the Forestry and Countryside 
Commissions and their key role is: 
To establish an effective national framework to prosote and support the i1ple1entation of the 
objectives and proposals of the Great North Forest Plan towards the creation of a new, well-
wooded, toltiporpose countryside in south Tyne and Wear and north-east Dorha1. 198 
The CFs are a joint initiative developed between CC and FC, and they are 
actively involved in directing and advising the Project members. In 
addition, they provide financial support for the GNF Project Team by 
directly supporting the running of the office and by employing Project 
Team members, and they are responsible for various grants that support 
the Forest development. The CC, for example, administers grant aid to the 
Project through the Countryside Stewardship Scheme, the Hedgerow 
Initiative, the Parish Paths Partnership and the Rural Action Initiative. 
It also promotes the GNF with central government and seeks continued 
government endorsement. 199 The FC administers the Woodland Grant Scheme 
and the Community Woodland Supplement, it can acquire appropriate land 
for development, and similarly seeks continued government endorsement of 
the Project. 200 
197 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.l6.23, p.93. 
198 Ibid., p.93. 
199 GNF, 'MemorandUJ of Agreement 1993-96', para.7.3, p.7. 
200 Ibid., para. 7 .4, p. 7. 
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Local Government 
The five local authorities participating in the GNF are major 
partners and the key role assigned to them is: 
To provide an effective and supportive local policy and programme framework to promote the 
impletentation of the Forest Plan and the delivery of its social, economic and environmental 
benefits to their own co11onity. 201 
As with the national partners, the local author! ties are actively 
involved in directing and advising the Project Team, and, again, they 
help fund the running of the office and employ some of the staff. They 
also have more general responsibilities for financing the development 
and, in particular, they undertake the establishment of woodland on land 
that they own. 
The local authorities are expected to 'give high priority to the 
creation of the Great North Forest'; to take account of the Great North 
Forest Plan in Structural Plans, Unitary Development Plans, District-wide 
Local plans, etc.; to assist with public relations work; and incorporate 
the Community Forest objectives into future developments. 202 It should 
also be noted that parish councils have a role in representing the views 
of their constituents. 203 
Central Government Departments 
The key role of central government departments is to 'help create 
an effective policy, advice and incentive framework to promote a major 
growth in woodland creation, public access and recreation provision 
within the countryside of the Great North Forest'. 204 
The Forest Plan cites the DoE (now DETR) as a major spending 
department dispensing countryside grants, and it is the sponsoring 
department for the CC and responsible for English Nature. Also cited is 
the MAFF, a major provider of farming grants and an adviser to farmers 
through ADAS205 , an executive agency since 1992 which 'provides a 
201 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), p.95. 
202 GNF, 'Memorandum of Agreement 1993-96', para.7.5, p.7. 
203 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.16.34, p.95. 
204 Ibid., p.94. 
205 Ibid., para.16.29, p.94. 
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comprehensive range of consul tancy services to the land-based 
industries'. 206 The FC also reports directly to Forestry Ministers in 
the MAFF, amongst others. The Department of Employment (now part of the 
DfEE), although not specifically cited as a partner, is involved through 
secondment of a Business Liaison Officer to the Project Team, and the DNH 
is indirectly involved through The Sports Council and English 
Heritage. 207 
National Agencies 
National agencies have a key role through 'their advisory powers, 
specialist knowledge and professional resources to offer appropriate 
policy resources and technical advice, administrative and financial 
support to promote the realisation of the Great North Forest as a sound 
and sustainable project'. 208 The agencies cited are English Nature, the 
Sports Council and English Heritage. 
English Nature is the executive type NDPB sponsored by the DETR. 
Its role in the Forest is primarily to advise on nature conservation, 
although it is intended to provide some assistance with conservation 
fieldwork and technical and financial support for conservation 
projects. 209 The Sports Council is the executive type NDPB sponsored by 
the DNH and its role is 'advising landowners about recreational 
facilities on their land, possibly providing assistance through grants 
and national lottery funds, and encouraging Forest use by local 
people'. 210 English Heritage is the executive type NDPB also sponsored 
by the DNH; its role is 'to support the establishment of ... information 
on the historical and archaeological potential of the area in advance of 
major woodland planting', to secure the exploration, conservation and 
interpretation of the area's cultural heritage and possibly to provide 
206 Cabinet Office, The Civil Service Year Book 1996, (1995), col.60. 
207 Written enquiries have also been answered by the Government Office for the North Bast, itself 
responsible to the Rmploy1ent Department (now part of the Department for Education and Blployment), the 
Department of Trade and Industry, and the DoE and Department of Transport (now merged to form the DETR). 
208 GNP, Forest Plan, (1994), p.95. 
209 Ibid., para.16.30, p.98. 
210 Ibid., para.16.31, p.98. 
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financial assistance to landowners to meet these ends. 211 
Farmers and Landowners 
This group's key role is to 'develop a multipurpose approach to 
land management towards the economic provision of a wide range of 
community benefits within the context of a well-managed, wooded 
countryside'. 212 This is to be achieved directly through partnerships 
with individual farmers and landowners to encourage diversification of 
their activities as a response to wider agricultural changes. 213 
However, it also involves partnerships with their representatives, 
principally the CLA and NFU. 
The CLA is an association of owners of agricultural and other rural 
land, promoting their interests through political representation, 
advising members and publicising information of concern to its members. 
The NFU represents farmers; it is not a trade union as is often thought, 
but represents farmers' interests and plays a part in scrutinizing 
relevant legislation, particularly on parliamentary committees. 214 The 
role of the CLA and NFU in the Forest's development lies in 'articulating 
their members interests and concerns about the future management of the 
countryside', promoting the GNF as a 'positive vehicle for countryside 
change within the wider agricultural environment', and advising their 
members on incentives and diversification opportunities. 215 
The Business Community 
The Forest Plan includes forestry and timber companies, business 
groupings and agencies, and local businesses under this heading. Their 
key role is to 'give practical and financial support to the Great North 
Forest as a key project in the evolution of a high quality, productive 
environment for their employees and customers and for the attraction of 
211 Ibid., para.16.32, p.98. 
212 Ibid., p.95. 
213 Ibid., para.16.36, p.96. 
214 Barney Bolbeche, 'Policy and Influence: HAFF and the NFU', in Grant Jordan (Ed), The Couercial 
Lobbyists, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991), pp.136-7. 
215 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.16.35, p.96. 
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new investment to the north-east' . 216 
Clearly, forestry and timber companies 
Forest's development; 'offering advice 
are important for the 
and identifying 
opportunities ... for commercial woodland establishment, timber production 
and use, both for existing owners and for financial investors'. Moreover, 
they have an important part to play in developing new market outlets for 
products from the Forest. 217 
Business groupings and agencies are expected to act as a link for 
the transfer of advice, training and financial support from the private 
sector to other groups involved with the Forest. Less obviously they are 
to 'recognise the potential contribution ... of the Great North Forest. .. to 
the internal well-being and external image of the region in terms of 
economic regeneration'. 218 The Northern Development Company and The 
Wearside Opportunity, both private companies supporting local businesses 
(previously involved via the Officer Technical Group until its demise), 
and Business in the Community, a registered charity sponsored by 
business, have a part to play in coordinating the public, private and 
voluntary sectors. 
Other non-profit making companies supporting business like TECs 
have a role, as do more traditional organisations like local Chambers of 
Commerce, the voluntary organisations that represent the interests of 
commercial, industrial, and trading business people. Finally, there are 
local businesses themselves, which are expected to sponsor land 
acquisition and woodland creation, and to provide support 'through the 
donation of money and materials to activities, events and practical 
projects', in exchange for the benefits provided for public relations and 
from an improved local environment. 219 
The Voluntary Sector 
The final partnership in the GNF is with the voluntary sector, a 
collection of environmental and other interest groups, schools and 
216 Ibid., p.96. 
217 Ibid., para.16.37, p.96. 
218 Ibid., para.16.38, p.96. 
219 Ibid., para.16.39, p.96. 
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educational institutions, community groups and local people. The role 
given to this group is to 'use their organisational skills and financial 
resources to engage local communi ties with the planning, practical 
management and use of their countryside'. 220 
The environmental groups identified are the Woodland Trust, the 
National Trust (NT) and the BTCV. These are registered charities which 
either acquire and preserve woodland and other places of natural beauty 
or, as in the case of the BTCV, simply work to protect and improve the 
environment through practical activities. Also noted in the Forest Plan 
is The Groundwork Trust which supports community development through 
education, the arts and practical activities, particularly the 
improvement of derelict land. The Groundwork Trust was established in 
1981 to improve the environmental and economic prospects of local areas. 
It consists of a network of not-for-profit companies managed and funded 
by the public, private and voluntary sectors. 221 These environmental 
organisations, according to the Forest Plan, will 'play an important part 
in the creation of the fabric of the ... Forest' and underpin local 
involvement. 222 
The Project also involves interest groups 'with concerns about 
particular aspects of the rural environment' . 223 Examples mentioned 
elsewhere in the Forest Plan are The Tidy Britain Group, a charity 
supported by the government; the CPRE, a conservation charity; and the 
Ramblers Association, a charity furthering the interests of walkers. 
Schools and educational institutions are mentioned under the 
heading of voluntary groups (although it is difficult to see how they can 
be properly described as such), and are given some importance as 'future 
custodians and users of the countryside'. 224 Undoubtedly the Forest 
also has significant importance in offering educational opportunities for 
children and young people. Finally, the Forest Plan notes that: 
220 Ibid., p.96. 
221 The Ground Work Trust is overseen by a board of manage11ent drawn from the couunity, local 
authorities and local businesses. Stoker, The Politics of Local Government, (1991), p.73 & Groundwork 
leaflet 'Introducing Groundwork: people in action for the environ•ent', (1999). 
222 GHF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.16.40, p.96. 
223 Ibid., para.16.U, p.96. 
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'Community groups will be key focal points for local people to develop 
their individual associations with the Forest'; local people themselves 
being 'central to the long-term strength and security of 
the ... Forest'. 225 
FINANCING THE FOREST 
Although appealing to citizen participation, sustainable 
development is to be achieved primarily through the use of market forces 
and the GNF is no exception. Many of the partners are linked to the 
Project principally through the financial support they can either gain 
from involvement in the Forest development or offer to it. Financing the 
development of the Forest is a complex affair and will come from a 
variety of public and private sources and the Forest Plan states that: 
Grants from Countryside and Forestry Co11issions, Ministry of Agriculture and Department of the 
Environment will help with planting, land management, land restoration and recreation 
provision. Farther 1oney will come from local govern1ent and industry and private invest1ent 
will be attracted from companies which recognise future recreation potential. Sound business 
partnerships will be a key concern for those responsible for planning, establishing and 
managing Co~munity Forests. 226 
Grants from the public sector are, therefore, vital to the success of the 
Project and, although some aspects of the grant system have already been 
discussed, by way of summary they are as follows. 
Grants and Incentives for Farmers and Landowners 
To a large extent, the implementation of the CF programme is driven 
by financial inducements mainly provided by the CC, the FC and the MAFF, 
to farmers and landowners in the area. Farmers, for example, can apply 
for grants from the Set-Aside Scheme and the Farm Woodland Premium 
Scheme, both administered by the MAFF to encourage the removal of 
agricultural land from production. 227 MAFF are also responsible for 
other grants for farmers like the Farm and Conservation Grant Scheme 
which 'helps ... with the capital costs of maintaining efficient farming 
systems, in meeting the cost of pollution control and in conserving the 
225 Ibid., paras.l6.43-16.44, p.97. 
226 Ibid., para.l.lO, p.4. 
227 GNF, Forest Advisory Forum Report, (26/7/94), para.15. 
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countryside' . 228 
Other landowners have recource to the FC's Woodland Grant Scheme, 
administered through the Forestry Authority, aimed at increasing tree 
cover; and the Community Woodland Supplement, aimed at creating new 
woodland with public access close to urban areas. 229 The CC also 
administers grants in the form of the Countryside Stewardship and 
Hedgerow Incentive Schemes to encourage farmers and other landowners to 
retain and enhance the attractive features of their holdings. 230 
Moreover, there are many other schemes that have been established and are 
administered by public or publicly sponsored bodies to assist farmers in 
activities less obviously related to forestry. For example, the CC's 
Landscape Conservation Scheme and Recreation Grants; the RDC's Redundant 
Building Grants; Training and New Enterprise Grants provided by TECs; 
English Heritage's Historic Building and Ancient Monument Grants; and 
Project Grants from English Nature. 231 
Financial Support for Voluntary Groups 
Voluntary groups are intended to play a significant part in the 
development of the GNF and a proliferation of grants and incentives are 
also available to them. They have access to various grants from central 
government agencies, like those available from the CC for the purchase 
of existing woodland for management, or for buying new land for forestry 
development. 232 The Project Team can provide grant aid for community 
led environmental projects implemented by groups like the BTCV and the 
Groundwork Trust. 233 Arts and culture projects can be supported through 
charitable trusts like Northern Arts which runs the Artists in Residence 
Project jointly with Local Arts Development Agencies. 234 Environmental 
228 CC, Farainq in Co11unity Forests, (1993), p.10. 
229 GNF, Forest Advisory Forum Report, (26/7/94), paras.17 & 25. 
230 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.6.8, p.22. 
231 cc, Farminq in Comaunity Forests, (1993), p.11. 
232 
233 
GNF, Forest Advisory Forum Report, (26/7/94), para.56. 
Ibid., para.56. 
234 Ibid., paras.58 & 60. 
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education projects may be funded by local authorities, the Woodland Trust 
and the National Trust/35 and, since 1996, environmental groups have 
been able to obtain financial support from local landfill operators 
through the Landfill Tax Credit Scheme. 236 
European Funding 
As with many other areas of local government, funding from the EU 
is becoming more significant. This is particularly true in areas like the 
north-east of England which is in the throes of restructuring following 
the decline of heavy industries such as coal mining, shipbuilding and 
steel production. The GNF, it is claimed, will attract European funds by 
providing an 'anchor for substantial grant applications for capital 
programmes' from the EU's Single Regional Programme. 237 
Other Capital Project Funding 
In addition to funds from the EU, capital projects can also be 
financed through the Government's Single Regeneration Budget, the 
derelict land programme administered by English Partnerships (a NDPB 
sponsored by the DETR which raises money from the public and private 
sectors to support regeneration and inward investment) 238 and from the 
CC and FC. 239 Interested parties can also bid for capital funding 
Lottery and Millennium Funds, administered by the Office of the National 
Lottery at the DNH, which are used to finance an ever wider range of 
projects. 
Business Funding 
Business funding is expected not only to come from forestry and 
timber companies, but also from local businesses and the relevant 
business groupings and agencies. Such financial support is expected to 
arise from commercial timber production potential, the public relations 
235 
236 
237 
238 
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benefits derived from sponsorship and from the aesthetic improvements 
which will result from development of the Forest. 240 
3.4. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 
ORGANISATION 
The most important point about the administrative arrangements for 
developing the GNF is its complexity, combining elements of the public, 
private and voluntary sectors at local and national levels. It is clear 
that this structure does not lend itself to tradi tiona! notions of 
accountability where responsibilities can be clearly identified and 
traced up through the organisation to accountable ministers or 
councillors. There are three specific features of the GNF which are worth 
discussing because of the difficulties they present for accountability. 
First, the blurring of the boundaries between sectors and between 
participating groups, arising from mixed membership of the formal and 
wider organisations. Secondly, the diverse and multiple accountabilities 
which appear to exist, specifically with some members of the formal 
organisation. Finally, the complex system of funding the Forest's 
development which divides responsibility between many of the 
participating groups and, in particular, public bodies. 
PUlED JIIEIIIJBERSHIP 
The administration of this example of sustainable development is 
inclusive and is characterised by the concepts of community and 
partnership. The result is participation by a wide variety of public, 
private and voluntary bodies, reflected in the membership of both the 
formal and wider organisation. 
First, the formal organisation is advised and steered by groups 
(more properly committees) served by representatives of the many bodies 
with an interest in the development of the Forest. This is not so unusual 
as the Forest spans five local authority areas and, as noted in Chapter 
2, joint arrangements are often employed in similar administrative 
activities. Secondly, and less usual, is the mixed membership of the 
Project Team which has a staff appointed from a mixture of public and 
voluntary bodies of the wider partnership. These are mainly the 
240 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.16.37-16.39, p.96. 
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participating local authorities, but also include two government 
departments, a NDPB and two charities. 
Mixed membership arrangements are not new and, for example, can be 
traced back to at least the 1960s and the National Economic Development 
Council. 'Neddy', as it came to be known, was established in 1962 for 
indicative economic planning, and brought together ministers, employers 
and trades unionists in an organisation staffed from the private 
sector. 241 Neddy reflected the corporatist beliefs popular at the time 
and was not so dissimilar to the current public/private partnership idea. 
Public/private partnerships for implementing policy have become common 
in the local government arena where the likes of local enterprise 
agencies have been established to support the development of small 
businesses. Here, both the public and private sectors have responsibility 
for providing resources and are represented on the management 
committees. 242 
A third aspect of mixed membership is to be found in the make up 
of the wider organisation which is comprised of the many public, private 
and voluntary sector partners fundamental to the success of the Project. 
The GNF illustrates the changing nature of local governance where the 
emphasis is placed upon local authorities working in partnership with the 
private and voluntary sectors. It also illustrates the proliferation of 
quasi-governmental organizations in recent decades, multiplying the 
number of bodies with which local authorities have to interact, and the 
increasing role that these bodies have in the field of local governance. 
The partnership arrangement found in this Project is clearly not 
simply external, resulting from cooperation between different sectors of 
the economy or between different organisations. It also characterises the 
internal workings of such participating bodies as TECs, Tidy Britain and 
Groundwork; and, importantly, the workings of the formal organisations 
where, for example, the staff of the Project Team are appointed and paid 
by their sponsoring bodies. The overall result is a noticeable loss of 
" 
clarity and a blurring of the boundaries between organisations and 
between sectors which serves to obscure the identity of those who are 
241 See R.J.S.Baker, Administrative Theory and Public Adlinistration, (London: Hutchinson University 
Library, 1972), pp.165-6; and Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, (London: Fontana, 1990), p.180. 
242 Stoker, The Politics of Local Govern1ent, (1991), pp.71-72. 
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responsible for the implementation of the Project. 
MULTIPLE ACCOUNTABILITIES 
Accountability in bureaucracies has traditionally been based on 
hierarchical control, and the most rational form of bureaucracy is 
defined by offices having clearly specified functions and a clear 
hierarchy of offices. 243 Accountability here, as Elcock explains, is 
upwards, 'through the bureaucratic chain of command and ultimately to 
elected representatives' who may be ministers or elected local 
councillors. 244 However, the field of public administration is known 
for its complexity and it is common to find mixed accountabilities. 
Indeed Elcock points out that officials can be simultaneously accountable 
in several directions - upwards, downwards to the public, and outwards 
to their colleagues. Nevertheless, it is unusual to find individual 
officials accountable upwards to several different public bodies as 
appears in this case study. 
Accountability upwards remains the mainstay of the administrative 
arrangements in the public sector in the UK and this is also the case in 
the GNF. The CC's representative on the Members Steering Group, for 
example, remains accountable through the CC to the DETR and its Minister 
in Parliament in a, more or less, conventional way. However, the lines 
of accountability are undoubtedly confused by the diverse membership of 
the Project's organisation, and by the number of participating public 
sector bodies. This is a particular concern for the formal organisation 
and perhaps most acute in the Project Team where the Project Director 
provides the clearest example. He must remain responsible to Gateshead 
MBC and its councillors as both his employer and as financial controller 
of the Project. He is responsible to the MSG which is accountable for the 
actions of the Project Team and has a duty to review the progress made 
in developing the Forest. Yet he is also responsible to the DETR and MAFF 
which monitor the progress of all twelve CFs through Annual Monitoring 
Reports to which the Project Directors contribute. Moreover, an element 
of responsibility must also exist towards the FC and CC, as lead 
organisations for the Project, and towards the many other grant awarding 
243 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellscaft, (1921), quoted in Albrow, Bureaucracy, (1970), p.44. 
244 Elcock, Change and Decay?, (1991), p.16. 
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public bodies which support the Project. 
There is little precedent elsewhere in the public sector for such 
a complex arrangement as found in this case study. Mixed membership was 
a feature of bodies like Neddy, and still is for bodies like the local 
enterprise agencies, TECs, the Groundwork Trust and joint bodies and 
committees. However, the GNF differs in the sheer number and variety of 
participating public bodies. The result is that responsibility is 
stretched in many directions and this presents real difficulties for 
identifying to whom individuals are accountable. 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITIES 
The third point to be made about accountability in this case study 
is the curious way in which the development of the Forest is financed. 
Although private sector funding for the Forest should not be ignored, the 
bulk of financial support inevitably comes from the many public bodies 
which make up the formal and wider organisation. So, whilst the Project 
Team has a clear role in establishing the GNF, it is not primarily a 
spending body and, consequently, responsibility for the successful 
implementation of the Project is separated from its funding. The Project 
Team has, for example, a responsibility 'to secure adequate resources for 
the Great North Forest, including private sector funding and targeted 
grant aid', 245 but since those funds come from other bodies, it is not 
properly an executive body. Rather, its role is as an advisor to those 
interested in participating in the Project, and as a coordinator, 
bringing interested parties together with the appropriate grant awarding 
bodies. 
This financial arrangement highlights the increasing role given to 
central government departments and quasi-governmental bodies in the 
execution of local projects. There is no practical reason why the Project 
could not be financed by central government grant via the relevant local 
authorities, rather than funding it through a series of departments and 
other agencies. The Project Director claims that the structure of the GNF 
Project is seen to offer a more direct link between the 'grass roots' and 
the major decision makers in government. 246 However, the chosen 
245 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.3.4, pp.ll-12. 
246 Interview with Vaughan, July 1995. 
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arrangement is less democratic and may be less responsive than direct 
funding, and tends to further emasculate an already weakened local 
government. Moreover, these financial arrangements represent a further 
diminution in the clarity of accountability for local government 
expenditure criticised, for example, in the 1965 Layfield Report. 247 
Overall, the Project suffers from no single agency having overall 
control, 248 and there is undoubted confusion between responsibilities 
for the provision of resources and for the success of the Project. As a 
demonstration of this, it is worth quoting at some length the DETR's 
response to questions raised about the administration of the GNF which 
begs the question of where responsibility finally lies: 
The whole rationale of the Community Forest idea was •.. that it would try to draw in funding and 
support from a whole range of public and private partners, without itself requiring funds other 
than to cover the ad1inistrative costs of the Teams. If at the end of the day targets for 
afforestation etc are not met it would mainly be for the Countryside Commission, as sponsor 
of the initiative, to answer any criticisms about the forest teams' effectiveness. The 
Commission itself answers, in torn, to the Secretary of State for the Environment. 249 
ELUSIVE ACCOUNTABILITY 
This chapter has illustrated the complex arrangements which have 
been developed for administering the GNF. It is argued that such 
arrangements offend against the traditional principles of accountability 
expounded more than a century ago by John Stuart Mill. In his oft quoted 
comment, Mill contended that: 
As a general rule, any executive function, whether superior of subordinate, should be the 
appointed duty of some individual. It should be apparent to all the world who did everything, 
and through whose default anything was left undone. Responsibility is null when nobody knows 
who is responsible ... To maintain it at its highest there must be one person who receives the 
whole praise of what is well done, the whole blame of what is ill. Nor, even when real, can it 
247 Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Local Government Finance, The Layfield Report, [Cmd.6453], 
(London: BMSO, 1976). 
248 Similar observations have been made by Allan Bruce & Allan McConnell, 'Accountability in Local 
GoverDJent and the NBS', in Robert Pyper (Ed), Aspects of Accountability in the British Systea of 
Government, (Eastham, Merseyside: Tudor, 1996), p.146. 
249 Letter from Jim Bowaan, Forestry Policy Branch, DETR, 1/12/98. 
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be divided without being weakened. 250 
Society has changed considerably since Mill's time, and the provision of 
public services expanded so much in breadth and complexity that 
traditional concepts of accountability are no longer workable. The 
proliferation of government agencies presents particular difficulties for 
the administration of the GNF and may have serious implications for 
coordination and control. 
Accountability based on hierarchical control is unlikely to 
function adequately in the peculiarly complex administrative arrangements 
found in this case study. However, the GNF remains primarily a public 
project funded mainly by public money and it is vital that accountability 
be clear. This is particularly so where the public sector operates in 
such close proximity to the private and voluntary sectors that may have 
different motives. Yet it is difficult, even after detailed examination, 
to identify just who is accountable and to whom they are accountable in 
this Project. Noting what Dennis Thompson has called 'the problem of many 
hands', Bovens has recently made this point, saying that 
in co.11plex organisations many different functionaries, at various levels and in various 
aeasure, often contribute to the policy and decisions of the organisation, it is often 
extraordinarily difficult to determine who is responsible for the organisation's conduct in the 
last instance. 251 
However, accountability remains a critical difficulty for complex 
organisations like that for the administration of the GNF. 
In conclusion, the difficulties of accountability in the GNF can 
be compared to those prevalent in the later half of the 19th Century when 
the scale and complexity of the emerging welfare state created new links 
of accountability in the hierarchy between local and central government, 
and a new body of professional administrators to replace those operating 
at a purely local level. According to Patricia Day and Rudolf Klein, 
Edwin Chadwick's vision of administrative rationality embodied in the 
1834 Poor Law, attempted to 'assimilate accountability in service 
250 J.S.Hill, Considerations on Representative Government, [1861], R.B.McCallum (Ed), (Oxford, 1946), 
p.264. 
251 Bovens, The Quest for Responsibility, (1998), p.4. 
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delivery to the bureaucratic model'. 252 They assert that there are two 
features of the Chadwickian system that continue to have relevance to the 
discussion of accountability. First, that the New Poor Law 'provoked 
debate about the location of accountability' and 'raised questions about 
possible conflicts between different lines of accountability'. 253 This 
is particularly relevant to this study which has, so far, highlighted the 
complexity of the administration of the GNF arising from the inclusion 
of many participants. 
Secondly, Day and Klein say that Chadwick's 'faith in controlling 
services through defining their aims was betrayed by the ability of those 
actually running the Poor Law system at the local level to substitute 
their own objectives and rules'. 254 Little need be said about this 
here, apart from the fact that it represents some of the difficulties to 
be found with the move from thinking about accountability as control 
through rigid bureaucratic arrangements to that of good estate management 
or managerial accountability. Managerial accountability and the process 
of 'making those with delegated authority answerable for carrying out 
agreed tasks according to agreed criteria of performance', 255 dominates 
in the administration of the GNF and provides the subject of the 
following chapter. 
252 Patricia Day & Rudolf Klein, Accountabilities: Five Public Services, (London: Tavistock, 1987), 
pp.l6-17. 
253 Ibid., p.l8. 
254 Ibid., p.l8. Also see 'The Many Beaded Tribunal', The Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission 
of 1909, Reprinted in Richard A.Chap1an & A.Dunsire, Style in Adainistration: Readings in Public 
Adlinistration, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971), pp.91-97. 
255 Day & Klein, Accountabilities, (1987), pp.7 & 27. 
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CHAPTER 4 
T~HE 
GREAT NOR~H FOR:EST: 
IMPLEM'ENTAT1E'ON 
AND MANAGERIAL M:ETHODS 
OF ACCOUNTABiiLITY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
It is claimed that the CF programme is 'pioneering a new approach 
to integrated environmental planning and management' based on forging new 
partnerships between the public, private and voluntary sectors. 256 This 
is a new method of implementing public policy and provides a good example 
of how sustainable development is being undertaken. The programme is, 
therefore, of interest because it may provide a model for the 
implementation of future sustainable development policies. It is also of 
broader interest because of the new relationships which have been 
developed between public sector bodies, and because of the unusually 
close relationships which exist between the public, private and voluntary 
sectors. This chapter assesses the success of the CF programme by 
considering the progress that has been made in establishing the GNF. In 
addition, the system of accountability prevalent in this peculiarly 
complex partnership arrangement, primarily managerial accountability, is 
explored. First, the principles of managerial accountability are 
discussed with particular reference to the need for clear assignment of 
responsibility, the use of explicit standards and measures of 
performance, and the concept of value for money. Secondly, the progress 
that has been made in implementing the GNF Project, its cost and some of 
the difficulties encountered, are considered through analysis of 
interview material and available quantitative data. Finally, the 
practical difficulties of applying managerial methods of accountability 
to this Project are examined and the adequacy of these methods 
considered. 
4.2. MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE COMMUNITY FOREST 
PROGRAMME 
PRINCIPLES 
Managerial accountability has progressively replaced systems based 
on hierarchy in the public sector over the last twenty years or so. It 
emerged from what Christopher Hood has called 'new public management' 
(NPM), a convenient shorthand 'for the set of broadly similar 
administrative doctrines which dominated the bureaucratic reform agenda 
256 CC, Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998), Appendix B, paras.1.5 & 1.6, pp.1-2. 
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in many of the OECD group of countries from the late 1970s 1 • 257 
Managerial accountability is the result of attempts to move the public 
sector away from the hierarchical bureaucratic structures with which it 
has traditionally been associated, and to incorporate business methods. 
According to the Head of the Civil Service, Robin Butler, this 
'management revolution' reflects a need to deal with the 'myth of 
omnipotent personal responsibility 1 of ministers by delegating 
responsibility for administration to the lowest appropriate levels of the 
civil service, whilst retaining accountability at ministerial level. 258 
These new arrangements depend upon providing ministers with the necessary 
information to better oversee the work of their departments and enable 
them to act as chief executives, as well as perform their more 
traditional role of chief policy makers. 259 
Hood has summarised seven doctrinal components of NPM (see Appendix 
4) and most of them can be identified in the workings of various parts 
of the CF programme. However, there are two broad aspects of managerial 
accountability, combining one or more NPM features, which need to be 
considered here. The first is the clear assignment of responsibility for 
action to manageable units within the public sector (government 
departments, NDPBs, Agencies, local authorities, and so on) reducing the 
need for ministers to involve themselves in the day-to-day running of 
their departments. In this way, ministers would more easily be able to 
balance their role of departmental management with their political 
responsibilities, including policy direction. As an example of NPM, the 
FMI offered the following benefits: 
By delegating responsibility, by emancipating themselves from responsibility for individual 
actions by their no1inal subordinates, linisters and parliament would be able to strengthen 
their effective control. 260 
257 OECD is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Hood, 'A Public Management for 
All Seasons?', (1991), pp.3-4. 
258 Robin Butler, 'The Evolution of the Civil Service - A progress Report', Public Adlinistration, 
(1993), Vol.71, p.398, and his 1992 Frank Stacey Memorial Lecture, 'The New Public Manage1ent: The 
Contribution of Whitehall and Academia', reprinted in Public Policy and Administration, (1992), Vol.7, 
p.6. 
259 This, for example, was the reason behind the introduction of the MINIS and FMI systems by 
Mrs. Thatcher's Efficiency Advisor Derek Rayner in the early 1980s. Hennessy, Whitehall, (1990), p.608. 
260 Day & Klein, Accountabilities, (1987). p.44. 
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Secondly, goals, objectives and targets must be specified and 
performance against these criteria must be measured. The information 
concerning achievement and relevant costs can then be fed back to 
ministers for them to assess the performance of the manageable units for 
which they are responsible. Ministers, it is argued, are thus better able 
to hold those units responsible for their actions and are, in themselves, 
more accountable to Parliament: effective political accountability, to 
paraphrase Day and Klein, is seen to be dependent on effective managerial 
accountability. 261 
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Locating responsibility in the administration of the GNF is 
difficult because many public bodies (as well as private and voluntary 
sector groups) have been given a role in the development of the Forest 
and responsibility is divided amongst them in a complex way. Some public 
bodies have specific responsibilities for the progress of the Project and 
the establishment of the Forest. The Project Team, for example, was 
responsible for the preparation of the Forest Plan, it must prepare 
business plans and annual reports and, particularly, it must compete to 
attract funding for the Project from a variety of sources. However, 
responsibility for funding the Project lies with other public bodies, 
like the CC, FC and MAFF which administer the grants necessary to develop 
the Forest. This separation of responsibility for funding from 
responsibility for the Forest's physical establishment is a. result of the 
partnership approach adopted for the CF programme. The DETR claims that 
'a considerable degree of accountability for public money' is built into 
the system because each participating public body is responsible for the 
funding that it provides to the programme. 262 The CC, for example, is 
responsible to the DETR for the f3,959,000 it spent on CFs in 
1997/98. 263 
Although in the complex arrangements developed for administering 
the GNF responsibility is devolved and divided, there is continued 
reliance on hierarchical links between individual public sector bodies 
261 Ibid., p.H. 
262 Jim Bowman, DBTR, letter of 1/12/98. 
263 cc, Annual Report 1997/98, 31st Report, [CCP 533), (Cheltenham: CC, 1998), p.l5. 
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and accountable ministers or local authorities. However, the emphasis 
given to breaking up monolithic structures of government and creating 
manageable administrative units more distant from accountable ministers 
in NPM, requires those manageable units to have a much clearer 
understanding of what is expected of them. This is achieved through a 
further characteristic of NPM, that of explicit statements of goals, 
objectives and targets so that progress can be easily measured and the 
performance of manageable units assessed. However, the responsibilities 
of these different bodies are not always clearly defined. So, for 
example, if targets for afforestation are not met, it would be the CC, 
as sponsor of the initiative, which has to answer to the Secretary of 
State for the Environment for any criticisms about the effectiveness of 
the forest teams, rather than the Project Teams themselves. 264 
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The clear statement of goals and objectives for the public sector 
bodies responsible for implementing any government policy serves two 
purposes. First, goals and objectives provide direction and a sense of 
purpose for the participating organisations. Secondly, progress made 
towards goals and objectives provides the relevant information for 
accountable ministers to oversee and assess the performance of the 
accountable units for which they are responsible. Thus the minister acts 
as chief executive, directing and controlling those units, and can be 
legitimately held to account for their actions. The accurate measurement 
of performance is, therefore, crucial for the effective functioning of 
managerial accountability. 
Ministers must have adequate information about both the inputs and 
outputs to manage and control their departments and ensure that value for 
money is obtained. This is because value for money includes economy - the 
comparison of actual and planned inputs to ensure as few resources as 
possible are used - effectiveness - the comparison of actual and planned 
outputs to measure the extent to which objectives are achieved, and 
efficiency - the comparison of actual inputs and outputs to ensure that 
264 Letter from Jim Bowman, DETR, 1/12/98. 
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resources are used in the best possible 265 way. Nevertheless, 
managerial accountability may not be easy to apply to the important area 
of programmes and projects where, as Leslie Chapman once commented, 
'government spending .. ,though well intentioned, seems so often to end in 
disaster'. 266 This is particularly so where inputs may originate from 
a number of units of different departments and agencies, where outputs 
are numerous and diverse, and where the public sector operates in close 
partnership with the private and voluntary sectors. 
PERFORJIIANCE MONITORING IN THE GNF 
There are a number of sources of information that can be used to 
assess the performance of the GNF Project. First, annual business plans 
are prepared by each participating public body setting out proposed 
activities and their costs for the forthcoming year. So, for example, the 
GNF Project Team prepares business plans that are agreed with the Members 
Steering Group; the CC prepares business plans for the DETR, and so on. 
Secondly, targets can be developed for activities which contribute to the 
objectives of the Project, like the area of land to be planted or the 
distance of hedgerow to be established over a given period. Thirdly, 
annual reports may be published by participating public bodies, outlining 
achievements and costs over the year. Finally, numerous data are 
collected by the CC and presented in annual monitoring reports to the 
departments accountable for the CF programme, principally the DETR and 
MAFF. Monitoring reports are of vital importance for evaluating 
efficiency, effectiveness and economy since they bring together 
information about targets, progress made and the costs incurred. 
The CC's annual monitoring reports represent a summary of the 
annual outputs, and many inputs, of all twelve CF projects, enabling 
ministers to judge the overall progress of the programme and the value 
for money that has been achieved. They are, therefore, central to this 
study and include quantitative data for the following seven indicators 
265 See, for ezample, Greenwood & Wilson, Public Adainistration in Britain Today, (1989), p.l2, & John 
Glynn, Andrew Gray & Bill Jenkins, 'Auditing the Three Hs: The Challenge of Effectiveness', Public 
Policy and Adtinistration, Vol.7, No.3, (1992), pp.58-59. 
266 Leslie Chapman, Your Disobedient Servant: The Continuing Story of Whitehall's Overspending, 
(Bar•ondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p.13. Hennessy also notes the large proportion of expenditure absorbed 
by programmes and the difficulties of controlling this e1penditure in the late 1980s. Whitehall, (1990), 
pp.616-617. 
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identified by the DETR and MAFF for monitoring purposes: 
i. area of new planting; 
ii. area of existing woodland brought into management; 
iii. area of land and/or length of routes newly opened for recreation/access; 
iv. area of non-woodland habitat created and/or managed; 
v. length of hedgerows created and/or managed; 
vi. area of derelict land reclaimed for forest related uses; and 
vii. amount of private and voluntary sector support. 
In addition, information is requested on: 
- non-forestry funding of the forest; 
- coamunity involvement; and 
- costs of the core forest teams. 267 
However, the monitoring reports also include details of many other 
activities undertaken for the CFs, and of particular interest are the 
levels of grant and other funding attracted to the programme, and 
specific initiatives that have been started or are in progress. 
4.3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GREAT NORTH FOREST 
Significant progress has been made in implementing the GNF since 
it was formally created in 1990. A Project Team has been established and 
agreements between principal partners confirmed. A Forest Plan was 
developed, agreed and published by January 1994, and thence incorporated 
into the statutory development plans of the relevant local authorities. 
By 1998 the Project was fully five years into its implementation 
phase268 , providing a sufficiently long period for its progress to be 
sensibly assessed. The assessment of the GNF which follows will consider 
both the inputs and outputs of the Project as far as they can be 
established. First, the progress that has been made in implementing the 
GNF since its establishment will be considered through presentation of 
some of the forestry and non-forestry activities undertaken, and 
discussion of the quantitative data that is available. Secondly, some of 
the costs of implementation will be considered, together with an 
examination of the principle difficulties encountered in implementing the 
267 CC, Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998), Appendix B, paras.1.7 & 1.9, p.2. 
268 Implementation formally began so•etime in 1993. The GNF, Forest Plau, (1994), p.101, gives a start 
date of March 1993; and the CC, Com1unity Forest Briefing Docu1ent, (1995), p.13, gives this as lOth 
August 1993. 
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Project. 
PROGRESS 
Forestry and Non-Forestry Activities 
The GNF is not intended to be a continuous tract of trees but 
woodland interspersed with heath, wetland, ponds and streams. Moreover, 
it incorporates leisure, sports, arts, archaeological and educational 
facilities to make this a multipurpose development. 269 So it is worth 
considering some of the individual developments highlighted by the 
participants, to illustrate something of the breadth of the Project. 
These developments are divided into forestry activities, like the 
purchase of woodland, which are directly related to the aims of the 
Project; and non-forestry activities, like the development of sports and 
recreation facilities, which help illustrate how specific developments 
have been tailored to conform to the aims and objectives of the Project. 
A number of existing woods have been acquired for management in the 
GNF area. Durham County Council has itself purchased woodland at Craghead 
near Stanley, at Cong Burn near Chester-le-Street and, in cooperation 
with the Woodland Trust, some smaller woods in the area like Hellhole 
Woods. Considerable work has also gone into developing and improving the 
woodland surrounding the Beamish North of England Open Air Museum, west 
of Chester-le-Street. The museum is a re-creation of life in the region 
around the turn of the Century, set in an historic wooded estate at the 
head of the River Team. In the South Tyneside area, the Metropolitan 
Borough Council and the Woodland Trust have purchased Monkton Fell, a 
small but important piece of woodland beside the Sunderland to Newcastle 
railway line. 
A number of trails and walks have been established around the area, 
often enhanced by sculptures which can be seen along the woodland 
footpaths around Beamish, for example. In the City of Sunderland Council 
area the Coalfield Way takes the walker around some of the reclaimed 
industrial sites of Hetton, and the Stephenson Trail follows the old rail 
line from Hetton to the sea. Reclamation has also been undertaken at 
South Pelaw in the Durham County Council Area, considerable tree planting 
has been carried out at Newbottle Village near Sunderland by a local 
269 GNF, Forest Plan, (199(}, p.3 and pp.20-48. 
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landowner after planning permission for housing was rejected, and the 
private Lambton Estate, near Chester-le-Street, has continued to plant 
trees. 
Several sports facilities have been developed with the Forest in 
mind. The Community North Sports Complex, near Sunderland, for example, 
includes a hedged perimeter, woodland planting and a link with a nearby 
cycle way. The Wickham Thornes Adventure Woodland project has been 
developed by Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council with the help of 
£318,000 of Sports Lottery funding. 270 However, the most significant 
sports and leisure development in the area is the Riverside at Chester-
le-Street. This prestigious development on the peninsula formed by the 
River Wear adjacent to Chester-le-Street, will provide sports pitches, 
an athletics track, a sports pavilion and a cricket club to host Durham 
County games. Moreover, the existing Riverside Gardens, Donald Owen Clark 
Centre, Rowing Club and Rugby Club have been refurbished and enhanced 
with 30 acres of newly planted woodland interspersed with meadows and a 
riverside walk. 
Quantitative Measures 
Some difficulties have been encountered in collecting data about 
the GNF, mainly because the criteria for monitoring progress were not 
properly in place until some time after the formal start of the 
implementation phase in 1993. This is clear from comments in the 1994 
Forest Plan that 'it will be important to identify appropriate 
performance indicators ... against which to assess progress and from which 
to review the effectiveness of the policy'. 271 Moreover, the CC's 
1997/98 Monitoring Report explained that full scale monitoring of the 
implementation of the CFs did not officially start until 1st April 1995. 
The Report continued that 'problems of data collection and definition of 
data are still being resolved' and that this had 'hindered the ... project 
teams' ability to set up comprehensive data collection systems with 
partners', leaving some figures subject to verification. 272 Obtaining 
information from some of the participating public bodies has also been 
270 CC, Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998), p.12. 
271 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.17.13, p.101. Also see p.90. 
272 CC, Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998), Appendix B, para.1.10, p.2. 
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a problem since not all were as open as might be expected in a community 
programme. Moreover, the absence of regularly published annual reports 
from the GNF Project Team has made assessment especially difficult. 273 
The progress made in establishing the GNF in its first five years of 
operation is, therefore, largely based on the information contained on 
the CC's 1997/98 annual monitoring report. 
The CC's monitoring reports primarily concern the progress of the 
CF programme as a whole for each reporting year and this again presents 
some difficulties for assessing the GNF. First, not all the information 
is broken down to show the progress of individual CFs and, secondly, most 
of the information is given in annual form with little cumulative data 
presented to show the progress that has been made since the programme 
began. The cumulative data concerning the progress of the GNF from 
1991 274 to 1997/98 are given in Table 1. However, they only relate to 
the first six of the seven monitoring indicators identified by the DETR 
and MAFF. Figures for the remaining indicator (the amount of private and 
voluntary sector support) and the other data requested by the DETR and 
MAFF (non-forestry funding, community involvement and the cost of the 
forest teams) are not given in this cumulative fashion. Table 1 shows 
that considerable progress has been made in establishing the Forest. 
Astonishingly targets have not been agreed for several of the activities, 
making it difficult to assess whether progress has been satisfactory, but 
where targets have been given they have been exceeded. However, 
performance measures like these are only a crude measure of what is being 
undertaken in the GNF and some analysis is required. It is impossible 
adequately to consider performance against all indicators and, therefore, 
the level of woodland creation has been chosen for analysis. 
Nevertheless, this will help to illustrate the complex activity 
underlying the figures and the difficulties in interpreting such crude 
measures. 
273 Annual reports are prepared by the project teams of 11any of the CFs and it was anticipated that they 
would be prepared for the GHF (see Meaorando11 of Aqreeaent for the GNF 1993-96, para. 8 .1, p.10. ) . 
However, only one has been produced since 1991 despite repeated clai•s from the Project Director that 
these were in preparation. 
274 The CC clai! that the Project feat's activities began to have an impact froa 1991 which is why this 
date has been chosen rather than the fortal start of the impleaentation phase in 1993. 
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Table 1: Cumulative Data for the GNF from 1991 to 1997/98 
Indicator Total Target Notes 
(a) (b) (c) 
Area of woodland planted 476.6ha 425ha 11% of the total of 
(Tables 1 & 2) 4000ha to be planted 
Woodland brought under 578.9ha N/A 51.5% of existing 
management (Table 10) woodland 
Woodland opened for rec- 678.9ha N/A 38.6% of existing 
reation & access (Table 11) woodland 
Non-woodland area newly 10l.Oha N/A 
opened for recreation & 
access (Table 13) 
Rights of way brought into 162.4km N/A 37.3% of existing right 
good condition (Table 14) (est) of way 
Non-woodland habitat 375.6ha 200ha 17 fold increase on 
created/managed that existing in 
(Table 15) 1991/92 
Hedgerow created/managed >35km 15km Approx.44 fold increase 
(Table 17) on that existing in 
1991/92 
Derelict land reclaimed 75.4ha N/A 16.9% of total derelict 
(Table 18) land 
Notes: 
1. Data is from Appendix A of the CC's Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998). 
2. ColoJn (a) relates the cuJulative totals of work undertaken in the GNF area since 1991. 
3. Coluan (b) relates to targets for progress until the year 2000, in some cases given as the 5 year 
target 1995-2000. 
4. Colo1n (c) provides additional information for comparative purposes. 
Woodland creation is clearly of central importance to the Project. 
It is the only activity for which targets are given in the Forest Plan 
and heads the list of monitoring indicators laid down by the DETR and 
MAFF. Some 476.6ha of woodland was planted in the Forest area between 
1991 and 1997/98, out of the 4, OOOha expected to be created in the 
lifetime of the Project. This exceeds both the 375ha planned for the 
first five years of the Project to 1998, 275 and the year 2000 target. 
However, woodland was being created by local authorities and others in 
275 The targets for woodland creation in the first five years of implementation are 75ha/year. GNF, 
Forest Plan, (1994), para.17.5, p.98. 
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the area at a rate of 20ha/year276 before the establishment of the 
Project Team. If this had continued from 1991 onwards, it would have 
contributed 140ha of woodland to the Forest area by 1998. The Project 
Team's activities can, therefore, be said to have contributed an 
additional 235ha of woodland to the area that would have been planted by 
local authorities, increasing woodland creation by 67%. Nonetheless, the 
1997/98 monitoring report did point out that 'public authorities still 
account for the largest area of new planting' in the CF programme as a 
whole. 277 So whilst the rate of woodland creation has been increased by 
the establishment of the Project Team, planting is not yet being 
undertaken by the private and voluntary sectors to the degree 
anticipated. Rather, as council officers commented, local authorities are 
being pressured into undertaking most of the woodland creation. 
The contribution made by local authorities and other public bodies 
towards woodland creation remains disproportionate five years into the 
life of the Project. Despite repeated requests, the specific amount of 
woodland planted by local authorities in the GNF area could not be 
provided by the Project Director. However, a document obtained via a 
local councillor in the areas suggests that local authorities planted 
243ha of trees and shrubs between 1991 and 1995 alone, under the Forestry 
Authority's WGS (see Appendix 5). Although this figure may be subject to 
revision, it constitutes a significant 57% of the total planting 
undertaken between 1991 and 1998. Moreover, the 1997/98 Monitoring Report 
shows that 85.4% of the Woodland Grant Scheme approvals (an indication 
of the desire to plant trees in the future) in the GNF lay with local 
author! ties and other public bodies. 278 There is a clear difficulty 
here because a mere 15% of the GNF land area is in the hands of local 
authorities and other public bodies, the larger part being privately 
owned. 279 
Although woodland creation is but a small, though important, part 
of the GNF Project, analysis of the monitoring data illustrates the 
276 This is the baseline figure for planting per hectare in the area before the Project started. CC, 
Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998), Appendiz A, Table 2, p.2. 
277 Ibid., para.2.2.3, p.7. 
278 Ibid., Appendiz A, Table 7, p.8. 
279 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.4.15, p.15 ' para.16.6, p.91. 
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difficulties of interpreting such crude measures and raises two important 
questions. First, from the available figures it is unclear which bodies 
have been responsible for woodland creation up to 1998 and, therefore, 
which should be credited. It may be that increases in tree planting were 
the result of the establishment of the GNF Project Team. However, it 
appears that the bulk of planting is still being undertaken by local 
authorities and other public bodies, albeit at a higher rate than 
previously. Secondly, the long term future of the Project may be 
questionable because, unless landowners in the private sector can be 
encouraged to undertake more planting, it is likely to 'run out of 
steam', as one local authority officer put it. Although the CC argue that 
they are simply 'pump priming' the Project there appears to be little 
evidence that the private sector is taking up the mantle of woodland 
creation to the degree required. 
FUNDING COSTS 
It would be fair to say that the CC's annual monitoring reports 
tend to concentrate on the outputs of the programme, the only cost data 
specifically requested by the DETR and MAFF concerning 'non-forestry 
funding benefiting the forest' and the 'costs of the core forest 
teams'. 280 The CC claim that the reports are an assessment of 
activities undertaken in each Forest area which contribute to the goal 
of creating better environments by developing multipurpose forests. This 
is effectiveness - the extent to which objectives are achieved - and does 
not properly attend to other aspects of value for money like efficiency -
the relationship between input and outputs - and economy - minimising 
the consumption of resources. If managerial accountability is to operate 
adequately in the CF programme, economy and efficiency must be considered 
alongside effectiveness, and the importance of funding costs in this 
process cannot be overstated. 
Unfortunately, like much of the information in the CC's monitoring 
reports, the cost of funding the CFs is not presented in a clear and 
systematic fashion and this presents some difficulties in assessing value 
for money. For example, cumulative figures are not given for total costs 
of each Forest or for the whole programme since implementation. Annual 
280 See CC, Monitoring Report for 1997/1998, (1998), p.24 and Appendix A, Table 21, p.22. 
94 
costs are given, but in some cases they are broken down into spending in 
each CF area, and in others they are presented as a figure for the 
programme as a whole. Moreover, there is no total annual cost, including 
all receipts, for the individual Forests or for the whole programme. The 
cost of administering the GNF will, therefore, be assessed, first, by 
considering the limited annual funding data available for the Project, 
which mainly relate to forestry related activities. Secondly, as far as 
it can be ascertained, the annual funding of the entire CF programme 
(including forestry and non-forestry activities) will be presented and 
discussed. 
Cost of the GNF 
The available information about the annual cost of administering 
the GNF in funding terms in 1997/98 is summarised in Table 2 below. The 
largest item was funding for the reclamation of derelict land, but this 
figure may be unreliable because English Partnership, the body 
responsible for grant aided reclamation, was not able to provide accurate 
details, and because some information about grant aided projects may not 
have been recorded. 281 
Table 2: GNF Funding Data 1997/98 
Source of Funding Cost/annum (£) 
Woodland Grant Scheme (Appendix A, Table 8) 108,100 
Reclamation Grants (Appendix A, Table 18) 603,700 
Sponsorship & Donations (Appendix A, Table 19) 34,000 
Secondments (Appendix A, Table 19) 51,000 
Land transfers (Appendix A, Table 19) 5,000 
Land acquisitions (Appendix A, Table 19) 228,000 
Landfill tax (Appendix A, Table 19) 457,000 
Project Team salaries & support costs (Appendix A, 91,400 
Table 21) 
Total 1,578,200 
Botes: 
Data from CC, Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998). 
281 Ibid., para.7.1.2, p.19. 
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The figures also show a significant amount of funding for woodland 
creation from the FC's Woodland Grant Scheme. However, other woodland 
funding from the MAFF 1 s Farm Woodland Premium Scheme is not clearly 
recorded and neither is funding from the CC 1 s Countryside Stewardship 
Scheme. 282 The inaccuracy or absence of funding information presents 
some difficulties for the estimation of the GNF 1 s cost and this is 
compounded by the classification of some funding items in the CC 1 s 
monitoring reports. A case in point is 'private and voluntary sector 
support 1 which includes sponsorship and donations, support in kind, 
secondments, land transfers, land acquisitions, and landfill tax. 283 
The origins of these funds are not made clear and may give a misleading 
impression of the support for the GNF from the private and voluntary 
sectors. The CC say that land acquisitions refers to land which has come 
into the hands of Project's partners to be specifically used for Forest 
development, and land transfers concern land swapped between owners in 
the GNF area. However, it is unclear whether land acquisitions or land 
transfers can properly be considered as gifts from the private or 
voluntary sectors to the GNF. 
Landfill Tax was the second largest funding item for the Project 
in 1997/1998 and represented a significant source of funds for the 
CFs. 284 However, it represents an even more complex example of the way 
that the CC' s monitoring reports may mislead. Since 1996, landfill 
operators have been liable for tax on their activities which is collected 
through HM Customs and Excise. However, these companies can contribute 
an amount up to 20% of their annual tax liability to bodies undertaking 
environmental projects in the vicinity of the landfill site like the GNF. 
The landfill operators can claim back 90% of the contributions made as 
tax credits through ENTRUST, a private-sector not-for-profit company 
approved by HM Customs and Excise. The remaining 10% can be paid to the 
I 285 landfill companies by a 1 third party, and all contributions offset 
282 Ibid., p.5 & Appendix A, Table 8, p.9, Table 18, p.19 & Table 16, p.17. 
283 Ibid., p.21 & Appendix A, Table 19, p.20. No support in kind was received by the GNF in 1997/98. 
284 Ibid., para.8.1.1, p.21- p.22. 
285 ENTRUST, 1 Procedure for Enrol11ent and Project Approval Applications' & 'Interpretations & Precedents 
of the Landfill Tax Regulations', (1998), section I, p.l & section 49, p.7. 
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against Corporation Tax. 286 Moreover, landfill operators may gain 
indirect benefits from an improved environmental image, reduced criticism 
from environmental groups, and 'better prospects of getting planning 
permissions for new landfill sites • . 287 
The Landfill Tax Credit Scheme, as it is known, puts the public and 
private sectors in close proximity and, given the benefits for landfill 
operators, hardly represents the benevolence that the CC's monitoring 
reports suggest. Landfill Tax Credits can be considered as subsidies and 
a burden to the taxpayer, because they 'represent expenditure forgone 
which could [have] become available for spending elsewhere or for 
reducing taxation'. 288 Nonetheless, the contributions made by landfill 
operators to environmental bodies are not considered as ever having been 
public money, yet they are offset against the Landfill Tax paid to the 
Treasury through HM Customs and Excise. Moreover, because they are not 
regarded as public money the 'contributions are available for being 
matched by European, Central Government or ... Millennium or Lottery 
Commission funding', according to ENTRUST. 289 This is a curious and 
complex arrangement in which the true cost to the public of environmental 
projects like the GNF is significantly understated, whilst the 
reputations of private sector companies are enhanced and support for 
environmental projects by landfill companies is overblown. 
Private and voluntary sector support is variously attributed to 
receipts from local businesses and the local community indicating 'that 
there is strong support for the Community Forest programme in the local 
community', according to the Monitoring Report, and that 'support is 
growing as the programme becomes more established'. 29° Funding 
certainly includes sponsorship & donations, support in kind, & 
286 ENTRUST, 'Interpretations & Precedents', (1998), section 59, p.9. 
287 Ibid., section 52, p.8. 
288 Subsidies can be defined in strict public expenditure terms as 'unrequited current payments related 
to the provision of a good or service'. But could include 'tax exe1ptions, and capital grants and other 
expenditure, for exa1ple on transport infrastructure, provision of insurance cover, research and 
publicity'. British Government Panel on Sustainable Development, Third Report: January 1997, (London: 
DoE, 1997), pp.12-13. 
289 ENTRUST, 'Interpretations & Precedents', (1998), section 44, p. 7. 
290 CC, Monitoring Report for 1997/1998, (1998), p.21. 
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secondments which may be considered gifts from various sectors of the 
community at large. However, whilst land transfers, land acquisitions, 
and particularly landfill tax, may in strict terms be said to represent 
support from the local community they are funds which may otherwise have 
accrued to the public sector. 291 If these items are excluded, private 
and voluntary sector support accounts for a mere 5.4% of total funding 
figure, surprisingly low for a Project based on partnership. 
The cost of funding the GNF in 1997/98 seems large at £1,578,200 
and this may be an underestimate of the actual cost. Although some of 
this funding was contributed by the private and voluntary sectors 
(properly sponsorships and donations, secondments and benefit in kind) 
by far the largest proportion, £1,493,200, was public sector funding. 
This can usefully be compared to the FC's 1994 cost-benefit analysis of 
the Project which suggested a medium term discounted net present value 
of £15. 3 million over the life time of the Project. 292 Although this 
figure may need to be adjusted for inflation, the funding cost of the GNF 
of around £1.5 million per year seems high and could escalate to £45-£75 
million over the 30-50 year lifetime of the Project. This suggests that 
significant benefits must be found to justify the cost of funding the 
Project. 
Cost of the CF Programme 
Given the limitations of the available funding data for the GNF, 
it is worth briefly considering the funding of the CF programme as a 
whole to provide a more accurate picture of overall costs. The CC' s 
estimates for 1997/98 are summarised in Table 3 and show the cost of 
implementing the programme to be astonishingly high at just over £74 
million. It includes a substantial amount of non-forestry funding from, 
for example, the RDC, the Single Regeneration Budget, the EU and, most 
significantly, £56,871,000 (92.5% of the total) from the National 
291 When questioned on 17/11/98, a CC representative said that this may have been the result of ENTEC, 
the body which prepared the 1997/1998 Report, misunderstanding the criteria for including data under 
the heading of private & voluntary sector support. 
292 Cost-benefit analysis is a method of appraising an investment project by comparing all social and 
financial costs and benefits, as far as they can be deter1ined. Present value is the discounted value 
of a financial som arising at some future period. These figures are from CC, Community Forests: Briefing 
Doco1ent, (1995), para.8, p.I2. 
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Lottery. 293 Non-forestry funding may be for economic regeneration 
which, although not primarily related to forest creation, is considered 
an integral part of the programme's objectives. However, there is no 
clear separation of funding according to use and some woodland creation 
projects, like the Woodland Trust's 'Woods on Your Doorstep' scheme and 
the 'Millennium Forest' project are confusingly included in non-forestry 
funding. 294 In addition, a considerable amount of funding was itemised 
as 'support from the community', yet, as discussed earlier, very little 
of this can properly be considered as such. Even excluding community 
support, the CF programme represents an enormous cost to the public 
sector and, at this rate of spend, funding could easily exceed £3 billion 
over its lifetime. 
Table 3: Global Annual Cost Data 1997/98 
Funding Source Cost/annum (£) 
WGS establishment grants & supplements (Table 2. 2' p.S) 1,166,000 
Support from the community (Table 8.1, p.21) 7,783,500 
Non-forestry funding (Table 9.1, p.24) 61,484,000 
Land Reclamation Grants (Appendix B, Table 18) 1,790,900 
Project Team costs (Appendix B, Table 21) 1,848,000 
Total costs 74.072,400 
Notes: 
I. This data is taken from the CC's Monitoring Report for 1997/1998, (1998), as indicated. 
2. Data excludes some costs, like the Countryside Stewardship ScheQe. 
OUTCOMES AND DIFFICULTIES 
Although funding costs are considered by the CC, the emphasis of 
monitoring of the CF programme tends to be towards effectiveness - the 
extent to which objectives are achieved. However, effectiveness can be 
defined in a broader way than just the intended consequences of the 
programme. The effects of an activity are the outputs, or 'the units of 
goods and services produced by a project, programme or policy'. However, 
outcomes which are 'the direct and measurable consequences' on those 
293 It should be noted that £45 million of the National Lottery funding granted for the CF prograaoe 
in 1997/98, Nas spent on CFs other than the GllF. CC, Monitoring Report for 1997/1998, (1998), 
para.9.1.3, p.24. Also letter froo Bowoan, DETR, 1/12/98. 
294 CC, Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998), paras.9.1.1. & 9.1.5, p.24. 
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involved or with an interest, but which are external to the activity 
itself, need also to be considered. Effectiveness also includes the 
impact of an activity and 'the ultimate policy effects of a project, 
programme or policy', encompassing abstract notions like changes in 
quality of life. 295 Moreover, the term effectiveness in all its guises 
-outputs, outcomes and impact - is frequently taken to refer to intended 
or desirable effects, but can be extended to unintended and undesirable 
effects, dysfunctional effects, even desirable effects that may not have 
been specifically intended or intended effects that are not 
desirable. 296 It is worth considering some of the broader aspects of 
the GNF Project that may not have been intended or be desirable. These 
might be called difficulties and can be separated into two broad but 
interconnected areas. The first concerns funding of the GNF, and the 
second relates to land and planning. 
Funding 
The funding required to successfully implement the CF programme has 
been a concern since the announcement of the initiative in 1989. The 
programme was to be led by grants and other economic incentives from 
central government and a sum of £20-25 million was expected to be needed 
for each Forest. However, the £70 million that the Government initially 
put towards the programme was considered insufficiently generous. 297 
Furthermore, concerns about funding were expressed in the Forest Plan, 
prepared for the GNF and published in 1994, which stated that: 
It is not clear whether currently available grants, programmes and other incentives will be 
sufficient to generate the required scale of change .•. Research suggests that substantial 
additional funding 1ay still be required and it will therefore be i1portant to assess the 
anticipated overall cost of the Forest against existing resources to identify at an early stage 
what further assistance may be necessary to ensure success. 298 
Local authorities have until 1998 carried the burden of developing 
295 Glynn, Gray & Jenkins, 'Auditing the Three Es', (1992), p.59. 
296 Ibid., p.60. 
297 See Michael McCarthy, 'Forests to restore urban fringe', The Times, 26/7/89, & Peter Brimacombe, 
'They have branches everywhere', Daily Telegraph, 23/2/91, for example. 
298 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.17.1, p.98. 
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the GNF and have found funding shortages particularly acute. Funding 
constraints imposed by central government have limited the ability of 
local authorities to pursue the GNF's objectives and drawn comments that 
'the Project is laudable, but without cash it will not progress'. Some 
council employees believed that the Project should be funded through 
direct grants from central government but that does not conform to the 
Government's rationale of the CF idea. Some local authorities have also 
found it difficult to secure the matching funds needed to receive grants 
from the EU, the National Lottery and so on. The introduction of the 
Landfill Tax Credit Scheme and the classification of contributions to 
environmental bodies as private funding has undoubtedly eased this 
situation, but this is of little help to local authorities which are 
specifically excluded from being treated as environmental bodies. 299 
Moreover, local author! ties are constrained by the EU' s development 
grants which are restricted to spending on infrastructure and job 
creation, and not forest creation. 
It is undoubtedly true that the CC and FC have also faced financial 
constraints and may have been unable to fund the CF programme as they 
might have wished. However, significant extra money has been made 
available for the development of the CFs through the Landfill Tax, for 
example, which has benefitted forest related activities like woodland 
creation and management, and hedgerow planting for the CF programme. 300 
The funding of non-forestry related activities, loosely termed economic 
regeneration and including heritage and sports projects, has also 
significantly increased through National Lottery funding. 301 
Despite the CF programme being planned as a partnership between the 
public, private and voluntary sectors, it remains primarily funded and 
implemented by the public sector. With regard to the GNF, the business 
community was to 'give practical and financial support', but finding 
support from business has been difficult. The Forest Advisory Forum noted 
in 1994 that 'a cautious approach has been taken in building links with 
299 ENTRUST, 'Interpretations & Precedents' ,(1998), section 78, p.11. 
30
° CC, Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998), Sumtary & para. 8.1.1, p.21. 
301 Ibid., Su11ary & p.24. 
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the private sector', 302 suggesting that this was not entirely 
unexpected. It was noted by local authorities that few businesses in the 
GNF area were in a position to support the Project either because of the 
economic climate of the mid-1990s, or because they already had difficulty 
in simply surviving in depressed areas like the north-east of England. 
Moreover, local authorities did not consider it cost-effective to 'chase' 
companies for money for the Forest and neither did they see any clear 
economic benefits that would, in the short term, attract funding from 
businesses. 
Some funding has been provided by the private and voluntary sectors 
and the CC said in their 1996/97 Monitoring Report that there had been 
'a slight increase in support from the private and voluntary sectors' 
during the year. 303 Their Report the following year stated that: 'The 
level of funding received from businesses and the local community has 
increased year on year' and that this source of funding had increased by 
400% since 1994/1995, 'indicating that there is strong support for 
the ... programme in the community, and that support is growing as the 
programme becomes more established'. 304 However, much of this 
improvement can be attributed to the Landfill Tax Credit Scheme rather 
than increased interest from the private and voluntary sectors. If 
landfill tax contributions are excluded, actual funding from the 
community declined by 3% in 1997/98. 305 The CC claims that the object 
at this early stage is merely to 'pump-prime' the programme, but there 
is an appreciable danger that the cost to the Treasury will spiral 
upwards. This is primarily because of difficulties in finding private and 
voluntary sector funding to take over from that of the public sector, but 
also because the classification of Landfill Tax and some other funding 
contributions as private rather than public sector funding may lead to 
an underestimate of the public cost. 
302 GNF, Forest Advisory Forum Report, (26/7/94), paras.66-67, p.12. 
303 CC & FC, Monitoring Report 1996/1997, (Cheltenham: CC, 1997), section 8, p.5. 
304 CC, Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998}, Su~mary. 
305 Ibid., para.8.1.1, p.21. 
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Land Use and Planning 
Land use and planning are closely linked and particularly so in 
CFs. The success of the programme relies on forest plans being included 
in relevant local authority plans which dictate future developments. The 
tree belts produced by CFs can act as a restraint on urban expansion and 
rural development comparable to green-belts, albeit in a less permanent 
way. Local authorities, with responsibility for the planning system, use 
CFs as an additional tool to control development. As one council officer 
in the GNF area noted during this research, the Forest will allow a 
'period of settlement and consolidation of past developments which were, 
perhaps, not so well organised and planned'. 
The planning system can also be used by local authorities as an 
incentive for the establishment of CFs in a process often called 
'planning gain'. Here planning permission for housing or some other 
development is given by a local authority on condition that additional 
work of benefit to the CFs is undertaken by the landowner or developer. 
The danger of this activity is that it is open to corruption and planning 
gain caused some concern in the DoE (now the DETR) in 1996 because of its 
increased use by councils with financial difficulties as a means of 
getting public works done by developers. 306 Planning gain also caused 
some confusion amongst council officers in the GNF area in the mid-1990s, 
and differing views were held about its ethic and legality. At least one 
council used it as a bargaining tool for Forest development, but an 
officer from another council believed that the DETR might 'frown upon the 
idea'. 
Planning gain was accepted in 1997 and the DoE (now DETR) published 
a circular stating that 'Planning obligations have a positive role to 
play in the planning system', but warned that 'such arrangements must be 
operated in accordance with the fundamental principle that planning 
permission may not be bought or sold'. 307 It has also been used as an 
incentive to encourage landfill operators to take part in the Landfill 
Tax Credit Scheme, as noted earlier. However, developers can also benefit 
from the complex administrative arrangements of the Project. One council 
306 Sarah Boseley, 'Bard up councils cash in on developers' hole plans', The Guardian, 22/6/96. 
307 DoE, Circular 1/97, Planning Obligations, (London: The Stationery Office, 1997), para.B7, p.8 & 
para.6, p.l. 
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officer, for example, commented that developers tend to exploit the 
fragmented Forest development system by bartering with the Project Team 
over tree planting, then use agreements made to pressure local 
authorities into granting planning permission for, say, housing. 
Conversely, and despite the obvious benefits open to developers, 
some landowners in the Forest area did express concerns about the 
planning system and local authority planners. A representative of 
landowners said that whilst he didn't wish compulsion to be used to 
further the Forest development, the constraints of the planning system 
were a problem. He suggested that it might be useful to include a tree 
planting element into the local planning process to allow more bargaining 
to occur. Yet it is unclear whether this alone would encourage farmers 
to participate in the Project because of the considerable reduction in 
land value that accompanies tree planting. This point was noted by a 
representative of landowners and the 1994 Forest Plan noted that: 'It 
remains to be seen whether existing incentives can compete with more 
intensive agricultural returns or speculative land values' 308 
Farmers and other landowners, including local author! ties, may thus 
be resistant to participating in the CFs because of land value 
speculation. A piece of land may have a clear value based on its current 
use, say, for agriculture, but that value may increase if agricultural 
grants are improved. Moreover, land may be classified as suitable for 
more lucrative uses like housing, opencast mining or landfill at some 
future date, again increasing its value. In some cases like housing, the 
value of the land may increase further if the area has also been enhanced 
by tree planting. What is termed as 'hope value' reflects this potential 
increase in land value, as does 'option value' which refers to the 
potential for exploiting the land at some time in the future. 309 
Farmers and other landowners are understandably reluctant to commit land 
308 GHF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.l6.17, p.92. 
309 Option value can be defined as 'the value of the environment as a potential benefit as opposed to 
actual present use value' or 'a willingness to pay for the preservation of an environment against some 
probability that the individual will make use of it at a later date'. Pearce, Markandya & Barbier, 
Blueprint for a Green Econo1y, (1989), p.60. 
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to a long term crop like trees because of these phenomena. 310 Moreover, 
the increased public access required by some grants also presents a 
further disincentive for landowners. 
The difficulty of encouraging farmers to plant trees must be of 
particular concern to those responsible for implementing the CF 
programme. Some 50% of the land in the GNF area is under some form of 
agricultural management and farmers, therefore, have a major role to play 
in making it a success. However, in the reporting year 1996/1997, the CC 
noted that in the CF programme as a whole: 'Only 12% of the total area 
of new woodland planting was entered into the Farm Woodland Premium 
Scheme' (the grant administered by MAFF and aimed at farmers); and only 
13% of Woodland Grant Scheme applications (the grant administered by the 
Forestry Authority and also aimed at farmers) were from the farming 
sector. The CC concluded that: 'In the current business environment, 
planting trees on farmland is a difficult objective to realise'. 311 A 
year later, and after further decline in farm incomes, the CC still noted 
that: 
Achieving large areas of tree planting on farmland bas proved difficult, often because the 
returns from forestry are not comparable with the returns from agriculture particularly in the 
short term. 312 
The resistance of landowners and, particularly, farmers to 
participate in the CF initiative have, until now, not presented too many 
difficulties because local authorities have led the way and committed 
large areas of land to Forest development. However, local authorities 
only own around 15% of the land in the GNF area and this has led to 
comments from council representatives that the suitable land for 
development is becoming short: 'We are nearing the end of the easy bit', 
said one councillor, 'the next step is much more difficult because it 
requires landowners to accept a change of use of land'. Compulsory 
310 Several council officers in the GNF area commented about the difficulties associated with hope and 
option value and the point was also noted by the CC in their Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998), 
para.2.2.3, p.7. 
311 CC, Monitoring Report 1996/1997, (1997), section 2, p.3 & section 10, p.5. 
312 CC, Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998), para.10.1.5, p.26. 
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purchase has been ruled out 313 and the identification by local councils 
of suitable privately owned land is time consuming, expensive and often 
impossible, due to the lack of ownership records in many areas. Several 
participants in the GNF highlighted this problem in the mid-1990s. It is 
'running out of steam' said one, and another said that it 'was a great 
idea that was floundering'. Nothing seems to have changed by 1997/98 to 
significantly alter that view. 
4.4. MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY CONSIDERED 
Managerial accountability brings together several of the doctrines 
of NPM to deal with the difficulties presented by traditional concepts 
of ministerial accountability. It attempts to provide ministers with an 
appropriate framework for them to devote more time and energy to the role 
of chief executives of their departments. The key features of NPM are the 
devolution of responsibility to manageable public sector units, and clear 
statements of the responsibility for those units. In this way, it is 
claimed, responsibility can be delegated whilst retaining accountability 
with ministers. However, whilst this approach may improve a minister's 
ability to oversee the units for which he is accountable, it is a complex 
process and presents particular difficulties for controlling the 
implementation of the programmes and projects based on partnerships 
between a multiplicity of public, private and voluntary sector bodies. 
DEVOLVING RESPONSIBILITY 
The creation of manageable units within the public sector has, 
arguably, increased the flexibility of government and enabled partnership 
approaches to be adopted in the implementation of programmes like the CF 
programme. Smaller units with increased freedom from hierarchical control 
are more able to work with other units in the public sector, and with the 
private and voluntary sectors. The aim is to increase responsiveness and 
improve the value for money obtained by the public sector through joint 
administration. In these circumstances, there is more need to identify 
responsibility and enforce accountability because of the close 
relationships developed with the private and voluntary sectors. However, 
rather than improve clarity, the increased complexity of the partnership 
313 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), Statement of Understanding, p.lll. 
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arrangement appears to make responsibility and accountability more 
confused and confusing. 
First, many public sector units are involved in implementing the 
GNF and, though these units are accountable upwards to ministers, the 
route is often convoluted and many departments may be involved leaving 
no single minister in overall control. Secondly, responsibility for 
funding is often separated from responsibility for action within the 
programme and, in the case of the GNF, the Project Team largely acts 'as 
a catalyst for the actions of others'. 314 Whilst the Project Team is 
responsible for attracting funds to the Project from other public sector 
bodies (and others), it has little control over the raising or spending 
of those funds. Both of these features of the GNF Project were identified 
in the previous chapter. However, the difficulties presented by the 
fragmented approach towards implementation are highlighted when the 
Project's success is considered. This is because managerial 
accountability also depends on large amounts of information being 
provided to ministers from these many disparate bodies so that 
performance can be assessed and value for money obtained. 
PERFORJIIANCE MEASUREIIIENT 
General Difficulties 
There are a number of difficulties in the application of 
performance measurement to the CF programme which are general in nature 
and may be relevant to other areas of the public sector. First, as John 
Stewart and Kieran Walsh have pointed out, the development of performance 
management is based on the assumption that 'managers can be given clearly 
understood tasks, performance targets to achieve, and be accountable for 
the use of resources to achieve those tasks'. 315 However, public 
administration is a complex area of management where multiple objectives 
may exist and, in the absence of the profit motive, objectives are often 
difficult to define. 316 The public sector cannot be easily reduced to 
a set of targets and neither can a sufficient range of performance 
314 Letter from Bow1an, DETR, 1/12/98. 
315 John Stewart & Kieran Walsh, 'Change in the Management of Public Services', Public Administration, 
(1992), Vo1.70, No.4, p.513. 
316 Greenwood & Wilson, Public Administration in Britain Today, (1989), p.l30. 
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measures be drawn up to adequately describe its extent and diversity. 
Moreover, public administration is greatly influenced by the political 
environment in which it operates and the emphasis given to goals, 
objectives and targets may vary according to political priorities and 
constraints of the day. 
Secondly, goals and objectives often relate to qualitative as well 
as quantitative changes. This is particularly true for the CF initiative 
which aims to 'create better environments for people to use, cherish and 
enjoy' through the creation of multipurpose forests. 317 The value to 
society of objectives like an 'attractive and diverse landscape' or a 
'high quality environment ' 318 is not easy to measure. The problem is 
comparable to that faced by the Roskill Commission in their attempts to 
place monetary values on imponderables like the qual! ty of Norman 
architecture, open countryside and peaceful Sunday afternoons. 319 The 
difficulties of measuring the qualitative benefits of the CF programme 
are accepted by the CC which points out that: 'It is difficult to 
measure, for example, the enjoyment experienced and educational value 
gained by children in planting trees in their school grounds' . 320 
Nonetheless, it represents a serious practical problem for managerial 
accountability and remains unresolved. 
Thirdly, the implementation of some public policies may be 
difficult to measure and interpret because of the long timescales 
involved. Again, this is particularly true of the CF programme which is 
expected to take between 30 and 50 years to develop. 321 The GNF Plan 
notes that: 'It is difficult to be precise about the pattern and rate of 
development of such a long-term project', 322 and clearly development 
may not proceed at a linear rate. Moreover, development may be heavily 
317 CC, ColDionity Forests: Briefing Document, (1995), para.l.8, p.3. 
318 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.3.9, p.12. 
319 Report of the Commission of the Third London Airport, The Roskill Report, (London: BMSO, 1972). 
32
° CC, Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998), Appendix B, para.1.11, p.3. 
321 There is some uncertainty about this tisescale and it is variously quoted as 30 years [CC, Comaunity 
Forests: Briefing Docu1ent, (1995), para.1.1.3, p.4); 30-40 years [GNF, Forest Advisory Foro• Report, 
(26/7/94), para.4, p.1); 35-40 years [GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.17.5, p.98); and 30-50 years [CC, 
Co11unity Forest Monitoring Report 1996/1997, (1997), para.1, p.2). 
322 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), p.90. 
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influenced by outside variables like the speed of CAP reform or the level 
of grants offered under different governments. Furthermore, the trees 
that are planted will take many years to reach maturity so that visual 
improvements to the environment may not appear for some time, and 
interest from timber based industries in the forests may not arise for 
many years. 
Specific Difficulties 
A number of more specific concerns arise in the monitoring of the 
GNF resulting from the quality of the information made available to 
ministers. It is, after all, information that 'brings the machinery of 
accountability to life', and its quality 'determines the effectiveness 
of any system of accountability'. 323 Yet the available data about the 
GNF, whilst extensive, is also incomplete, fragmented and sometimes 
misleading. First, the monitoring reports compiled annually by the CC are 
the major source of information for ministers and these reports contain 
numerous data about the programme as a whole and about individual CFs. 
However, the accountable departments of MAFF and the DETR only formally 
request data on seven indicators and three other measures of the 
implementation of the initiative. This data mainly concerns the progress 
that has been made with the programme, that is the outputs of the 
programme or, more properly, effectiveness. This is curious since 
managerial accountability encompasses the concept value for money in the 
public sector. Devolving responsibility and identifying goals, objectives 
and targets attempts to improve ministerial oversight of departments to 
ensure that this is achieved. Value for money includes not just 
effectiveness, but also efficiency and economy (even equity perhaps), yet 
these matters seem secondary to the main thrust of the moni taring 
reports. 
Secondly, the data is fragmented in the annual monitoring reports 
and not presented in a systematic way. Some data concerns individual CFs 
and some the CF programme as a whole, making the comparison of projects 
difficult. There are particular concerns about the cost of the programme 
which is difficult to assess because the cumulative cost of funding 
either individual forests or the whole programme is not recorded. Of 
323 Day & Klein, Accountabilities, (1987), p.43. 
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course each participating public body also provides data about its own 
funding of the programme to ministers, but this cannot provide a clear 
overview of the programme and less so of individual CFs. Moreover, the 
complex administrative arrangement does not assist the managerial 
accountability process because targets often don't exist and where they 
do it remains unclear who is responsible for hitting them or for progress 
made towards goals and objectives. Overall, it is difficult to attribute 
praise if progress has been good, and if progress has been unsatisfactory 
it is difficult to attribute blame in the partnership arrangement. 
Thirdly, the available data is often incomplete because of the 
number and diversity of objectives to be considered, the problem of 
collecting the necessary information from such a wide range of bodies, 
and the difficulties inherent in the assessment of qualitative criteria. 
Again this may produce a distorted picture of the progress of the GNF and 
is particularly worrying in the area of costs where no information is 
collected for a number of grants. 
Finally, some of the data made available to ministers through the 
monitoring reports is confusing and misleading. This is most clearly 
illustrated in the matter of identifying whether funding has come from 
the public sector or from the community at large. Land transfers, land 
acquisitions and, particularly, the recently introduced landfill tax 
represent a significant proportion of the total cost of administering the 
CF programme. However, they are identified in the report as private and 
voluntary sector support, or support from the community. Yet identifying 
them in this way may mislead ministers about the true cost of the 
initiative to the public because, properly, they are subsidies, and 
public sector funding in all but name. That the figures are presented as 
an indication of 'strong support for the Community Forest programme in 
the community' 324 suggests, at the very least, an overstatement of the 
programmes' success. Moreover, the classification of contributions under 
the Landfill Tax Credit Scheme as private and voluntary sector funding 
enables the project teams to apply for other public funding where 
matching funds are required to be found by the applicant. This may lead 
to serious underestimation of the cost of the initiative to the public. 
The cost of implementing the GNF and CF programme is high by any 
324 CC, Monitoring Report 1997/1998, (1998), para.8.1.2, p.21. 
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standards, but whether it is too high or not high enough is difficult to 
gauge in the circumstances. Accurate assessment of value for money can 
be problematic in the public sector but is particularly difficult in the 
administration of the GNF where managerial accountability is favoured. 
Ministers, who have a significant role to play in ensuring value for 
money is obtained, are at a disadvantage because of the complex 
administrative arrangements. Devolving responsibility makes control of 
the programme difficult and reliance on performance measurement may 
compound this, presenting a distorted picture for which there is no 
corrective. There is no single audit of the whole programme, 325 and the 
Project Teams are neither statutory bodies nor companies and so there 
really is no external scrutiny. So whilst the programme may be effective 
in delivering multipurpose forests in the short run, insufficient private 
and voluntary sector interest is being generated to take it forward to 
completion. The cost to the public of supporting the initiative is 
seriously underestimated and, although it may be effective, it could also 
be both uneconomic and inefficient. This does not sit well with the value 
for money ideal and compromises the standards of prudence normally 
expected in the public sector. 
325 Letter from Bowman, DEfR, 1/12/98. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
5 .1. INTRODUCTION: COMPLEXITY AND MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
The GNF provides an example of the way in which sustainable 
development is being implemented in England in the 1990s. Both the 
process which led to the emergence of the CF programme and the first five 
years of implementation of the Project have been examined in detail. What 
has been found is a pluralist policy process resulting in a project based 
on a community or partnership approach between the public, private and 
voluntary sectors. Many public bodies, through central to local, have 
been given a role in the Project, producing a complex and overlapping 
hierarchical organisational pattern, confusing responsibility and making 
the enforcement of accountability difficult. Aspects of NPM feature 
highly in the administration of the Project, leading to an emphasis on 
managerial accountability rather than traditional forms based on 
hierarchy. However, difficulties for accountability remain even though 
the importance of accountability is heightened because of a blurring of 
the boundaries between the public, private and voluntary sectors arising 
from the partnership arrangement which has been adopted. 
This chapter draws together the salient features of the sustainable 
development concept with the mode adopted for its implementation, 
exemplified by the GNF. It is contended that the difficulties of 
accountability may have serious implications for the success of the GNF 
Project and the CF programme as a whole, and may also have further 
consequences for the implementation of sustainable development programmes 
more generally. 
5. 2. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE GREAT NORTH FOREST 
PROJECT 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
There is a tension between the continued economic growth needed to 
maintain (if not improve) our standard of life, and the preservation of 
the environment on which all life depends. This point, noted a century 
and a half ago by John Stuart Mill, has again come to the fore in recent 
decades. To ease this tension a concept, not dissimilar to Mill's 
stationary state, has emerged called sustainable development. Sustainable 
development was first defined in the 1987 Brundtland Report as 
'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
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ability of future generations to meet their own needs'. 326 However, 
since then it has been variously redefined to take account of competing 
views about what constitutes sustainable development and how it can be 
realised. 
In general terms there are two views about how sustainable 
development can be achieved. The first, propounded by the Brundtland 
Report, emphasises the political and social dimensions of sustainable 
development, and highlights the need for citizen participation in the 
decision making process. 327 According to the Brundtland view, 
sustainable development is virtuous, and success may depend on 'elevating 
sustainable development to a global ethic'. 328 Protection of the 
environment, therefore, requires motives higher than simple personal gain 
because of the frequent absence of immediate benefits from preserving the 
environment for a future and unknown society. This fits well with the 
concept of community which embodies a similar sense of morality329 and 
with the communitarian philosophy which has been resurrected in the last 
decade or so. The Brundland view of sustainable development, arguably, 
has overtones of Aristotle's good life in its contribution towards a 
common good achieved through virtuous action by citizens. 330 In this 
sense the framework for achieving sustainable development can be compared 
to idealist concepts of participative democracy exemplified by Mary 
Parker Follet's New State, amongst others. 
The second view of sustainable development can be found in the UK 
Government's 1990 environmental strategy. Like Brundtland's 'Our Common 
Future', the similarly titled White Paper, 'This Common Inheritance', is 
also founded on 'the ethical imperative of stewardship', and sustainable 
development is correspondingly defined as 'not sacrificing tomorrow's 
326 VCED, Our Comaon Future, (1989), p.43. 
327 Ibid., p.65. 
328 Ibid. I p.308. 
329 See, for example, Mary F.Rousseau, Comaunity: The Tie that Binds, (Lanhall, New York & London: 
University Press of Aterica, 1991), pp.II0-111. 
330 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Translated by David Ross, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1925), Book I, pp.l-27. 
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prospects for an illusory gain today'. 331 However, whilst the 
Government's strategy claims to provide people with the necessary 
information for them to make informed choices, the White Paper is 
suffused with market phraseology. So, whereas the 'responsibility for our 
environment is shared ... It is an obligation on us all' and should become 
'an instinctive characteristic of good citizenship', it is also argued 
that 'market mechanisms offer the prospect of a more efficient and 
flexible response to environmental issues, both old and new'. 332 
As with the concept of sustainable development itself, there is a 
tension also in the UK Government's view about how it can be achieved or 
implemented. Its view invokes a community ideal but one that is 
significantly different from Brundtland's, and the two views can 
helpfully be conceived in terms of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, or 
community and association, as expounded by Ferdinand Tonnies a century 
ago. 333 The Brundtland view of sustainable development conforms more to 
the gemeinschaft, where activity is small in scale, based on cooperation 
and family life, and where both means and ends are valued. Conversely, 
the UK Government's view conforms more to the gesellschaft where 
rationality and economics prevail, contracts are the custom and 
regulation the rule. The Government may be more realistic in its 
approach; first, because of the theoretical irreversibility of society's 
movement from gemeinschaft towards gesellschaft. Secondly, because of the 
growing international support given to combining citizen participation 
with market principles in the pursuit of sustainable development, as 
demonstrated by the Agenda 21 agreement which emerged from the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development. 
THE GNF PROJECT 
The term sustainable development defies exact definition and, as 
Pearce, Markandya and Barbier point out: 'There is some truth in the 
criticism that it has come to mean whatever suits the advocacy of the 
331 DoR, This Common Inheritance, (1990), p.10. 
332 Ibid., para.l.38, p.16 & para.l.29, p.14. 
333 Ferdinand Tonnies, Co11unity and Association, (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft), [1887), Translated 
by Charles P.Loomis, (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1955). 
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individual concerned'. 334 No clear principles exist about how it can 
best be realised and the newness of the concept means that it is largely 
untried. However, something can be learned from the programmes and 
projects that are in progress and this thesis is written with that 
objective in mind. The case study which has been chosen is the GNF 
Project; part of the CF programme established in 1989 and a relatively 
early piece of sustainable development policy to be put into practice in 
the UK. 
The Project has been considered in some detail; first, through the 
process which led to the emergence of the CF programme and, secondly, 
through the organisational arrangements supporting the practical 
implementation of the Project. It is clear that the CF programme resulted 
from a pluralist process with many competing groups contributing to the 
multipurpose forestry policy from which the CF initiative sprang. The CF 
programme is a set of twelve projects and it attempts to respond to 
changes in public opinion about the environment; reform of agricultural 
support systems in the European Union, namely the CAP; a shift in 
forestry policy and a desire to raise woodland coverage in England nearer 
to European levels; and the need to reclaim derelict industrial land on 
the urban margins which may then act as a barrier, checking urban 
expansion. 
The CF programme is couched in pluralist terms of community, 
partnership and participation, and implementation is to be encouraged 
through persuasion, purchasing and planning. The objectives of the 
programme are numerous and are aimed at satisfying the demands of many 
groups with interests in the four policy areas of the programme noted 
above. However, the process is mainly led by economic instruments in the 
form of grants from the public sector to pump prime the programme until 
it becomes self supporting. The implementation of the twelve CF projects, 
therefore, reflect the Government's general attitude towards sustainable 
development which looks simultaneously towards both community and the 
market. 
The GNF Project is designed as a partnership and its 'realisation 
will demand the committed support of key national ... and local bodies, 
together with all sections of the community', according to the Forest 
334 Pearce, Markandya & Barbier, Blueprint for a Green Economy, (1989), p.l. 
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Plan. 335 Examination of the Project shows that the net is cast widely 
with a role for central government departments, national agencies, local 
government, farmers and landowners, the business community, the voluntary 
sector, and local citizens. 336 Participating bodies are coordinated 
through a core formal organisation consisting of a Project Team and a 
number of supporting committees. These are composed of representatives 
of the principal partners from central government, farming and landowning 
interests, and the five local authorities in the area which also provide 
a democratic element to the process. 
5.3. ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE GREAT NORTH FOREST PROJECT 
Complexity is a notable feature of the process of making and 
implementing public policy and, according to John McCormick, this is 
particularly so in the field of environmental policy. 337 The 
administrative arrangements developed for the implementation of the GNF 
are complex in two respects. First, whilst the Project Team and its 
supporting committees provide a formal focus for the Project, there are 
numerous participating public bodies from all levels from central through 
to local. The formal organisation merges into a wider organisation 
composed of organisations of a private and voluntary nature. Moreover, 
some participating bodies, like the Project's MSG, TECs, Groundwork and 
Tidy Britain, combine public, private and voluntary features which makes 
classification difficult. For many, to quote Barker: 'Government 
departments and "private society" are offered ... as the two known entities 
between which these many organisations are to be found'. 338 
Secondly, because the CF programme aims at several policy areas -
environmental, agricultural, forestry and urban expansion the 
objectives handed down to individual CF projects, like the GNF, are 
multiple, often change, and appear to vary according to the documents 
consulted. Between eleven and fourteen objectives were found in three 
335 GNF, Forest Plan, (1994), para.16.23, p.93. 
336 Ibid., pp.93-97. 
337 McCormick, British Politics and the Bnviron•ent, (1991), pp.13-14. 
338 Barker, 'Governmental bodies and the networks of 1utual accountability', in Barker (Bd), Quangos 
in Britain, (1980), p.S. 
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documents published from 1994 to 1997. 339 Although, objectives may 
change in response to experience gained by the organisation and through 
bargaining and coalition forming by the participants, 340 such changes 
inevitably add to the existing complexity of the arrangements found in 
this case study. 
The complex organisational arrangement of the Project resulting 
from the close association of public, private and voluntary sectors with 
widely differing interests, presents some serious difficulties for the 
accountability. A.H.Birch once said that: 'It is clear that people who 
regard political responsibility as a virtue want their government to 
be ... responsive to public opinion, to pursue policies which are prudent 
and mutually consistent, and to be accountable to the representatives of 
the electors' . 341 Yet it is far from clear that all these aspects of 
responsibility are satisfied (or can be satisfied) in the GNF where there 
is a high degree of complexity and a near fusion of the public with the 
private and voluntary sectors. 
HIERARCHY AND TRADITIONAL PIETHODS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Although the overall pattern of public administration in the UK has 
changed significantly in recent decades, hierarchical arrangements remain 
important. Weber's rational, if highly abstract, theory of bureaucracy 
which attempted to provide a pattern for administration that was both 
efficient and under democratic control, remains of profound importance 
in the study of organisations. 342 The classical school, of which Weber 
is pre-eminent, provides a valuable lesson, according to R.J.S.Baker, in 
'the value of definitions of function, authority and responsibility, 
clear lines of command and control and orderly administrative 
structures'. 343 Moreover, it continues to provide the framework for the 
system of public administration in the UK. 'The principles of office 
339 See Chapter 2. 
340 Richard M.Cyert & James G.Karsh, 'A Behavioral Theory of Organizational Objectives', from Mason 
Haire (Bd), Modern Organization Theory, [1959], Reprinted in Jay M.Shafritz & J.Steven Ott, Classics 
of Organizational Theory, 3rd Edition, (Bel1ont California: Wadsworth, 1991), pp.133-142. 
341 Birch, Representative and Responsible Government, (1964), p.20. 
342 Baker, Adlinistrative Theory and Public Ad•inistration, (1972), p.37. 
343 Ibid., p.186. 
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hierarchy and of levels of graded authority', said Weber, 'mean a firmly 
ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a 
supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones'. 344 These 
hierarchical principles have an important role in the accountability 
process despite recent reforms. Regarding the GNF, the CC, as an 
Executive type NDPB with primary responsibility for the Project, remains 
hierarchically linked to its sponsoring Department, the DETR, despite 
that it operates at 'arms length from ministers'. 345 However, the 
number of participants and the multiple objectives of the GNF is 
confusing and there are a number of shortcomings of the hierarchical 
framework that governs the Project. 
First, responsibility and accountability are confused by the mixed 
membership of the formal organisation arising from the fragmentation of 
government and the partnership approach which has been adopted for the 
Project. It is found in the joint arrangements of the Members Steering 
Group, for example, which brings together representatives of several 
different public bodies (local authorities, the FC and CC) with those of 
private landowners (the CLA and NFU) . Moreover, mixed membership is found 
in the way that personnel in some bodies, like the Project Team, are each 
formally employed and salaried by other organisations, including local 
councils, government departments, NDPBs, a charity and a voluntary 
interest group in this case. 
Secondly, it is often difficult to identify to whom individuals are 
accountable because of the multiple accountabilities that exist in the 
Project. This is most obvious with the Project Team director who is 
responsible to a host of bodies in different ways: Gateshead MBC as his 
employer; the Project's locally accountable body, the MSG; the FC and CC 
as lead organisations of the Project; through the CC to the DETR; to the 
MAFF which, with the DETR, is responsible for monitoring the progress of 
the Project; and to the many grant awarding bodies which support the 
Project. 
Finally, accountability is confused by the separation of 
responsibility for funding from responsibility for the progress and 
344 Max Weber, 'Bnreaucracy', reprint of From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Edited & Translated by 
B.B.Gerth & C.Wright Hills, [1946], in Shafritz & Ott, Classics of Organization Theory, Jrd Edition, 
(1991), p.81. 
345 Cabinet Office, OPSS, Public Bodies 1994, (1995), para.5, p.v. 
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success of the Project. For example, whilst the Project Team is 
responsible for securing adequate resources for the Project, it has few 
resources of its own and little control over the spending of grants that 
have been awarded to other participating organisations. The role of the 
Project Team is primarily as a coordinating body, yet it remains 
responsible for the establishment of the GNF and, in common with other 
participating public bodies, has responsibilities which are divided to 
a level of complexity not formerly found in the public sector. 
Complex organisations, according to Bovens, are often the result 
of a combination of two or three of the elements of large scale, 
bureaucratic structures, and formal status. 346 They appear, he says, to 
have increased in number and social importance in this century and are 
characterised by 'many different functionaries, at various levels and in 
various measure', contributing to the policy and decisions of the 
organisation, making it 'extraordinarily difficult to determine who is 
responsible for the organisation's conduct in the last instance'. 347 
Responsibility and accountability pose particular difficulties for 
complex organisations which are organic in form and extend beyond the 
boundaries of the formal into a more diffuse wider organisation, as found 
in the GNF partnership. 
significance for the 
Moreover, these difficulties have a special 
public sector where responsibility and 
accountability form part of a wider democratic system. There is, in these 
arrangements, no single person in control and, to paraphrase Mill, no 
single person who can be given all the credit or all the blame for the 
Project. It is in this sense that the participating public bodies are 
'partially irresponsible', 348 a situation that Weber's ideal type 
bureaucracy sought to avoid. 
MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
The reform of government in the UK, particularly since 1979, has 
tended to focus on the control of resources and the introduction of 
business methods into the public sector, rather than on the organisation 
of departments and the machinery of government. This process began in the 
346 Bovens, The Ouest for Responsibility, (1998), p.IO. 
347 Ibid., pp.l3-4. 
348 Birch, Representative and Responsible Government, (1964), p.20. 
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1960s with the Fulton Committee's investigation into the Civil Service 
for the then Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Nevertheless, the process was 
taken much further by Mrs. Thatcher and has continued unabated ever since. 
The changes that have occurred within government are encapsulated by NPM 
and reflect both the contemporary, doctrinaire belief in business 
methods, and the move away from traditional Weberian ideas of 
administration that emphasised hierarchy and the functional division of 
tasks. It is argued that NPM deals with the 'constitutional fiction' of 
ministers being responsible for every action of their department by 
providing them with the tools to better manage their departments and 
ensure that value for money is obtained, whilst attending to their 
preferred role as policy advisers. 
It is asserted that NPM systems were introduced as a response to 
the increasing complexity of government arising from 'the growth in scale 
and scope of State activity' and the 'perceived lack of control and 
accountability' that accompanied it. 349 The foundations of 
accountability in the NPM are managerial and require, first, that 
responsibility for action should be devolved to clearly identified 
manageable units and, secondly, that those units should have clearly 
defined objectives and should be assessed according to how well they 
perform against them. The role of information in the process cannot be 
overstated. There is more of it for one thing, but more significantly it 
is also the means by which ministers judge whether value for money -
effectiveness, efficiency and economy - has been obtained by the 
manageable units for which they are accountable. It was, for example, the 
control of information that lay behind systems, like the management 
information system for ministers (MINIS), which were put in place 
following the Rayner scrutinies of 1979 to 1983. 350 However, two 
practical difficulties of applying managerial accountability have been 
found in this case study. The first concerns the flow of information in 
the system arising mainly from the organisational structure. The second, 
the quality of that information resulting from the procedures adopted and 
influenced by the behaviour of partners in the Project. 
349 Neil Carter, Rudolf Klein & Patricia Day, Bow Organisations Measure Success: The Use of Performance 
Indicators in Government, (London: Routledge, 1995), p.6. 
350 Greenwood & Wilson, Public Administration in Britain Today, (1989), p.125. 
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Information Flow 
Although there is less significance given to hierarchical methods 
of controlling organisations, hierarchy remains vital for the proper 
functioning of the public sector. Indeed it is hard to discern any 
fundamental difference in this respect between the organisational pattern 
demanded by the NPM and the traditional patterns that it attempts to 
replace. Weber's need to clearly specify the functions of offices that 
are themselves arranged in a clear hierarchy, sounds little different 
from NPM's emphasis on the clear statement of goals and clear assignment 
of responsibility. Bureaucracies may have become smaller and more 
fragmented, but hierarchy remains essential for the functional role it 
plays in providing the conduit through which information in the 
organisation flows and upon which accountability consequently depends. 
This study of the GNF raises important questions about the flow of 
information in projects which attempt to include community support and 
are implemented through partnership arrangements. First, the 
fragmentation of bureaucracies into smaller manageable units with more 
discretion over their activities means that they frequently operate at 
arm's length from ministers. Therefore, the lines of responsibility are 
often longer and more convoluted, impeding the information flow. 
Secondly, fragmentation also means that there are simply more public 
bodies to participate in the Project so information may not reach those 
that need it because of the confusion about who should receive it. For 
example, there are at least five government departments with an interest 
in the Project - the FC, DETR, MAFF, DNH and DfEE- and it may be unclear 
which of them should be informed about certain activities and progress 
with them. 
Information Quality 
Although each of the participating public bodies provide 
information about their activities in the GNF, it is the CC's monitoring 
reports which provide ministers with the data vital for them to assess 
performance. These reports, prepared annually, contain information 
relating to the indicators identified by the DETR and MAFF for monitoring 
progress in the CFs, together with substantial amounts of other data 
about the activities undertaken in the forest and their costs. The 
reports are presented to the relevant ministers at the departments with 
122 
responsibility for the CF programme, mainly the DETR and MAFF, for their 
assessment. However, study of the GNF raises concern about the quality 
of this information. 
First, the moni taring reports are incomplete because, although they 
contain much other data they mainly focus on seven indicators and three 
other criteria established by the DFEE and MAFF. Targets have not been 
properly identified even for these limited activities, a worrying 
omission. However, of most concern is the way that the monitoring reports 
primarily attend to outputs, a measure of effectiveness, at the expense 
of other aspects of value for money. Secondly, the data is fragmented and 
not presented in a systematic way, making it all but impossible to 
meaningfully compare progress made with individual forest projects or to 
estimate the cost incurred. Finally, some of the data in the monitoring 
reports is confusing to the extent that it may mislead ministers into 
overestimating the progress made by the project teams, and 
underestimating the cost to the public of the enterprise. 
The complexity, shortcomings and dispersion of information about 
the GNF also impinges on the openness of the Project because it makes it 
very difficult for the concerned citizen to establish what is being done. 
Though there may be no deliberate evasion, concerted effort is required 
to track down who has the relevant information about an aspect of the 
Project, secure and then interpret it. This is worrying since much of the 
reason for waste, extravagance and general overspending found in the 
Civil Service in the 1970s was attributed to inaction, obfuscation and 
secrecy. Openness, it was contended was the solution: 'I have learned by 
experience', said Leslie Chapman in 1978, 'that only if the deficiencies 
of the Civil Service are made public is there any prospect of change for 
the better'. 351 Yet, some 20 years later, it remains difficult for 
citizens to find out what is being undertaken on their behalf. The irony 
of this is that the reform of government over that same period has 
frequently been argued for on the basis of providing more information of 
better quality to rectify the problems of the past. 
351 Leslie Chapman, Your Disobedient Servant, (1979), p.7. 
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5.4. IMPLICATIONS OF NEW SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
In 1994, the Committee of Public Accounts began its report on The 
Proper Conduct of Public Business by saying that: 
In recent years we have seen and reported on a nUJber of serious failures in ad1inistrative and 
financial syste1s and controls within departments and other public bodies, which have led to 
money being wasted or otherwise i1properly spent. These failings represent a departure fro• the 
standards of public conduct which have tainly been established during the past 140 years. 352 
Amongst the failures which concerned the Committee were inadequate 
oversight, lack of clear lines of control and accountability, failure to 
hold individuals personally accountable for their action, the absence of 
regular reviews of expenditure programmes, concealing information, and 
failure in keeping adequate distance from the private sector. 353 These 
comments echo Leslie Chapman's 1978 analysis and have a resonance with 
the findings of this case study. There are two reasons for this. First, 
administration has been complicated by the proliferation of the number 
and types of public bodies in recent decades. Secondly, the limits of the 
public sector are blurred by the partial incorporation of the private and 
voluntary sectors into the public arena. Deficiencies in accountability 
are of concern in themselves; however, less obvious are the consequences 
of any shortcomings in accountability. It is argued here that 
difficulties of accountability restrict organisational learning and 
adaption, and may divert attention from how best to implement this and 
other sustainable development projects. 
PROLIFERATION 
There has been a proliferation of quasi-governmental public bodies 
in recent decades, arguably because they provide 'a vehicle for the 
incorporation of "New Public Management", with its alternative modes of 
accountability, into government'. 354 It is claimed that 'their 
352 Committee of Public Accounts (PAC), Eighth Report, The Proper Conduct of Public Business, (London: 
BHSO, 17/l/94), para.1, p.v. 
353 Ibid., Annex 1, pp.vi-viii. 
354 David Wilson, 'Quangos in the Skeletal State', F.F.Ridley & David Wilson (Eds), The Quango Debate, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.3. 
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influence is expanding at every level of government', 355 and there is 
growing concern about the use of these non-elected public bodies in the 
implementation of public policy. Such changes have, say Howard Davis and 
John Stewart, influenced the way that local communities are governed, 
resulting in 
a system ... in which responsibilities are increasingly frag1ented between different agencies and 
organisations governed by appointed or self-appointed members rather than elected 
representatives. 356 
The result is a confused and overlapping arrangement of hierarchies with 
little by way of democratic foundation. The proliferation of governmental 
bodies also has implications for coordination or 'the controlling of 
activities and decisions of individuals or agencies so that they are 
harmonized in the pursuit of some stated common goal or objective'. 357 
Paul Meyer has suggested that: 'Lack of co-ordination, or a cumbersome 
and protracted disintegrated co-ordination, may be the result if 
proliferation is carried to excess'. 358 Although managerial 
accountability attempts to counteract this by clearly identifying aims 
and objectives and those responsible for achieving them, this case study 
suggests that this may not be successful. 
The CC's monitoring reports tend to concentrate on the progress 
that has been made towards the objectives of the Project. Inevitably this 
leads participants to emphasise the successes by which they are judged 
and underplay activities that could in any way be interpreted as failure. 
The monitoring reports, for example, are packed with information, not all 
of which is entirely relevant to the progress of the Project or requested 
by the accountable departments. Moreover, successes like tree planting, 
which has chiefly been undertaken by local authorities and may have 
occurred in the absence of the CF programme, are often erroneously 
attributed to the Project Team. These differing accounts of performance 
355 Ibid., p.13. 
356 Howard Davis & John Stewart, The Growth of Government by Appointment: Implications for Local 
De1ocracy, (Luton: Local Govern•ent Management Board, 1995), p.3. 
357 J.Stanyer & B.Ssith, Ad1inistering Britain, (London: Fontana, 1976), p.157. 
358 Pool Meyer, 'Proliferation of Departments, Terminology of Departmentalization, and History of 
Regionalism', reprinted fro• Adlinistrative Organization: A Co1parative Study of the Organisation of 
Public Adlinistration, [1957), in Richard A.Chap1an & A.Dunsire (Rds), Style in Adlinistration, (1971), 
p.385. 
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are compounded by the difficulties in measuring performance. The 
moni taring reports do not include all outputs of the Project, nor do they 
include all the outcomes and unintended consequences whether good or bad. 
These difficulties in performance measurement raise questions about the 
functioning of managerial accountability in the GNF because it is not 
clear that ministers have appropriate or adequate information to oversee 
the manageable units for which they are responsible. 
In addition to objectives, ministers must also attend to goals or 
higher level activities which may be more general in nature. However, 
once again the monitoring reports may be inadequate for this purpose 
because they do not provide the systematic record of both the inputs and 
outputs of the programme essential for the evaluation of other dimensions 
of value for money like efficiency and economy. The effect of NPM and 
managerial accountability appears to be that more attention is given to 
the achievement of objectives than to the goal of establishing the GNF. 
Given that the high cost of the Project seems to far outweigh the 
benefits anticipated by the FC's cost-benefit analysis, economy, 
arguably, has not been properly considered. Similarly, efficiency is 
apparently compromised by the inadequate consideration given to whether 
the partnership approach continues to be superior to other methods like 
local authority implementation supported by direct grants. Institutional 
flexibility and capacity for self-correction have particular import in 
the pursuit of sustainable developmene 59 but may be overlooked in the 
GNF. As Bertrand Russell once said: 'There can be no final goal for human 
institutions; the best are those that most encourage progress towards 
others still better'. 360 
PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Perhaps the most important outcome of this research is that it 
focuses attention on the way sustainable development policy is being 
implemented in the UK. There is a clear tension between market and 
community and this is preserved rather than resolved in the partnership 
approach. In the partnership approach the tension reappears in the 
conflict between the public sector need for accountability and the 
3
.,
9 !ICED, Our Couon Future, (1987), p.65. 
360 Bertrand Rossell, Political Ideals, [1917], (London: Unwin Hyaan, 1977), p.17. 
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private sector desire for flexibility and entrepreneurship. There are 
obvious concerns about the proper spending of public money in such an 
environment because of basic differences in the aims of the public and 
private sectors. According to the Pearce Report, for example: 
Projects in the public sector should be assessed according to the goals and objectives of 
society as a whole. Projects in the private sector will be evaluated from the shareholder's 
perspective [and this] raises the possibility that private sector decisions will be 
incompatible with society's broader goals, that •private and social profit• will diverge. 361 
Moreover, despite the CC's claim that the Government's intention is to 
simply pump prime the CF programme, commentators like Marion Shoard are 
concerned that this will be subverted by private sector interests and 
negate some potential benefits: 
Eventually, foresters could come to take over the claim on the public purse on which farmers 
have so successfully relied. Many landowners would be delighted to replace CAP-funded barley 
with taxpayer-funded spruce. 362 
Tension in the implementation of sustainable development extends further 
because of conflict between the market and community action. The 
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft though 'interwoven in all kinds of 
associations' are, according to Tonnies, different in essence. 363 In 
the Gemeinschaft, he says, human beings 'remain essentially united in 
spite of all separating factors, whereas in the Gesellschaft they are 
essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors'. 364 Even the 
most discursive consideration of rational choice theory suggests that 
Mancur Olsen's proposition that 'rational, self-interested individuals 
will not act to achieve their common or group interests', 365 may have 
particular relevance for the implementation of sustainable development 
projects like the GNF. It is very likely that the most rational of 
individuals will be averse to participating because they will receive the 
benefits of a common good like the Forest anyway - the so-called free-
361 Pearce, Markandya & Barbier, Blueprint for a Green Economy, (1989), p.120. 
362 Marion Shoard, 'Woodman, spare us this cash demand', The Times, 16/2/91. 
363 Tonnies, Community and Association, [1887], (1955), p.18. 
364 Ibid., p.74. 
365 Mancor Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Second Edition, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1971 ), p.2. 
127 
rider problem. People may also refuse to contribute because of the 
presence of private companies which, they believe, will act in the most 
rational and self-interested of ways and will take advantage of their 
voluntary and unpaid work. Furthermore, the complexity and lack of 
openness of the administrative arrangements found in the GNF may act as 
a barrier to participation, presenting a real contradiction in the 
community or partnership model. 
In final conclusion it is worth drawing attention to the democratic 
weaknesses of the current methods of implementing sustainable 
development. The e.xtensi ve nature of reforms in government mean, to 
borrow from Harold Laksi, that 'it is still more urgent that the forms 
of the state assume such a shape that the power of government, at every 
point, be made responsible' . 366 It is argued that the partnership 
approach, which plays a significant role in the GNF, has 'served to 
exacerbate long term trends towards the erosion of local political 
structures and processes within the British state'. 367 The role of 
accountability is, therefore, not merely to prevent waste, extravagance 
mismanagement or corruption in the Civil Service. it underpins the 
democratic foundations of our society. It is vital for ensuring the trust 
of citizens in their government, that their rights are defended and that 
they have the confidence to commit themselves to this vitally important 
area of public policy. 
366 Harold J.Laksi, A Grammar of Politics, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1941), p.38. 
367 Keith Shaw, 'The Politics of Public-Private Partnership in Tyne and Wear', Northern Economic Review, 
Summer 1990, No.19, p.8. 
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Doctrine 
'Bands-on professional 1anagement' 
in the public sector 
Appendix 4. 
NPJII Doctrines 
Meaning Justification 
Active, visible, discretionary Accountability requires clear 
control of organizations from named assignment of responsibility for 
persons at the top, 'free to action not diffusion of power 
manage' 
Explicit standards and measures of Definition of goals, targets, 
perfor11ance indicators of success, preferably 
expressed in quantitative terms, 
especially for professional 
services 
Accountability requires clear 
state.11ent of goals, efficiency 
requires 'hard look' at objectives 
Greater eaphasis on output controls Resource allocation and rewards 
linked to aeasured perfor1ance; 
breakup of centralized bureaucracy-
wide personnel manageaent 
Need to stress results rather than 
procedures 
Shift to disaggregation of units in 
the public sector 
Break up of formerly 'monolithic' 
units, unbundling of unifor• 
management systems into 
corporatized units around products, 
operating on decentralized 'one-
line' budgets and dealing with one 
another on an 'arts-length' basis 
Need to create 'manageable' units, 
separate provision and production 
interests, gain efficiency 
advantages of use of contract or 
franchise arrangements inside as 
well as outside the public sector 
Shift to greater co1petition in Hove to ter1 contracts and public Rivalry as the key to lower costs 
public sector tendering procedures and better standards 
Stress on private-sector styles of 
manage1ent practice 
Stress on greater discipline and 
parsimony in resource use 
Hove away fro• .llilitary-style Need to use 'proven' private sector 
'public service ethic', greater manageaent tools in the public 
flexibility in hiring and rewards; sector 
greater use of PR techniques 
Cutting direct costs, ms1ng Need to check resource demands of 
labour discipline, resisting union public sector and 'do more with 
demands, liJiting 'compliance less' 
costs' to business 
Table taken fro• Hood, 'A Public Manage1ent for All Seasons?', (1991), pp.4-5. 
Appendix 5. 
FORESTRY AUTHORITY WOODLAND GRANT SCHEME 
PLANTING IN THE GREAT NORTH FOREST (Hectares) 
LOCAL 
AUTHORITY 
GATESHEAD 
Broad leaves 
Coniferous 
Shrubs 
SUNDERLAND 
Broadleaves 
Coniferous 
Shrubs 
EASING TON 
Broad leaves 
Coniferous 
Shrubs 
CHESTER LE 
STREET 
Broad leaves 
Coniferous 
Shrubs 
DURHAM 
Broad leaves 
Coniferous 
Shrubs 
DER WENTSIDE 
Broad leaves 
Coniferous 
Shrubs 
S TYNESIDE 
Broadleaves 
Coniferous 
Shrubs 
199(1 
11.4 
1.2 
-
6.2 
0.8 
-
-
-
-
6.6 
5.2 
-
-
-
-
2.0 
0.9 
-
1.3 
-
-
1991 199g 
31.21 9.94 
2.15 0.10 
3.34 0.93 
2.17 1.75 
- -
.08 -
- -
- -
- -
16.1 23.08 
0.5 2.96 
-
0.22 
- 0.54 
- -
- 0.06 
1.10 9.84 
- 10.36 
- 1.90 
- -
- -
- -
PLANTING YEAR 
199t.. 199j" HAs TREES 
26.93 17.47 96.95 17451 
- 2.12 5.57 12532 
1.89 0.70 6.86 12348 
11.77 4.00 25.89 46602 
- - 0.8 1800 
- - 0.8 1440 
0.5 - 0.5 900 
- - - -
- - - -
1.20 2.06 49.04 88272 
- 1.34 10.00 22500 
-
0.25 0.47 846 
6.9 2.12 9.56 17208 
1.0 - 1.0 2250 
- -
0.06 1350 
155 4.65 18.14 32652 
0.84 1.5 13.6 30600 
- 0.55 2.45 4410 
- - 1.3 2340 
- - - -
- - - -
Grand Totals: 1990- 1994 (Trees/Shrubs) 
Broadleaves 205,45.2 
Grand Totals: 1990 - 1994 (Hectares) 
242.99 broadleaves, conifers & shrubs 
Coniferous 69,682 
Shrubs 20,394 
Total Number of Trees/Shrubs: (1990 -1994) 295.528 
NB. The stocking density of trees/shrubs can vary for scheme to scheme: II 00 to 2500 
per hectare. (I Ha = 2.47 acres) 
Assume an average of 1800 for broadleaves and shrubs per hectare. 
Assume an average of 2250 for conifers per hectare. 
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